Mandeville and Hume:
anatomists of civil society

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Cover illustration: *The Leiden anatomical theatre*, engraving by Bartholomeus Dolendo after Jan Cornelis van't Woud (Johannes Woudanus), 1609, RP-P-1887-A-12041, by permission of the Rijksmuseum. [Mandeville studied medicine at Leiden. His description of the work of an anatomist of civil society in the preface to the *Fable of the bees* inspired Hume to draw a famous distinction between an anatomist and a painter of morals].

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To Mushi

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Abbreviations and conventions

The following abbreviations and short-title references are used throughout the book:

BL	British Library, London
Bodl.	Bodleian Library, Oxford
CUL	University Library, Cambridge
EHU	David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning human understanding*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford, 2000)
EPM	David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford, 1998)
Hobbes, *Leviathan*	Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford, 2012)
Hume, *Essays*	David Hume, *Essays: moral, political and literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller, second edn (Indianapolis, IN, 1987)
Hume, *Letters*	David Hume, *The Letters of David Hume*, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford, 1932)
Hume, *New letters*	David Hume, *New letters of David Hume*, ed. Raymond Klibansky and Ernest C. Mossner (Oxford, 1954)
Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*	Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees, or Private vices, publick benefits*, with a commentary critical, historical and explanatory by F. B. Kaye (1924; Indianapolis, IN, 1988), vol.1
Mandeville, *Part II*	Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees, or Private vices, publick benefits*, with a commentary critical, historical and explanatory by F. B. Kaye (1924; Indianapolis, IN, 1988), vol.2
NLS	National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh
T	David Hume, *A Treatise of human nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford, 2007)

References to Hume's works follow the standard method of the Hume Society. I am citing the *Treatise* in accordance with the

policy, where both the Clarendon edition of the works of David Hume and the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch (SBN) edition are cited. The editors of the Clarendon edition of the works of David Hume have attached a number to every paragraph, and refer to particular pages by a series of Arabic numerals. Thus, 'T 3.1.1.9' refers to the *Treatise* III i 1, at SBN 458. (My citing of the previous example would be 'T 3.1.1.9; SBN 458'.) When I refer to this work in the text, I use either *A Treatise of human nature* or the *Treatise*. I cite *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* following a similar principle, citing the paragraph from the Clarendon edition and indicating the corresponding page in the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch (SBN) edition. When I have seen it necessary to modify the use of standard editions of Hume's works (including his *Essays*), I refer to the original edition in the footnotes.

When I specifically refer to an editor's commentary of a particular work, I refer to him instead of the author. For example, F. B. Kaye's introduction to his edition of *The Fable of the bees* would be cited: Kaye, *The Fable of the bees*, p.xvii-cxlvi. The same style applies to other editors and their commentary including the footnotes of the edited work.

Since it was customary in the eighteenth century to refer to 'a man' as a universal, instead of 'an individual' or 'she/he', I have not attempted to change all the uses of pronouns into terms that are impersonal or gender-neutral.

All emphasis in quotes is in the original, unless specified that it has been added.

1. Introduction: Sociability and sceptical sentimentalism

David Hume attempted to become a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh in 1745.[1] He was not appointed to the Chair of Ethics and Pneumatic Philosophy and he never had an academic career.[2] Such is life, of course.[3] University chairs in eighteenth-century Scotland were political appointments and Hume was supported by a declining regime.[4] There were also doubts about his willingness to lecture on religious issues, and he probably was not exceedingly eager to spend his days tutoring very young boys.[5]

1. M. A. Stewart, *The Kirk and the infidel* (Lancaster, 1995); Roger Emerson, 'The "affair" at Edinburgh and the "project" at Glasgow: the politics of Hume's attempts to become a professor' in *Hume and Hume's connexions*, ed. M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright (Edinburgh, 1994), p.1-22 and Richard Sher, 'Professors of virtue: the social history of the Edinburgh moral philosophy chair', in *Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990), p.87-126.
2. For complimentary accounts of Hume's early intellectual development, see M. A. Stewart, 'Hume's intellectual development, 1711-1752', in *Impressions of Hume*, ed. Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail (Oxford, 2005), p.11-58; Roger Emerson, 'Our excellent and never to be forgotten friend: David Hume', in *Essays on David Hume, medical men and the Scottish Enlightenment* (Surrey, 2009), p.81-91; Emerson, 'Hume's intellectual development: part II', in *Essays on David Hume, medical men and the Scottish Enlightenment*, p.103-25 and John P. Wright, *Hume's 'A Treatise of human nature': an introduction* (Cambridge, 2009), p.11-39.
3. For a balanced overview of Hume's career, see James Harris, 'Hume's intellectual development: an overview', *Occasional papers of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities* (Edinburgh, 2011) and Harris, 'Hume's life and works: an overview', in *Oxford handbook of David Hume*, ed. Paul Russell (Oxford, forthcoming). For an analysis of Hume's metaphysical scepticism and early intellectual development, see Peter Millican, 'Hume's chief argument', in *Oxford handbook of David Hume*, ed. Paul Russell (Oxford, forthcoming). See also Emilio Mazza, 'Hume's life, intellectual context and reception', in *The Continuum companion to Hume*, ed. Alan Bailey and Dan O'Brien (London, 2012), p.20-37.
4. For a political explanation of Hume's unsuccessful attempt to obtain a professorship supported by Coutts and other Argathelians in the town council, see also Roger Emerson, *Academic patronage in the Scottish Enlightenment: Glasgow, Edinburgh and St Andrews University* (Edinburgh, 2008), p.341.
5. On life at the University in eighteenth-century Scotland, see M. A. Stewart,

Scholars have emphasised Hume's unorthodox religious views when explaining this episode. But after Hume had (in his own words) castrated the noble parts of the manuscript of his *Treatise* and cut out at least one part on miracles and maybe another on evil, there was little reason why his mitigated scepticism could not have been seen to advance the interests of moderate clergymen in eighteenth-century Edinburgh. Eighteenth-century Scottish thinking in general was not profoundly irreligious, and sought to reconcile, for example, sceptical tendencies in philosophy with natural religion.[6] Hume did not engage in biblical exegetics that left a University of Edinburgh student, Thomas Aikenhead, hanging by his neck in 1697, and his interventions in religious matters in the *Treatise* were indirect and fairly modest compared, for example, to D'Holbach, Helvétius and Diderot.[7] Only after the Edinburgh affair in 1745 did Hume engage more clearly in theological disputes in his *Philosophical essays*.[8]

Consequently, there is 'an elephant in the room' regarding this Edinburgh professorship that has significance for the history of philosophy. If it was not because of religious views, why did Francis Hutcheson oppose Hume's candidacy? Ever since the 1920s, Hutcheson has been seen as Hume's guiding light on the

'The curriculum in Britain, Ireland and the colonies', in *The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century philosophy*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge, 2006), p.97-120 and Michael Barfoot, 'Hume and the culture of science in the early eighteenth century', in *Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990), p.151-90.

6. James Harris, 'Answering Bayle's question: religious belief in the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment', in *Oxford studies in early modern philosophy*, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Oxford, 2003), p.229-54. For a useful treatment of Hutcheson's views on religion, pagan virtues and doubts about ancient philosophy, including the Stoics, see Thomas Ahnert, 'Francis Hutcheson and the heathen moralists', *Journal of Scottish philosophy* 8 (2010), p.51-62.
7. On religious issues, see also David Hume, *A Letter from a gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh* (Edinburgh, 1745).
8. M. A. Stewart, 'Two species of philosophy: the historical significance of the first *Enquiry*', in *Reading Hume on human understanding*, ed. Peter Millican (Oxford, 2002), p.67-95. For a contrasting interpretation of the role of irreligion in the *Treatise* to what I am suggesting, see Paul Russell, *The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: skepticism, naturalism and irreligion* (Oxford, 2008), p.12-23, 47-57, 204-22, 267-89.

question of morals, and the general view is that initially there was a warm relationship between these two philosophers in the manner of an older professor passing the torch to his protégée. For example, J. Y. T. Greig wrote a letter to J. M. Keynes in 1928 emphatically stressing the significant role that Hutcheson played in Hume's life and assuming that 'Hume was rather hurt when Hutcheson, cautious man, declined to support his candidature for the Chair of Ethics and Pneumatic Philosophy in Edinburgh'.[9] This conception was reinforced in the 1940s because of Norman Kemp Smith's influential work.[10] It is common to underline that 'there can be no doubt but that Hume's moral theory had roots in the writings of Francis Hutcheson'.[11] Particularly in the confines of Hume studies over the past thirty years, David Fate Norton's argument that 'Hume's moral theory' should 'be seen as part of this antisceptical moral tradition' of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and like-minded philosophers has shaped the way people read and think about Book 3 of Hume's *Treatise*.[12] In current

9. J. Y. T. Greig to J. M. Keynes, 25 June 1928, Cambridge University, King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, JMK/PP/87/24/11. This has since become a traditional interpretation of Hume and Hutcheson; for example, E. J. Hundert writes that Hume was 'Hutcheson's pupil and friend'; see Hundert, *The Enlightenment's fable: Bernard Mandeville and the discovery of society* (Cambridge, 1994), p.82.
10. For Kemp Smith's opinion, see his *The Philosophy of David Hume: a critical study of its origins and central doctrines* (London, 1941), p.12-52. On the 1940s view of Hutcheson's influence on the Scottish Enlightenment and Hume, see also Gladys Bryson, *Man and society: the Scottish inquiry of the eighteenth century* (Princeton, NJ, 1945), p.8.
11. Peter Kivy, 'Hume's standard of taste: breaking the circle', *British journal of aesthetics* 7 (1967), p.57. See also, for example, Duncan Forbes, *Hume's philosophical politics* (Cambridge, 1975), p.32, and T. D. Campbell, 'Francis Hutcheson: "Father" of the Scottish Enlightenment', in *The Origins and nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. R. H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh, 1982), p.167.
12. David Fate Norton, *David Hume: common-sense moralist, sceptical metaphysician* (Princeton, NJ, 1982), p.43. See also, David Fate Norton and Manfred Kuehn, 'The foundations of morality', in *The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century philosophy*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge, 2006), p.939-86. Norton has emphasised that Kemp Smith and others overlook the religious differences between Hutcheson and Hume. I do not think that this was the major issue at stake. Hence, I see no difficulties interpreting Norton in the same line of scholarship as Kemp Smith regarding Hume's moral theory.

scholarship there is a tendency to embellish the role of sympathy and the moral point of view, and to suggest that Book 3 of Hume's *Treatise* should be read as prescriptive moral theory.[13] I argue that this was not Hume's intention. One aim of this study is to show that the significance of sympathy in its Hutchesonian sense regarding the development and existence of civil society in Hume's thinking has been overstated, while other central concepts are neglected.[14]

Hutcheson's works had, of course, an important role in Hume's intellectual development. But Hume, as I maintain in this book, belonged to a different line of thought where the idea of sociability was similarly that human minds function as mirrors to each other, contradicting rationalist accounts of morals. This sceptical thread of sentimentalism stood in almost diametrical opposition to Hutcheson's understanding of benevolent human nature and disinterested love towards human beings. An example of this juxtaposition is that in Hutcheson's system political organisation is required because moral sense can at times be impaired, in the same way that vision can be blurred without there being anything wrong with the faculty. Moral institutions, such as justice, help our natural moral sense to function, but the institution of laws does not constitute our respect for other people's property. For Hume, in contrast, in a crucial sense it does, even when the mechanism of sympathy explains how people are public-minded, and how in extreme

13. For a corresponding interpretation that a person ought to judge his or her actions from a corrective moral perspective, see Katie Abramson, 'Sympathy and Hume's spectator-centred theory of virtue', in *Blackwell companion to Hume*, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe (Oxford, 2008), p.240-56. The diminishing role of sympathy in the transition from *Treatise* to the *Second Enquiry* is a standard question in Hume scholarship. For a recent contribution, see Remy Debes, 'Humanity, sympathy and the puzzle of Hume's second Enquiry', *British journal for the history of philosophy* 15 (2007), p.27-57. On the extensive role given to sympathy, see Jennifer A. Herdt, *Religion and faction in Hume's moral philosophy* (Cambridge, 1997), p.17-81.
14. For a balanced account of sympathy, see especially Luigi Turco, 'Sympathy and moral sense: 1725-1740', *British journal for the history of philosophy* 7 (1999), p.79-101 and Turco, *Lo Scetticismo morale di David Hume* (Bologna, 1984). On Hume and sympathy, see also Tony Pitson, 'Sympathy and other selves', *Hume studies* 22 (1996), p.255-72.

cases one might even come to hate oneself for lacking certain approvable qualities in one's character.[15]

I see political philosophy as the main string of Book 3 of Hume's *Treatise* – what keeps it together. Hume's analysis of civil society cannot be understood from a perspective of modern ethical theory because the contrast that Hume draws between small and large societies diminishes the role of free-standing ethical principles. It is possible for a man in small society to grasp what is his 'enlightened self-interest' regarding the question of respecting other people's property, but in large society the relevance of agent-oriented moral perspective is narrowed down considerably because of human nature. I interpret the interrelated fundamental difference in moral and political philosophy as the main reason why Hutcheson's attitude towards Hume was dismissive and why he, according to Hume, blamed him for lacking warmth in the cause of virtue.

Hume and Hutcheson did not know one another personally before 1739 and Hutcheson indicated that he did not have a real interest in metaphysical questions in 1739, which puts even more emphasis on his views of Hume's moral philosophy.[16] Hutcheson played a significant role in the affair of the Edinburgh professorship.[17] Having been asked to provide a list of people he con-

15. For relevance of character and virtues as character traits and an excellent account of justice in accordance with other social conventions, see Annette Baier, *The Cautious jealous virtue: Hume on justice* (Cambridge, MA, 2010), p.123-48.
16. Francis Hutcheson to David Hume [*c.* April 1739], published in Ian Ross, 'Hutcheson on Hume's *Treatise*: an unnoticed letter', *Journal of the history of philosophy* 4 (1966), p.69-72. For two excellent contributions revealing how in the crucial question of association of ideas Hume differs from Hutcheson, see Michael Gill, 'Fantastick associations and addictive general rules: a fundamental difference between Hutcheson and Hume', *Hume Studies* 22 (1996), p.23-48 and M. Gill, 'Nature and association in the moral theory of Francis Hutcheson', *History of philosophy quarterly* 12 (1995), p.281-301.
17. On Edinburgh, see also Nicholas Phillipson, 'Culture and society in the eighteenth-century province: the case of Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment', in *The University in society*, ed. Lawrence Stone (Princeton, NJ, 1974), vol.2, p.407-48, and Emerson, *Academic patronage*, p.211-363. On the relevance of the professorship affair regarding Hutcheson and Hume's moral philosophy, see also John Robertson, 'Hume, David (1711-1776)', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004) and Stewart, 'Hume's intellectual development, 1711-1752', p.45.

sidered fit for the chair of moral philosophy, he gave the names of seven candidates, none of them called David Hume.[18] Hutcheson probably wrote a letter to his publisher suggesting that he publish Book 3 of the *Treatise* having received a letter from Hume about this matter.[19] Nevertheless, this lack of support in 1745 raises a crucial question about Hutcheson and Hume's relationship in terms of whether, in the light of their existing correspondence, there was any real friendship or torch-passing going on, or whether it was a matter of the slender bond between two philosophers falling very rapidly apart because of an unbridgeable gulf in their approach to morals.[20]

James Moore has based his œuvre on the difference between Hume and Hutcheson, characterising Hume as an Epicurean thinker in contrast to Hutcheson's Stoicism.[21] This seemed a useful characterisation at first, followed in splendid fashion by John Robertson who added a contextual touch to the argument in his *Case for the Enlightenment*. However, the discussion has now degenerated into a debate about labels and there is a risk of not seeing the wood for the trees.[22] I do not think it is very helpful to

18. See also M. A. Stewart, 'Principal Wishart (1692-1753) and the controversies of his day', *Records of the Scottish Church History Society* 30 (2000), p.60-102.
19. On Hutcheson recommending Hume's Book 3 to be published by Thomas Longman, see David Hume to Francis Hutcheson, 16.III 1740, *Letters*, vol.1, p.37.
20. James Moore, 'Hume and Hutcheson', in *Hume and Hume's connexions*, ed. M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright (Philadelphia, PA, 1995), p.23-57. See also Moore, 'Hutcheson, Francis (1694-1746)', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004) and Moore, 'The eclectic stoic, the mitigated skeptic', in *New essays on David Hume*, ed. Emilio Mazza and Emanuele Ronchetti (Milan, 2007), p.133-70. Norton interprets Hutcheson's opposition to Hume in 1745 regarding the nature of their moral philosophy in diametrically opposite way. David Fate Norton, 'Hume and Hutcheson: the question of influence', in *Oxford studies in early modern philosophy*, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Oxford, 2005), vol.2, p.234.
21. James Moore, 'Hume's theory of justice and property', *Political studies* 24 (1976), p.103-19; Moore, 'Hume's political science and the classical republican tradition', *Canadian journal of political science* 10 (1977), p.809-39 and Moore, 'The social background of Hume's science of human nature', in *McGill Hume studies: studies in Hume and Scottish philosophy*, ed. David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi and Wade L. Robinson (San Diego, CA, 1979), p.23-42. See also John Robertson, 'The Scottish contribution to the Enlightenment', in *The Scottish Enlightenment: essays in re-interpretation*, ed. Paul Wood (Rochester, NY, 2000), p.47.
22. On this, see Luigi Turco, 'Hume and Hutcheson in a recent polemic', in *New essays on David Hume*, ed. Emilio Mazza and Emanuele Ronchetti (Milan, 2007), p.171-98.

conduct a serious dispute about what is real Epicureanism or neo-Epicureanism.[23] This book is intended as a direct intervention in this matter. I do not attempt to settle the question of Hume's neo-Epicureanism or neo-Augustinianism (I use neither of these related terms and I will soon explain why). I offer an account of the development of artificial virtues in Hume (that is *de facto* limited to his *Treatise of human nature* because he does not use the phrase 'artificial virtue' in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*), and how the young Hume's moral and political thought can be interpreted in the context of Bernard Mandeville's intellectual development.

This book is entitled *Mandeville and Hume: anatomists of civil society* because Mandeville and Hume identified their projects of conjectural history of civil society under a similar category. They both employed an anatomical analogue of cutting up carcasses (Mandeville) and pulling off the skin, and displaying all the minute parts (Hume) – revealing something trivial, if not hideous, even in the noblest attitudes – when making a distinction between anatomists and painters of morals.[24] Moreover, Hume borrowed his 'anatomist identity' from the *Fable of the bees*, implying that he sees his own moral and political philosophy belonging to the same tradition as Mandeville, who had studied medicine at Leiden and sat in its anatomical theatre.[25] I hope that studying the relationship between the later works of Mandeville (who was, of course, Hutcheson's nemesis) and the

23. In the manner of David Fate Norton, 'Hume and Hutcheson: the question of influence', p.211-56. See, however, Christopher Brooke, *Philosophic pride: Stoicism and political thought from Lipsius to Rousseau* (Princeton, NJ, 2012), p.149-202; Hans Blom, 'The Epicurean motif in Dutch notions of sociability in the seventeenth century', in *Epicurus in the Enlightenment*, ed. Neven Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz (*SVEC* 2009:12), p.31-51 and James Harris, 'The Epicurean in Hume', in *Epicurus in the Enlightenment*, ed. Neven Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz (*SVEC* 2009:12), p.161-81.
24. For a different interpretation of the anatomist and painter of morals that puts an emphasis on the role of metaphysics, see Stewart, 'Two species of philosophy', p.67-95.
25. For further discussion and how Hume's phrase 'anatomist of morals' is borrowed directly from Mandeville's *Fable of the bees*, p.3-4, see below p.153-57.

early work of Hume will turn over a new page in the scholarship in two respects. Not only will I cast more serious doubt on the idea that Hutcheson was Hume's gateway to morals, I will demonstrate Mandeville's positive influence on Hume and the history of moral and political philosophy in general, offering at the same time an alternative view of some major issues that have fundamentally affected how we understand eighteenth-century European moral and political thought.[26] It must be pointed out that this kind of intellectual effort needs to be balanced with a social historical approach. To understand, for example, the relevance of Mandeville and Hume for the development of modern ideas of civility, we need to also comprehend the impact that these authors had on their contemporaries, which, however, is beyond the scope of this book.[27]

Mandeville and Hume scholarship

I claim in this work that Book 3 of Hume's *Treatise* is a Mandevillean account of civil society, but emphasise that 'Mandevillean' is not to be interpreted in its usual meaning of Hobbism or selfish theory. The focus is on Mandeville's intellectual development and his later works, published in 1729 and 1732, when, according to his own testimony, Hume's thinking took its most dramatic turns.

My interest in Mandeville is in how his thinking evolved into his sophisticated analysis of political society that is crucial in terms of understanding Hume's account of political sociability in his *Treatise*.[28] Scholars nowadays consider Mandeville, in some sense, Hume's predecessor, but even specialists interested in Hume's political theory take him only to offer 'a picture of society' that is no more than a 'grumbling hive' of 'avaricious self-promoters', in

26. This book is meant to continue on a similar path, although with a different focus, as F. B. Kaye, 'The influence of Bernard Mandeville', *Studies in philology* 19 (1922), p 83-108, and E. J. Hundert, 'Bernard Mandeville and the Enlightenment's maxims of modernity', *Journal of the history of ideas* 56 (1995), p.577-93.
27. For such efforts, see Mark Spencer, *David Hume and eighteenth-century America* (Rochester, NY, 2005) and Mark Towsey, *Reading the Scottish Enlightenment: books and their readers in provincial Scotland 1750-1820* (Leiden, 2010).
28. For new discoveries on Mandeville, follow Arne Jansen's website at www.bernard-mandeville.nl.

contrast to Hume's more complex view of civility.[29] In this book I aim to show how reading the *Treatise* in the context of Mandeville's later works, in which civility is understood quite differently than in the original *Fable of the bees*, will greatly enhance understanding of Hume's theory of civil society.

There is evidence that Hume read and followed Mandeville's later works in his writings before the *Treatise* during the 1730s, a crucial time for his intellectual development. Hume wrote his first known essay on the 'origin of modern honour'. It was modelled after Mandeville's *An Enquiry into the origin of honour, and the usefulness of Christianity in war*.[30] John P. Wright has drawn attention also to the fact that Hume's description of his condition of 'disease of the learned' in the famous letter to a doctor in 1734 resembles passages of Mandeville's *A Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick passions*.[31] Hume also paid tribute to Mandeville in identifying him as his predecessor in the introduction to his *Treatise* and also in the *Abstract*, at a time when naming him alongside Shaftesbury, Butler and Hutcheson was a controversial move, given the polemics surrounding Mandeville's name.[32]

The idea of a Mandevillean influence on Hume is by no means original, but with the exception of John Robertson and John P. Wright there have so far been few systematic or serious studies on

29. Neil McArthur, *David Hume's political theory: law, commerce and the constitution of government* (Toronto, 2007), p.3.
30. (London, printed for John Brotherton, 1732). On this, see the discussion below and John P. Wright, 'Hume on the origin of "modern honour": a study in Hume's philosophical development', in *Philosophy and religion in Enlightenment Britain. New case studies*, ed. Ruth Savage (Oxford, 2012), p.187-204.
31. (London, printed for the author, 1711). John P. Wright, *The Sceptical realism of David Hume* (Minneapolis, MN, 1983), p.190-91, 236-37, and Wright, 'Dr George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay and Hume's *Letter to a physician*', *Hume studies* 29 (2003), p.139 n.44. On the letter to the physician, and essay on modern honour, see also Wright, *Hume's 'A Treatise of human nature'*, p.8-19. On conjectural history and the role of Mandeville for Hume, see Michael Gill, 'Hume's progressive view of human nature', *Hume studies* 26 (2000), p.87-108. See also Simon Evnine, 'Hume, conjectural history, and the uniformity of human nature', *Journal of the history of philosophy* 31 (1993), p.589-606.
32. T Introduction 7; SBN xvii and T Abstract.2; SBN 646. On the *Abstract*, see J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa, 'Introduction', in David Hume, *An Abstract of 'A Treatise of human nature, 1740', a pamphlet hitherto unknown* (Cambridge, 1938), p.v-xxxii.

the matter.[33] Moreover, most commentators do not take into consideration Mandeville's intellectual development, or the fact that his thinking was not a unified defence of Hobbist principles or a version of the selfish theory.[34] There is a tendency, after acknowledging some similarities between Mandeville and Hume, to add that Hume attempted to 'partially rebut well-known views of Hobbes and Mandeville, in which self-love or self-preservation are seen as the primary motive for engagement in social and political relations'.[35] Among Hume scholars, in particular, it has been common to depict Mandeville as a representative of 'out-and-out scepticism' who thought that 'moral rules' had been 'invented by moralists and politicians'.[36] I maintain that Hume

33. John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760* (Cambridge, 2005), p.256-324. Michael Gill points out that regarding artificiality of justice Hume is Mandevillean; see Gill, 'Hume's progressive view of human nature', p.90. See also Gill, *The British moralists on human nature and the birth of secular ethics* (Cambridge, 2006), where Gill is more concerned to discuss the aspects of theology and Hume's secularism, p.201-70. See also, Gill, 'Shaftesbury's two accounts of the reason to be virtuous', *Journal of the history of philosophy* 38 (2000), p.529-48 and Gill, 'A philosopher in the closet: reflexivity and justification in Hume's moral theory', *Canadian journal of philosophy* 26 (1996), p.231-56.
34. For discussions of the 'Mandevillean side of Hume', see for example, A. B. Stilz, 'Hume, modern patriotism and commercial society', *History of European ideas* 29 (2003), p.22; Jerrold Seigel, 'Self-centeredness and sociability: Mandeville and Hume', in *The Idea of self: thought and experience in Western Europe since the seventeenth century* (Cambridge, 2005), p.111-39; M. M. Goldsmith, 'Liberty, virtue, and the rule of law, 1689-1770', in *Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649-1776*, ed. David Wootton (Stanford, CA, 1994), p.218-19; Dario Castilgone, 'Considering things minutely: reflections on Mandeville and the eighteenth-century science of man', *History of political thought* 7 (1986), p.463-88; Reinhard Brandt, 'The beginnings of Hume's philosophy', in *David Hume: bicentenary papers*, ed. G. P. Morice (Edinburgh, 1977), p.117-25 and Andrea Branchi, *Introduzione a Mandeville* (Roma-Bari, 2004). See also Hans Lottenbach, 'Monkish virtues, artificial lives: on Hume's genealogy of morals', *Canadian journal of philosophy* 26 (1996), p.367-88.
35. Stilz, 'Hume, modern patriotism and commercial society', p.17-18. See also Moore, 'The social background of Hume's science of human nature', p.40.
36. David Miller, *Philosophy and ideology in Hume's political thought* (Oxford, 1981), p.41, 116. See also M. A. Box, *The Suasive art of David Hume* (Princeton, NJ, 1990), p.243. On Mandevillean egoism, see also Box, *The Suasive art of David Hume*, p.245, 253. For a contrast, see Antony Flew, *David Hume: philosopher of moral science* (London, 1986), p.159. For a recent, perceptive reading of Hume's relationship to scepticism, see Dario Castiglione, 'Hume's two views of modern scepticism', *History of European ideas* 32 (2006), p.1-16.
37. For a more elaborated explanation of how 'Hobbism' is discussed in this book and how *it is not* used with a necessary reference to Thomas Hobbes, see chapter 2, p.41-45, 51-53.
38. Regarding the emphasis placed on the relevance of language and politics in Mandeville, see E. J. Hundert, 'The thread of language and the web of dominion: Mandeville to Rousseau and back', *Eighteenth-century studies* 21 (1987-1988), p.169-91. On the important topic of Mandeville and language, see also F. B. Kaye, 'Mandeville on the origin of language', *Modern language notes* 39 (1924), p.136-42 and Rüdiger Schreyer, 'Condillac, Mandeville and the origin of language', *Historiographia linguistica* 5 (1978), p.15-43.

argues in his *Treatise* that real moral distinctions exist, and soundly refutes what had been advanced in the original *Fable of the bees* on the matter. However, his relationship with Mandeville and how Mandeville changed his mind regarding this in his later works are complicated questions. Making sense of them is one of the purposes of this book.

There was a clear and crucial development in Mandeville's philosophy. What began partly as a polemical Hobbist account turned into an original social theory, but this could not have happened without a revision of the initial premise. The original *Fable* is a Hobbist work in that Mandeville uses a strict, Jansenist category of virtue that proves impossible to live by, which then leads him to make remarks on how seemingly benevolent actions can be reduced to self-interest and on how moral distinctions are not real, but invented.[37] In the grand scheme of things, the question of how morality was invented is a mere detail.[38] Moreover, whether or not some, or even most, of the elements constituting his theory of the social evolution of moral institutions in his later works are present in the original *Fable* is beside the point. One debate in Mandeville scholarship concerns whether the role of politicians in the original *Fable* is concrete or symbolic. Many of the best Mandeville scholars, including Maurice Goldsmith, have defended the view that Mandeville is not a Hobbist in the original *Fable*, but when we take into consideration what he says, for example, in the *Female tatler*, we should realise that Mandeville is already visibly developing his evolutionary social theory. Although I find Goldsmith's account useful, I disagree about the general interpretation because it

misses the actual intellectual development that takes place in Mandeville.[39] J. A. W. Gunn has pointed out with a reference to Goldsmith's works that there are several occasions when Mandeville uses the term 'politician' in a narrow, instead of symbolic, sense.[40] I argue that although his characters use the *Fable* as the basis of their discussion in the dialogues of *Part II*, and Cleomenes (who often expresses Mandeville's views) instructs his interlocutor, Horatio, to read the work, Mandeville crucially modifies his original account of what many took to be the arbitrary role of politicians inventing morality when he came to write *Part II*, published in 1729.[41] By then he had developed a new hypothesis explaining justice and politeness as (what Hume would soon call) artificial moral institutions based on previous human conventions. I do not claim to be the first to notice that there is a difference between early and later Mandeville.[42] But for Goldsmith, for example, there is no paradigmatic change in Mandeville's thought. Mandeville only 'extended and refined his view'.[43] I should remind the literary-minded reader at this point

39. See M. M. Goldsmith, *Private vices, public benefits: Bernard Mandeville's social and political thought* (Cambridge, 1985), p.62-64.
40. J. A. W. Gunn, 'Mandeville: poverty, luxury and the Whig theory of government', in *Beyond liberty and property* (Montreal, 1983), p.102-103. Jacob Viner made a different point along the same lines that 'skilful management' means government planning; see Jacob Viner, *The Long view and the short: studies in economic theory and policy* (Glencoe, IL, 1958). Shelley Burtt has emphasised the role of politicians extensively in *Virtue transformed: political argument in England 1688-1740* (Cambridge, 1992), p.137-38.
41. On John Robertson's concise account of the *Part II*, see his *Case for the Enlightenment*, p.270-77.
42. On earlier emphasis on the differences between the two parts of *The Fable* in Mandeville scholarship, see especially J. Martin Stafford, 'Introduction', in *Private vices, publick benefits: the contemporary reception of Bernard Mandeville* (Solihull, 1997), p.xvi-xviii. See also, Goldsmith, *Private vices, public benefits*, p.62; his 'Review of Hundert's Enlightenment's fable', *British journal for the history of philosophy* 6 (1998), p.295-96 and his 'Introduction' to *By a society of ladies: essays in the 'Female tatler'*, ed. M. M. Goldsmith (London, 1999), p.50.
43. Goldsmith, *Private vices, public benefits* (1985) p.65, 107. Goldsmith confirms in his revised edition that 'the thesis of the book' [*Fable*] remains 'unchanged'. M. M. Goldsmith, *Private vices, public benefits: Bernard Mandeville's social and political thought*. Revised edn (Christchurch, 2001), p.9. Other scholars have also been interested in this; see Sterling P. Lamprecht, 'The *Fable of the bees*', *The Journal of philosophy* 23 (1926), p.565, and Hundert, *The Enlightenment's Fable*, p.50. Bert Kerkhof makes a good account of the difference in his 'A fatal attraction?: Smith's *Theory of moral sentiments* and Mandeville's *Fable*', *History of political thought* 16 (1995), p.219-33.

that I am fully aware of the relevance of the change in literary style from satire to dialogue in Mandeville's works. However, I will not address this issue in any greater depth here, but rather concentrate on the intellectual contrast between the original *Fable* and Mandeville's later works.[44]

A descriptive reading of Book 3 of the Treatise

In my view, Hume's mitigated moral scepticism in its Mandevillean manner could be read as being somewhat coherent with his mitigated metaphysical scepticism.[45] Nevertheless, I am not implying a unified reading of Hume or his *Treatise*. What I maintain is that Hume's moral theory in the *Treatise* is linked to political philosophy, and that it is a descriptive, not a prescriptive, account.[46] For him there was no autonomous moral principle that would alone make a foundational difference in a large society in which people are not necessarily related to or even acquainted with each other.[47] Neither is there any lasting spontaneous order

44. Irwin Primer has offered us a perceptive view of Mandeville as an author of literature. Primer, 'Introduction', in *Bernard Mandeville's 'A modest defence of publick stews': prostitution and its discontents in early Georgian England* (New York, 2006), p.1-25. On the literary style of the *Fable*, see Phillip Harth, 'The Satiric purpose of the *Fable of the bees*', *Eighteenth-century studies* 2 (1969), p.321-40; George Hind, 'Mandeville's *Fable of the bees* as Menippean satire', *Genre* 1 (1968), p.307-15. On *Part II* and literary style, see Irene E. Gorak, 'The satirist as producer: Mandeville's *The Fable of the bees, part II*', *Genre* 23 (1990), p.1-14.
45. For a recent interpretation of the *Treatise* stressing that Hume's study of morals is descriptive, with Hume's account of morality as a solution to the controversy between Hutcheson and Mandeville, see John P. Wright, *Hume's 'A Treatise of human nature'*, p.258-88.
46. On a similar note, see James Harris, 'Hume on the moral obligation to justice', *Hume studies* 36 (2010), p.25-50. See also David Raynor, 'Why did David Hume dislike Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the history of civil society*?', in *Adam Ferguson: philosophy, politics and society*, ed. Eugene Heath and Vincenzo Merolle (London, 2009), p.45-72, 179-188.
47. For a sophisticated analysis summing up the contrasting Humean reading of common point of view and emphasising the role of correcting principles in Hume's moral theory, see Rachel Cohon, *Hume's morality: feeling and fabrication* (Oxford, 2008), p.150-58.

in a large society to serve self-interest or other passions without a government to redirect their natural course.[48] Therefore, the political element and origin of government are the first questions Hume needed to answer, more or less as Thomas Hobbes suggests and as Mandeville maintains in his later works. In Hume's understanding a civil society cannot exist for very long unless it is a political society. Here one should not make the mistake of thinking that Hume was referring to civil societies in writing that 'the state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and may subsist with the conjunction of many families'.[49] Justice is a core element in his moral theory, and political philosophy and moral philosophy in the *Treatise* are inseparable.[50]

One of Hume's objectives was to avoid the pitfalls of moralising, thus he steers clear of prescribing what motives people always ought to have for actions that are approved by others. Rachel Cohon thinks that 'mere rule-following is not enough' and 'one needs morally-motivated rule following'. Her interpretation is that Hume's requirement of the virtue of honesty (for example) is that a person's approval of honesty is strengthened so that it becomes a motivating sentiment to be honest.[51] I agree that the idea of different interests creating a morality of its own is important in Hume's moral theory; however, I do not think that Hume puts any relevant weight on the idea of 'morally-motivated rule following'. In the *Treatise* it is

48. Ideas of spontaneously created social order without a necessary link to government and its guiding role, in contrast to what is advanced in this book, with a particular reference to Mandeville and Hume, have been advanced by thinkers of different backgrounds. See, for example, F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of liberty* (Chicago, IL, 1960); Hayek, 'Dr Bernard Mandeville', Lecture on a Master Mind series, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 52 (Oxford, 1966); and Ronald Hamowy, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the theory of spontaneous order* (Carbondale, IL, 1987).
49. T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541. On passions in general in the *Treatise*, see Lilli Alanen, 'The powers and mechanisms of the passions', in *The Blackwell guide to Hume's 'Treatise'*, ed. Saul Traiger (Oxford, 2006), p.179-98.
50. For a brief discussion on this, see Mikko Tolonen, 'Review of Annette Baier's *The Cautious jealous virtue: Hume on justice*', *Utilitas* 23 (2011), p.352-54.
51. Rachel Cohon, 'Hume's difficulty with the virtue of honesty', *Hume studies* 23 (1997), p.91-112.

enough for Hume to explain the system of moral approbation and the moral psychology that accounts for reasons why in the normal course of action people tend to follow rules. In accordance with Michael Gill's reading, I claim that the system offered in the *Treatise* does not embellish man's reflective moral qualities and it does not attempt any justification beyond that of explaining human action.[52] Hume explains how a particular system of morals functions with regard to moral approbation. He shows how actions are approved and assumes that these particular actions are generally desirable for individual agents living in that political society. However, he was not saying that people often acted because they had any sort of morally worthy motivation guiding them. Book 3 of the *Treatise* was not designed to be prescriptive, but it was a Mandevillean anatomist account of morals.

What is important is that Hume purposely does not make this connection from moral approbation to moral motivation. This was also a normative decision. The reason for this is that human nature functions so that what some might call self-deception is always present in the world, and that motivation in general comprises different passions. People tend to be moved by narrowly confined drives that create a plethora of different and even contradictory wants in a political society. It should also be kept in mind that the purpose of justice is not to counter the human passion of self-interest at any point, only to redirect its course. This is also why so much emphasis should be put on political philosophy, instead of a contrasting interpretation of 'free-standing sentimentalism' based on such 'Humean' elements as sympathy, standard of taste, general point of view, corrected moral sentiments, normativity and dignity of virtue.[53]

52. Gill, 'Hume's progressive view of human nature', p.90.
53. For a contrasting, recent interpretation, see Michael L. Frazer, *The Enlightenment of sympathy: justice and the moral sentiments in the eighteenth century and today* (Oxford, 2010), p.40-64. See also Christine Korsgaard, 'The general point of view: love and moral approval in Hume's ethics', *Hume studies* 25 (1999), p.3-42. On the partly contrasting concept of character, see Jacqueline Taylor, 'Virtue and the evaluation of character', in *The Blackwell guide to Hume's 'Treatise'*, ed. Saul Traiger (Oxford, 2006), p.276-96 and Annette Baier, *Death and character: further reflections on Hume* (Cambridge, MA, 2008), p.3-57.

Hume's point in his anatomist approach to morals is to frame a structure of the human mind and social institutions that explain how large societies can continue to exist regardless of whether or not people act with what some would call 'moral worth'.[54] His model is adept in explaining why there are so many different kinds of conflicts in large societies, which are very confusing because it is not clear who is right and who is wrong, and everyone believes that they act based on the right kind of moral motives. However, the fact that one feels justified does not necessarily reveal anything at all about the 'right' kind of motivation. An essential feature of this kind of Mandevillean moral psychology is that it leaves the realm of unintended consequences as such untouched. The idea is to harness and redirect human nature in a social direction, not to reform or moralise.

I should also point out that in Hume's system making moral judgements about questions of justice, but not necessarily being moved by them, does not mean that people are sociopaths of a kind. His general tone underlines their capacity for empathy and so forth, but the point is that this has to do with emotions leading to natural virtues (generosity, humanity, affection towards children and kindness towards benefactors). They are original in human nature, but Hume's tone is rather different with artificial virtues, and particularly justice that is plainly meant to concern respect for private property, promises, contracts and obedience to government.[55] There is no natural motive why a man would refrain from taking things in another man's possession that he thinks he needs. As I show in this book, moral psychology of justice is a complex issue. There is also an inherent conflict between natural and artificial moral principles that easily leads

54. For a good account of the evolutionary aspect of social conventions from a legal theoretical perspective, see Neil McArthur, 'David Hume's legal theory: the significance of general laws', *History of European ideas* 30 (2004), p.149-66. See also McArthur, *David Hume's political theory*, p.37-81.
55. This scope of justice is understood in a similar manner for example in Baier, *The Cautious jealous virtue*, p. 35-55. See also Rachel Cohon, 'Hume's artificial and natural virtues', in *The Blackwell guide to Hume's 'Treatise'*, ed. Saul Traiger (Oxford, 2006), p.256-75. On the evolution of the discussion on justice after Hume, see Eric Schliesser and Spencer J. Pack, 'Smith's Humean criticism of Hume's account of the origin of justice', *Journal of the history of philosophy* 44 (2006), p.47-63.

to confusion. Explaining this feature of Hume's *Treatise* and the influence that Mandeville's later works had on its formation is another aim of this book.

Political sociability

Recent scholarship has witnessed the emergence of a more favourable attitude towards the so-called selfish theory, and towards Hobbes and Mandeville. The influence of Hobbism on economic thinking and different game theories has been particularly noticeable during the last few decades.[56] The re-emergence of Hobbes and Mandeville has also led to more sophisticated analyses of *homo economicus* as the outcome of Enlightenment activity, meaning that concepts such as luxury are interpreted above all as moral and political questions.[57] This field was first ploughed by Albert Hirschman in his classic *The Passions and the interests*.[58] Hirschman's book has much to do with self-interest and marked the triumph not only of the intellectual origins of capitalism, but also of the centrality of self-love as the scholarly focus. However, this has not been a balanced development in that the end result has been to exaggerate the concept of self-interest, for example, in Mandeville's and Hume's thinking.[59] Pierre Force's

56. For clashing views, see Russell Hardin, *David Hume: moral and political theorist* (Oxford, 2007), p.55-133 and Baier, *The Cautious jealous virtue*, p.36-53. On commerce and Hume, see R. G. Frey, 'Virtue, commerce and self-love', *Hume studies* 21 (1995), p.275-88; Loren Gatch, 'To redeem metal with paper: David Hume's philosophy of money', *Hume studies* 22 (1996), p.169-91; Edward Soule, 'Hume on economic policy and human nature', *Hume studies* 26 (2000), p.143-58; and Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind (ed.), *David Hume's political economy* (London, 2009). See also E. J. Hundert, 'The achievement motive in Hume's political economy', *Journal of the history of ideas* 35 (1974), p.139-43.
57. Eloquently argued by Robertson in *The Case for the Enlightenment*, p.325-405 and Koen Stapelbroek, *Love, self-deceit, and money: commerce and morality in the early Neapolitan Enlightenment* (Toronto, 2008), p.3-87.
58. Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the interests: political arguments for capitalism before its triumph* (Princeton, NJ, 1977), p.7-66. See also Victoria Kahn, Neil Saccamano and Daniela Coli (ed.) *Politics and the passions, 1500-1850* (Princeton, NJ, 2006).
59. A recent example of an extensive role given to self-interest in Hume's conception of human nature with commentary on 'mirroring' based on sympathy, but without an analysis of the role of self-esteem or pride, is Russell

Self-interest before Adam Smith is a recent landmark publication on this path. Force predominantly emphasises the concepts of self-interest and 'tangible goods'.[60] Bernard Mandeville, quite naturally, plays a key role in Force's account, which is too tightly attached to the concept of self-interest.[61]

The latest significant turn in Hume scholarship regarding political philosophy is the emergence of a discussion on commercial sociability with a focus on political economy. Istvan Hont stresses its importance in a narrative that is appealing and has many followers.[62] Hont's interpretation of Pufendorf with regard to Scottish Enlightenment has been seen as groundbreaking.[63] His work on the luxury debate is a consistent development of this line of thinking and particularly the emphasis put on Fénelon has opened up a new way of looking at eighteenth-century

Hardin, 'Hume's human nature', in *The Continuum companion to Hume*, ed. Alan Bailey and Dan O'Brien (London, 2012), p.303-18.

60. Pierre Force, *Self-interest before Adam Smith: a genealogy of economic science* (Cambridge, 2003), p.38.
61. According to Force, 'the first principle of Epicurean philosophy' is 'that all human action tends to maximize pleasure'; see Force, *Self-interest before Adam Smith*, p.49. In Mandeville's case, for example, this goes astray. It misses the political nature of *The Fable of the bees*. To argue against the role of reason, as Mandeville and Hume did, was to argue against interest calculations at the same time.
62. See Istvan Hont, 'Jealousy of trade: an introduction', in *Jealousy of trade: international competition and the nation-state in historical perspective* (Cambridge, MA, 2005), p.1-158. On Hont's influence on scholarship, see for example, Robert Wokler, 'Rousseau's Pufendorf: natural law and the foundations of commercial society', *History of political thought* 15 (1994), p.373-402. See also Wokler, 'Anthropology and conjectural history in the Enlightenment', in *Inventing human science: eighteenth-century domains*, ed. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter and Robert Wokler (Berkeley, CA, 1995), p.31-52.
63. For example, Wokler follows Istvan Hont's interpretation of Pufendorf. For Hont's Pufendorf, see Hont, 'The language of sociability and commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the theoretical foundations of the "four-stages theory"', in *The Languages of political theory in early modern Europe*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 1987), p.253-76. On Pufendorf's non-Kantian account of dignity, see Kari Saastamoinen, 'Pufendorf on natural equality, human dignity and self-esteem', *Journal of the history of ideas* 71 (2010), p.39-62. For a particularly astute discussion of Pufendorf, sociability and first principle of natural law, see Saastamoinen, *The Morality of the fallen man: Samuel Pufendorf on natural law* (Helsinki, 1995), p.62-94.

politics.[64] However, as the argument about jealousy of trade and the relevance of political economy in eighteenth-century thinking has been gathering force, the scope of Hume's own thinking has simultaneously been narrowed down. The shift towards political economy in Hume means a turn away from *A Treatise of human nature* towards the essays he wrote at a later stage in his career. *Political discourses*, which could be described largely as political economy, were not published until 1752. Although Hume's early notebooks reveal that he took economic questions seriously at a younger age, international market competition is not the focal point of the *Treatise*. The young Hume was not concerned with political economy when he first discussed politics and human nature. The turn towards political economy took place in his later career.

There are some references to Machiavelli and commerce in Hume's early *Essays, moral and political*, specifically in 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences', but the relevance of political economy for his political philosophy is by no means self-evident at this point. Yet, political philosophy is the key to understanding his intention in writing Book 3 of the *Treatise*. What is apparent is the necessary connection between science of man, civilised monarchies, social distance, hierarchical structure of civil society and politeness (which I will soon turn to discuss). As the present book purports to establish, this political sociability was the primary point the young Hume wanted to make in connecting science of man and politics. The relevance of this link is something that most accounts emphasising the role of political economy fail to mention. The reason for this is that the scholarly focus has been self-interest, whereas Hume was structuring a view where pride and the correlating moral institution of politeness have a significant role in civil society. My emphasis on political sociability, the artificial institution of politeness and the idea that Hume's *Treatise* ought to be read as social theory is intended to balance this view.

This book is not the only recent attempt to understand the

64. Istvan Hont, 'The early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury', in *The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century political thought*, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), p.379-418.

social elements of Hume's *Treatise*.[65] Christopher Finlay, for example, in *Hume's social philosophy*, attempted a unified reading of it in this respect.[66] He underlines modern elements in Hume's theory of civil society, meaning that Hume did not necessarily think of civil society only in terms of a political society, and hence there is a modern element in Hume that is usually seen to emerge after Hegel.[67] 'Hume's conception of society and government is commensurable with modern theories of civil society', Finlay claims, because 'it is built around a fundamental distinction between society and government'. While I agree that Hume 'attempts an explanation of the mechanisms' that facilitate 'the production and exchange of goods', achieving sociable patterns of behaviour 'that go beyond mere abstinence and mutual harm', I do not think this means, as Finlay suggests, that 'Hume's theory of society' was 'distinct from government'.[68]

Finlay's analysis links Hume's conception of sympathy with commercial sociability, which is intended to function as a self-sustaining social principle that facilitates discussion about societies without a strong reference (or no reference at all) to political society and government.[69] This seems to be a direction in which many scholars interested in Hume are bound, and why it has been relevant to underline the Hutchesonian side of Hume.

65. For a similar view that we are better off talking about Hume's social theory instead of his moral theory, see Christopher Berry, 'Hume's universalism: the science of man and the anthropological point of view', *British journal for the history of philosophy* 15 (2007), p.535-50. For a general account of social theory in the Scottish Enlightenment, see Berry, *The Social theory of Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1997), p.23-51, 91-199. On Mandeville's conception of civil society, Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment, see also, for example, Claude Gautier, *L'Invention de la société civile: lectures anglo-écossaises Mandeville, Smith, Ferguson* (Paris, 1993).
66. Christopher Finlay, *Hume's social philosophy: human nature and commercial sociability in 'A Treatise of human nature'* (London, 2007), p.44-157.
67. On intellectual changes in the use of the concept of civil society, see for example, Sunil Khilnani, 'The development of civil society', in *Civil society: history and possibilities*, ed. Sudiptan Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge, 2001), p.11-32.
68. Christopher Finlay, 'Hume's theory of civil society', *European journal of political theory* 3 (2004), p.371.
69. Finlay, 'Sympathy, sociability and esteem: Hume's account of social relations', in *Hume's social philosophy*, p.105-23.

For me, this supposed union between sympathy and commercial sociability in the *Treatise* is a disappointment because it misses what Book 3 of the *Treatise* puts forward. While I agree that the complex question of commerce is important in terms of understanding Hume's thinking in general (and especially his *Political discourses*), I still read him, and particularly the young Hume who wrote the *Treatise*, as an early modern social theorist (or theorist of civil society). My reading differs from Finlay's because I believe that Hume in his *Treatise* sees civil society in terms of political society.[70] His conception of civil society is grounded on government. Therefore, as I see it, commercial sociability and commerce as such cannot be considered the core elements that enable the existence of civil society. At the same time, the moral and political conventions of justice and, equally importantly, politeness, and their relationship with government become the elements that explain the structure of *civitas*. My aim in this book is to show that Hume's conception of politeness is built on the idea of a political framework, and that his thinking is a prime example of a top-down system in which a political structure is considered fundamental in all aspects of life. For example, Hume admired what he termed civilised monarchies because:

> In a civiliz'd Monarchy, there is a long Train of Dependence from the Prince to the Peasant, which is not great enough to render Property precarious, or depress the Minds of the People; but is sufficient to beget in every one an Inclination to please his Superiors, and form himself upon those Models, which are most acceptable to People of Condition and Education.[71]

Understanding Hume's position among a line of thinkers who put the prime emphasis on political structure, namely Hobbes, Pufendorf and Mandeville, is crucial in terms of understanding the differences between Hume and Hutcheson.[72] Sympathy for

70. For a conceptual analysis of the prevalence of 'the political' in the Scottish Enlightenment, see Oili Pulkkinen, 'The labyrinth of politics: a conceptual approach to the modes of the political in the Scottish Enlightenment', unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Jyväskylä, 2001), p.11-30.
71. Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences', in *Essays*, p.127.
72. On the difference between Hutcheson's moral principles in large societies and those of Hume, see below, p.188-93.

Hume does not simply play the extensive explanatory role that many commentators assign to it. This does not mean that sympathy had no relevance in his social theory, as I explain in this book, but the question of rechannelling the passions through political and moral customs still plays the key role in civil society. The main function of sympathy is to explain how people communicate their states of mind. Sympathy is not sufficient to overcome the challenges that passions create in large societies.[73] The key point that most scholars have hitherto missed is the relationship between self-love and self-liking, and justice and politeness as the foundational moral and political institutions.

Augustinian and Epicurean

The argument advanced in this book is that what made a great difference in Mandeville and Hume's accounts of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. This distinction amounts to an anatomy of justice and politeness revealing self-love underpinning systems of law, and self-liking (or pride) underlying good breeding. The purpose of employing this conceptual pair, combined with the reality of moral distinctions in recognising the existence of some natural virtues, was to discourage debate as to whether humans are selfish or other-regarding by nature. In this manner it was possible to focus on the relationship between passions and moral institutions that explains how a large, anonymous political society with multiple sets of values is able to function.[74] The idea is to limit the number of general political and moral rules to a bare minimum. What becomes clear in conjectural history of civil society is that without justice that

73. For a sophisticated reading of 'sympathetic sociability' where sympathy plays an important role for sociability in some contrast to my reading, but also understanding the role of government in a large society, see James Harris, '"A compleat chain of reasoning": Hume's project in *A Treatise of human nature*, Books 1 and 2', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian society* 109 (2009), p.129-48. See also, Annette Baier, *A Progress of sentiments: reflections on Hume's 'Treatise'* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), p.129-219.
74. On a similar conundrum, see John Colman, 'Bernard Mandeville and the reality of virtue', *Philosophy* 47 (1972), p.125-39.

guards private property and politeness that secures people's self-esteem, civil society cannot function.

Mandeville introduces the concept of self-liking in the third dialogue of *Part II* of the *Fable*, arguing that it consists of two components. Cleomenes informs Horatio that 'nature has given [men] an instinct, by which every individual values itself above its real worth'. This natural instinct is aligned with 'an apprehension' of the fact that we 'over-value ourselves', which 'makes us so fond of the approbation, liking and assent of others; because they strengthen and confirm us in the good opinion we have of ourselves'.[75] Mandeville did not invent the distinction between self-love and self-liking, or the idea that other people's opinions are the crux of the opinion we entertain of ourselves. Seventeenth-century French moralists were advancing a similar yet different line of analysis of *amour-propre*.[76] With regard to the French context it is worth pointing that he was equally familiar with the discussion on self-love and Hobbes because of his Dutch background.[77] Besides Hans Blom, who can be considered the leading scholar for Dutch moral and political thought regarding Mandeville, other scholars have also studied this aspect.[78]

75. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.130.
76. French seventeenth-century thought as source for many of Mandeville's ideas has been underlined for a long time. See, for example, Wilhelm Hasbach, 'Larochefoucauld und Mandeville', *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich* 14 (1890), p.1-43. Kaye put a particular emphasis on French psychology; see F. B. Kaye, 'Introduction', *The Fable of the bees*, p.xciv and F. B. Kaye, 'The writings of Bernard Mandeville', *The Journal of English and Germanic philology* 20 (1921), p.419. On the emphasis on Pierre Bayle, see Paulette Carrive, *La Philosophie des passions chez Bernard Mandeville* (Paris, 1983), vol.1, p.121-297; Hundert, *Enlightenment's fable*, p.16-61; and Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment*, p.256-80.
77. For Mandeville in the Dutch tradition of moral and political thought, see the work of Hans Blom, for example, his 'Causality and morality in politics: the rise of naturalism in Dutch seventeenth-century political thought', unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Utrecht, 1995), p.101-56, 277-79. See also Rudolph Dekker, '"Private vices, public virtues" revisited: the Dutch background of Bernard Mandeville', translated by G. T. Moran, *History of European ideas* 14 (1992), p.481-98.
78. Irwin Primer, 'Erasmus and Bernard Mandeville: a reconsideration', *Philological quarterly* 72 (1993), p.313-35; Harold J. Cook, 'Bernard Mandeville and the therapy of "the clever politician"', *Journal of the history of ideas* 60 (1999), p.110-18; Annie Mitchell, 'Character of an independent Whig: "Cato" and

Mandeville's originality lies mainly in his descriptive use of the conceptual pair of self-love and self-liking, thus the question is no longer about the Fall of Man, but about the morally neutral analysis of the relationship between human nature and civil society. I think it is important to understand that this is not necessarily a sign of preference for a secular (in the sense of a non-religious or an atheistical) understanding of civil society: the idea is to distance the analysis from *any* prescriptive moral theory. For Mandeville in his later works this was a way to explore cultural variety in that an individual's relationship with the opinion of others takes different patterns, which in turn plays a crucial role in shaping commonly shared and contrasting values in different political cultures.

When Horatio suggests in *Part II* that 'self-liking is evidently pride', Cleomenes cannot accept it.[79] Self-liking is the cause of pride, but only when 'excessive, and so openly shewn as to give offence to others' is it called pride. When it is kept out of sight it has 'no name', even when men act 'from that and from no other principle'.[80] Horatio then proposes that the passion should be called 'a desire of the applause of others', but Cleomenes disagrees yet again. The effects of self-love should not be classified as a passion, and neither should self-liking be confined to some of its consequences.[81] Mandeville had a good reason for this intellectual move. It enabled him to use these terms without the implication of higher moral principles or 'Christian politeness'. The fundamental part of his thought is the separation of the two different origins of the so-called selfish passions in this neutral manner. He also reminds his audience in *Origin of honour* that self-liking is 'plainly distinct from self-love'.[82]

Bernard Mandeville', *History of European ideas* 29 (2003), p.300; Mitchell, 'A *liberal* republican "Cato"', *American journal of political science* 48 (2004), p.598; Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: philosophy and the making of modernity 1650-1750* (Oxford, 2001), p.623-27; and Israel, 'The intellectual origins of modern democratic republicanism (1660-1720)', *European journal of political theory* 3 (2004), p.7-36; see also works cited there.

79. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.131.
80. Mandeville, *Origin of honour*, p.3.
81. Mandeville, *Origin of honour*, p.4.
82. Mandeville, *Origin of honour*, p.3.

The importance of the concept of self-liking to Mandeville is by no means a new discovery. Paul Sakmann emphasised its significance,[83] F. B. Kaye singled it out as an important concept, and Maurice Goldsmith perceptively noticed how it functioned as part of the conjectural history of civil society.[84] Ed Hundert also noticed the importance of self-liking in the evolutionary scheme and how Mandeville 're-shaped his original argument'.[85] Bert Kerkhof makes an explicit distinction between self-love and self-liking, describing self-liking as the propensity to 'overestimate ourselves' in 'comparison with others'.[86] Because of this quality a human being could be described 'as an animal living in constant anxiety about the opinion of others'. One consequence is that at times self-liking 'conquers' the 'fear of death' (self-love), which could explain phenomena such as bravery in battle, duelling and suicide.[87] Markku Peltonen has since made a crucial contribution to Mandeville scholarship, taking this discussion further with his analysis of how self-liking functions in the context of early mod-

83. Paul Sakmann, *Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienenfabel-controverse* (Freiburg, 1897), p.59.
84. Goldsmith, *Private vices, public benefits* (1985), p.66-77, 162.
85. Hundert, *Enlightenment's fable*, p.52-55. See also Michael Boyd Wood, 'Whom only vanity intices', unpublished doctoral dissertation (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1979); Douglas J. Den Uyl, 'Passion, state and progress: Spinoza and Mandeville on the nature of human association', *Journal of the history of philosophy* 25 (1987), p.378; Neil de Marchi, 'Exposure to strangers and superfluities: Mandeville's regimen for great wealth and foreign treasure', in *Physicians and political economy: six studies in the work of doctor-economists*, ed. Peter D. Groenewegen (London, 2001), p.67; R. A. Collins, 'Private vices, public benefits: Dr Mandeville and the body politic', unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Oxford, 1988), p.111-20, p.125, 133-36; and Burtt, *Virtue transformed*, p.139.
86. Kerkhof, 'A fatal attraction?', p.219-33. On the relationship between Mandeville and Smith, see also Thomas A. Horne, 'Envy and commercial society: Mandeville and Smith on "Private vices, public benefits"', *Political theory* 9 (1981), p.551-69. Horne also points towards the relevance of the distinction between self-love and self-liking; see Horne, 'Envy and commercial society', p.556. But, for example, Laurence Dickey, 'Pride, hypocrisy and civility in Mandeville's social and historical theory', *Critical review* 4 (1990), p.387-431 does not pay attention to the distinction.
87. Kerkhof, 'A fatal attraction?', p.221. For another perceptive account of self-liking, bravery, honour and civil society, see Hector Monro, *The Ambivalence of Bernard Mandeville* (Oxford, 1975), p.116-47.

ern ideas of politeness.[88] This book attempts to expand the scope of the discussion by showing that the reason why the division between self-love and self-liking is important in moral and political philosophy is that it is the key behind the moral institutions of justice and politeness that explains the general structure of political society.

More often than not in French Augustinian analysis *amour-propre* concentrates on self-love and self-interest in the sense that excessive attraction to the self (*amour-propre*) is distinguished from the proper love of the self (*amour de soi*) that arguably correlates with the love of God. This is the familiar idea of the juxtaposition between charity as a theological concept and the self-love that corrupts it. Even without the theological element in this conceptual pair, it is still a prescriptive use of the terms, not descriptive in the Mandevillean sense.[89] Therefore, I disagree with Paulette Carrive, who in her well-informed work on Mandeville decided to translate 'self-love' as *amour de soi* and 'self-liking' as *amour-propre*, linking Mandeville closely to earlier French moralists, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and unnecessarily adding the prescriptive side to this conceptual pair. Rousseau characteristically distinguishes between proper self-preservation (instinctual) and 'excessive, and illusion-ridden attachment to the self'.[90] The

88. Markku Peltonen, *The Duel in early modern England: civility, politeness and honour* (Cambridge, 2003), p.263-302. See also Anna Bryson, *From Courtesy to civility: changing codes of conduct in early modern England* (Oxford, 1998), p.1-106. On self-love and self-liking, see also Christian Maurer, 'Self-love in early eighteenth-century British moral philosophy: Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, Butler and Campbell', unpublished doctoral dissertation (Université de Neuchâtel, 2009), p.121-66.

89. Carrive, *La Philosophie des passions chez Bernard Mandeville*, vol.1, p.108, 165. See also Carrive, *Bernard Mandeville: passions, vices, vertus* (Paris, 1980), p.44-45. On prescriptive reading of self-love and self-liking as *amour de soi* and *amour-propre* and the idea that for Mandeville human beings are corrupted, see also, for example, Malcolm Jack, *Corruption and progress: the eighteenth-century debate* (New York, 1989), p.18-62.

90. Michael Moriarty, *Fallen nature, fallen selves: early modern French thought II* (Oxford, 2006), p.238. See also Force, *Self-interest before Adam Smith*. Regarding Cornelius Jansen pointing to this division, see Moriarty, *Fallen nature, fallen selves*, p.171-85. On Rousseau's role in shaping the early modern discussion on *amour-propre*, see Force, *Self-interest before Adam Smith*, p.41-47. Force takes his cue from Rousseau's definition of *amour-propre* already in his 'Self-love, identification, and the origin of political economy', *Yale French studies* 92 (1997), p.46-64.

meaning of Rousseau's use of *amour-propre* is an object of scholarly discussion in its own right.[91] But what we do know is that his formulation of *amour-propre* was a famous reaction to Mandeville's later works that sent the on-going debate back to its seventeenth-century French origins and the question of the moral basis of self-love and vanity.[92] There are many accounts of what makes an author Augustinian and whether Mandeville was one.[93] I think we should acknowledge the Augustinian origin of the arguments he and Hume developed, but at the same time we should realise that they are also very different.[94]

91. On considerations about different aspects of Rousseau's conception of *amour-propre*, see also N. J. H. Dent, '*Amour-propre*', in his *A Rousseau dictionary* (Oxford, 1992), p.33-36; Dent, 'Rousseau on *amour-propre*', *Supplement to the transactions of the Aristotelian Society* 72 (1998), p.57-73; Timothy O'Hagan, 'Rousseau on *amour-propre*: on six facets of *amour-propre*', in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99 (1999), p.91-107; Frederick Neuhouser, 'Rousseau on the relation between reason and self-love (*amour-propre*)', *Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus* 1 (2003), p.221-39 and Jacques Domenech, *L'Ethique des Lumières: les fondements de la morale dans la philosophie française du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1989), p.58-98.

92. We have several studies of *amour-propre*, concupiscence and self-love as moral and theological concepts in seventeenth-century France: Anthony Levi, *French moralists: the theory of passions, 1585-1649* (Oxford, 1964); Levi, '*Amour-propre*: the rise of an ethical concept', *The Month* (1959), p.283-94; Nannerl O. Keohane, *Philosophy and state in France: the Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Princeton, NJ, 1980), p.151-360; B. M. Rogers, 'In praise of vanity: the Augustinian analysis of the benefits of vice from Port-Royal to Mandeville', unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Oxford, 1994); Force, *Self-interest before Adam Smith*, p.48-168, and Moriarty, *Fallen nature, fallen selves*, p.159-271.

93. On Mandeville and Jansenists, see Dale Van Kley, 'Pierre Nicole, Jansenism and the morality of enlightened self-interest', in *Anticipations of the Enlightenment*, ed. Alan C. Kors and Paul Korshin (Philadelphia, PA, 1987), p.69-85; Dickey, 'Pride, hypocrisy and civility in Mandeville's social and historical theory', p.387-431; E. D. James, 'Faith, sincerity and morality: Mandeville and Bayle', in *Mandeville studies: new explorations in the art and thought of Dr Bernard Mandeville*, ed. Irwin Primer (The Hague, 1975), p.54; Anne Mette Hjort, 'Mandeville's ambivalent modernity', *Modern language notes* 106 (1991), p.953; Ronald Commers, 'L'apologie radicale de l'hétéronomie morale de Bernard Mandeville: un conservatisme précoce du début du dix-huitième siècle', *Tijdschrift voor de studie van de verlichting en van het vrije denken* 14/15 (1986-1987), p.408; and Force, *Self-interest before Adam Smith*, p.5.

94. Continuity, as well as break with Augustinian arguments based on the premise that Mandeville does not equate vice with sin, has been noticed by Hundert, *Enlightenment's fable*, p.36-38, and by Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment*,

In short, Mandeville and Hume's distinction between self-love and self-liking and the idea of not treating this as an ethical question sets them apart from Rousseau and several other French moralists in significant ways. The point of view is not compatible with the familiar division between charity and self-love. This study is an attempt to deliberately break this mode of reading *amour-propre* as self-love comprising self-preservation and excessive attachment to oneself. Or, to be more precise, this was the point Mandeville and Hume were making in distinguishing between self-love and self-liking in their moral anatomy. Given that the significance of the distinction between the two *in this sense* has thus far been overlooked, the theoretical importance of the moral institution of póliteness, and crucially how it correlates with justice, has not been sufficiently addressed in the history of early modern philosophy either. Mandeville and Hume, although inspired by French Augustinian thinkers such as La Rochefoucauld, articulated the challenges of civil society and human nature in morally neutral terms, which was a similar break in tradition, made for similar reasons, as the break between Mandeville's later works and Hobbism.[95] In particular Pierre Nicole comes very close to what was the Mandevillean idea in the distinction between self-love and self-liking.[96] Nevertheless, it is important to see the discontinuity between the different parts of the *Fable* because the step from the original to *Part II* changes

p.270. Both analyses are based on Mandeville's supposed interest in showing that sociability is unrelated to religion, not on the morally neutral terminology employed by Mandeville. I see discontinuity between Bayle and Mandeville as well. For Mandeville, the question whether an atheist society can be virtuous is not, in the end, the first question that needs to be asked.

95. On this, and also how Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in their own way can be seen to differ from earlier Christian and French Augustinian authors, see Gill, *The British moralists on human nature*, p.77-270.

96. Mikko Tolonen, 'Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume', unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Helsinki, 2010), p.131-49. On Nicole, see Béatrice Guion, *Pierre Nicole: moraliste* (Paris, 2002), p.23-120, 311-12, 406-24 and E. D. James, *Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and humanist: a study of his thought* (The Hague, 1972), p.99-174. For an essay that grasps the relevance of self-liking and self-esteem in Mandeville and places this in the Dutch tradition, see Blom, 'The Epicurean motif' (*SVEC* 2009:12), p.31-51.

the premises of the discussion from normative moral theory to social theory, leaving both Hobbism and French Augustinianism behind.

Consequently, I do not discuss Mandeville and Hume as neo-Augustinian thinkers in this book, and I refrain from calling them neo-Epicurean, in part because I do not see them as proponents of selfish theory. On Hobbism, David Fate Norton writes that 'the reconstruction of a viable moral theory was the most urgent concern of British philosophy in the hundred years following the publications of the major works of Thomas Hobbes'.[97] Perhaps this is true, but it did not concern Hume. As I argue below, there is a change from Hobbism to a different kind of theory in Mandeville, who in his later works accepts the existence of natural virtues in the form of natural affection for children (partly as a reaction to his critics), which Hume then follows with his account of natural virtues.[98] Given Mandeville's treatment of natural affection it is difficult, or in fact ineffective, to claim that he was then arguing that a man is incapable by nature of other-regarding affection. Thus, one cannot simply deduce his later ideas of sociability from an Augustinian/Epicurean line of thought according to which self-interest is the only motivating principle.[99] My solution is simply to study Mandeville and Hume

97. Norton, *David Hume: common-sense moralist, sceptical metaphysician*, p.21. The centrality of Hobbes is also stressed by J. L. Mackie in *Hume's moral theory* (London, 1980), p.7; Daniel E. Flage, 'Hume's Hobbism and his anti-Hobbism', *Hume studies* 18 (1992), p.369-82; Paul Russell, 'Hume's *Treatise* and Hobbes's *The Elements of law*', *Journal of the history of ideas* 46 (1985), p.41-63; and Russell, *The Riddle of Hume's 'Treatise'*, p.61-70.

98. On Duncan Forbes's reluctance to accept that Hume is a 'Hobbesian' and his emphatic defence of Hume as a representative of a modern version of the natural law tradition, see Forbes, 'Natural law and the Scottish Enlightenment', in *The Origins and the nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. A. S. Skinner and R. H. Cambell, (Edinburgh, 1982) p.191-93.

99. This has been generally argued by Force in his *Self-interest before Adam Smith*, p.7-47. Also Shelley Burtt writes that Mandeville 'brushes aside', also in *Part II*, 'any suggestion that an inborn affection' might 'account for moral or sociable behavior'; see Burtt, *Virtue transformed*, p.139. On the relevance of natural affection, see also Jennifer Welchman, 'Who rebutted Bernard Mandeville?', *History of philosophy quarterly* 24 (2007), p.57-73, and Patricia Sheridan, 'Parental affection and self-interest: Mandeville, Hutcheson and the question of natural benevolence', *History of philosophy quarterly* 24 (2007), p.377-92.

as anatomists of morals by focusing on their ideas of political sociability as self-love and self-liking in civil society, and how the concept of artificial virtues relates to this.

Elements of natural law and politeness

In taking a step away from the Epicurean-Augustinian line of interpretation I am emphasising the relevance of political society to my argument and the interpretation Duncan Forbes put forward long ago.[100] Since then the scholarly debate on the role of natural law and civic humanist tradition in Hume's thinking has taken different turns.[101] I believe that in order to understand Hume's conception of civil society attention should be paid to the crucial division and discontinuity between family-based society and a large, anonymous political society.[102] What I am therefore suggesting is that in order to understand Hume's social thought it

100. Duncan Forbes, 'Hume's science of politics', in *David Hume: bicentenary papers*, ed. G. P. Morice, (Edinburgh, 1977), p.39-50. Forbes, 'Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment', in *The Philosophers of the Enlightenment*, ed. S. C. Brown (Sussex, 1979), p.94-109 also emphasises the role of the natural law tradition. See also Forbes, 'The European or cosmopolitan dimension in Hume's science of politics', *British journal of eighteenth-century studies* 1 (1978), p.57-60.

101. See Roger L. Emerson, 'Science and the origins and concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment', *History of science* 26 (1988), p.351; Emerson, 'Science and moral philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment', in *Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990), p.33-34; M. M. Goldsmith, 'Regulating anew the moral and political sentiments of mankind: Bernard Mandeville and the Scottish Enlightenment', *Journal of the history of ideas* 49 (1988), p.587; Goldsmith, 'Public virtue and private vices', *Eighteenth-century studies* 9 (1976), p.477-510; Ronald Hamowy, 'Cato's letters, John Locke and the republican paradigm', *History of political thought* 11 (1990), p.273-94; Hont, *Jealousy of trade*, p.11 and the works cited there.

102. On this distinction, see Moore, 'Hume's theory of justice and property', p.103-19; James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, 'Gershom Carmichael and the natural jurisprudence tradition in eighteenth-century Scotland', in *Wealth and virtue: the shaping of political economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge, 1983), p.73-87; Moore, 'Natural rights in the Scottish Enlightenment', in *The Cambridge history of the eighteenth-century political thought*, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), p.291-316; and Moore, 'Presbyterianism and the right of private judgement: Church government in Ireland and Scotland in the age of Francis Hutcheson', in *Philosophy and religion in Enlightenment Britain. New case studies*, ed. Ruth Savage (Oxford, 2012), p.141-68.

is necessary to take a step back from the most elaborated developments of commercial sociability and turn to the likes of Duncan Forbes and James Moore's early essays that interpret Hume's political and moral thought in the context of the tradition of natural law.[103] Knud Haakonssen has paid close attention to natural and artificial virtues placing the individual 'in a social context'.[104] He does not give the legislators as crucial a role as Forbes does in Hume's political thought. Instead, his emphasis is on Hume's conception of sympathy, which is in line with that of Adam Smith's.[105]

A problem with interpretations of Hume based on natural jurisprudence is that he discusses rights to a minimal extent.[106] Another difficulty in my view is the prevalence of justice. Duncan Forbes, among others, emphasised Hume's belief that private property enabled promises and contracts, and hence had a foundational role in his political thinking.[107] A Rawlsian tendency to concentrate solely on justice as the defining concept of political philosophy and to expand its scope using ideas such as distributive justice and justice as fairness has dominated scholarly thinking and, as an unfortunate consequence, other key moral terms are often ignored. The overall result is that there is inadequate understanding of how Hume thought political sociability functioned. Justice is, of course, a foundational artificial virtue in the *Treatise*, but so is politeness: for each artificial virtue it analyses there is always a corresponding passion in human nature that

103. On Forbes's view of James Moore's account of Hume and the natural law tradition, see Forbes, 'Natural law and the Scottish Enlightenment', p.195-96.

104. Knud Haakonssen, *Science of the legislator: the natural jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith* (Cambridge, 1981), p.5. See also Haakonssen, *Natural law and moral philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1996), p.100-28.

105. Haakonssen, *Science of the legislator*, p.8-9.

106. For a recent discussion of the role of natural law in the Scottish Enlightenment as a more broad enterprise than just rights discussion, in contrast to John Pocock's formulations, see Knud Haakonssen, 'Natural jurisprudence and the identity of the Scottish Enlightenment', in *Philosophy and religion in Enlightenment Britain. New case studies*, ed. Ruth Savage (Oxford, 2012), p.270-77.

107. Forbes, *Hume's philosophical politics*, p.26. About private property and justice, see especially James Moore, 'Hume's theory of justice and property', p.103-19.

needs to be controlled or redirected. If we do not grasp this, we miss the point of what it means to be an anatomist of morals.

James Moore in his first ground-breaking article on Hume in 1976 noticed the crucial relevance of politeness in his political thought and its Mandevillean origin, but he did not develop this argument very far.[108] This book will continue on this path, revealing Hume's commitment to Bernard Mandeville's ideas of politeness. When describing politeness as an artificial moral institution I refer to a code of behaviour securing one's self-esteem, in the same way as when I talk about justice as an artificial moral institution I discuss a system of laws securing property (without any implication of social justice, for example).[109]

Hume adopted Mandeville's theory of political sociability, which stood in direct opposition to the idea of civility as natural expressions of the heart as preached by Shaftesbury, Addison, Hutcheson and others. Nowadays it is a familiar argument that politeness was an important part of Scottish Enlightenment, but I think it is a valid one and it explains something about the nature of the movement. The kind of Shaftesburyan politeness that Nicholas Phillipson, who developed this view of Scottish Enlightenment, had in mind was the aspiration among the moderate literati to soften manners, battle orthodox Calvinism and still maintain the tradition of virtue and even classical republicanism.[110] Politeness

108. Moore, 'The social background of Hume's science of human nature', p.28.
109. Another option in discussing politeness in eighteenth century is to make a stronger reference to polite style, in which case the discussion is somewhat different. On politeness as polite style, see Adam Potkay, *The Fate of eloquence in the age of Hume* (Ithaca, NY, 1994), p.59-103. On eloquence and politeness for an argument about the role of high and low rhetoric in Hume's political thought, see Marc Hanvelt, *The Politics of eloquence: David Hume's polite rhetoric* (Toronto, 2012), p.3-79. Hume's progressively more negative attitude towards eloquence in the evolution of different editions of Hume's *Essays* is pointed out by T. H. Grose in his 'History of the editions', in Hume, *The Philosophical works*, ed. Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose (London, 1886), vol.3, p.74.
110. See Nicholas Phillipson, 'The Scottish Enlightenment', in *The Enlightenment in national context*, ed. Roy Porter and Michael Teich (Cambridge, 1981), p.19-40, and Phillipson, *Hume* (Edinburgh, 1989), p.145-46. Although my interpretation of Hume and politeness is in contrast with Phillipson's view (see p.194-204, 212-27 below), the relevance of 'Addisonian politeness' in the Scottish Enlightenment in general is a point that he makes brilliantly.

that did not cross the boundaries of effeminacy and enthusiasm was even part of the Presbyterian clergy's programme of Enlightenment.[111]

When he published Book 3 of the *Treatise*, Hume stepped into the middle of a long-standing conflict. Eighteenth-century contemporaries tended to point to a dichotomy between Mandeville and Shaftesbury when describing the on-going debate about human nature. John Brown thought that Shaftesbury was the main author of the circle that taught 'human Nature' to be an extremely '*uniform* and *noble* Thing'. According to Brown, the leading figures of the opposing school were Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville and a variety of French philosophers.[112] Mandeville, according to Brown's understanding, appeared as Shaftesbury's main challenger, not as a mere shadow of Hobbes, but as a philosopher in his own right.[113] Hutcheson was not only battling against the selfish school, psychological egoism and plain atheism in his writings; there was something more important at stake. Mandeville had challenged Shaftesburyan sentimentalism from a perspective that arose from within this tradition in one sense. In the case of Mandeville, as of Hutcheson, one might debate what morality was, but it is certain that it was founded on sentiment and not reason. Hume committed himself to a similar

111. Richard Sher does not establish the relevance of provincial universities and science, as Roger Emerson and Paul Wood have pointed out, but Sher has provided one of the more enduring definitions of Scottish Enlightenment as 'culture of the literati' in his *Church and university in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Princeton, NJ, 1985), p.8-18. On recent discussions on the development of the concept of Scottish Enlightenment, see Colin Kidd, 'Lord Dacre and the politics of the Scottish Enlightenment', *Scottish historical review* 84 (2005), p.202-20, and John Robertson, 'Hugh Trevor-Roper, intellectual history and "The religious origins of the Enlightenment"', *English historical review* 124 (2009), p.1-33.
112. John Brown, *Essays on the characteristics of the earl of Shaftesbury*, ed. Donald D. Eddy (1751; Hildesheim, 1969), p.170-71, p.204. See also Laurence Nihell, *Rational self-love; or, A Philosophical and moral essay on the natural principles of happiness and virtue: with reflections on the various systems of philosophers, ancient and modern, on this subject* (Limerick, printed for the author, 1770), p.137-38, who is applying the same dichotomy after Brown.
113. Brown, *Essays on the characteristics*, p.204-27. Also see Brown's later, most famous work, *Estimate of the manners and principles of the times* (London, printed for L. Davis, and C. Reymers, 1757).

scheme. Of course, he did what he thought would smooth his path, denying what were considered to be Mandeville's most outrageous paradoxes and discussing moral sense. Yet, the Mandevillean commitment is there and it is plain to see in Book 3 of his *Treatise*. Hume's critical comments on Shaftesbury are also in evidence. His adoption of Mandeville's principles and argument against the Shaftesburyan position also marks the point at which the young man turned against the idol of his youth, Shaftesbury. Hume's struggle with the Edinburgh position should be seen bearing this in mind.

Politeness has been established as a key political term for Hume, but in an opposite way as I suggest here. There has been much debate as to whether Hume was a Whig or a Tory (and more recently, what sort of a Whig he was).[114] Part of this discussion has related to Hume's conservatism.[115] Some scholars attempting to describe the nature of his Whiggishness have emphasised active citizenship in his political thought.[116] According to John Pocock and many others, 'The heart of Hume's political position' rests on civil liberty, the 'exercise of sovereignty by the citizenship'.[117]

114. See Forbes, 'Hume's science of politics', p.39-50; Robert C. Elliott, 'Hume's "Character of Sir Robert Walpole": some unnoticed additions', *The Journal of English and Germanic philology* 48 (1949), p.367-70; and James Conniff, 'Hume on political parties: the case for Hume as a Whig', *Eighteenth-century studies* 12 (1978-1979), p.150-73. For another interesting reading of the nature of Hume's conservative tendencies, see Okie Laird, 'Ideology and partiality in David Hume's *History of England*', *Hume studies* 11 (1985), p.1-32.
115. On Hume's liberalism and conservatism and anachronism of asking such questions (usually it is thought that Hume's philosophical scepticism entails political conservatism), see Donald Livingston, 'On Hume's conservatism', *Hume studies* 21 (1995), p.151-64. For an argument that Hume is a liberal, see John B. Stewart, 'The public interest vs. old rights', *Hume studies* 21 (1995), p.165-88, and Stewart, *The Moral and political philosophy of David Hume* (New York, 1963). For a continuation of this discussion, see McArthur, *David Hume's political theory*, p.116-36. See also Christopher Berry, 'Science and superstition: Hume and conservatism', *European journal of political theory* 10 (2011), p.141-55.
116. See Jack Jr. Fruchtman, 'Classical republicanism, Whig political science, Tory history: the state of eighteenth-century political thought', *Eighteenth-century life* 20 (1996), p.94-103.
117. J. G. A. Pocock, 'Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers: a study of the relations between the civic humanist and the civil jurisprudential interpretation of eighteenth-century social thought', in *Wealth and virtue: the shaping of political economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge, 1983), p.239. Goldsmith, for example, agrees with the view that the 'problems posed in Hume's political essays are set by a civic humanist framework'; Goldsmith, 'Regulating anew', p.589.

Other scholars point out that this reflects Hume's use of the 'language of classical republicanism'.[118]

It is safe to say that active citizenship is the key to republican political thinking. Once this is compromised, an author cannot be described as a republican thinker. This is a problem that Duncan Forbes immediately spotted after the publication of the *Machiavellian moment*. Forbes sided with 'the traditional view' of seeing 'civic humanism' as 'recessive' in the eighteenth century 'unless one means' simply 'classical education' in the 'widest sense'.[119] Pocockian interpretation of the link between civic tradition and Hume has, of course, been challenged.[120] By and large, once one gives up the role of active citizenship there is no additional conception to disguise the fact that civic humanism was in a slump in the eighteenth century.[121]

Politeness is a significant term in the Pocockian interpretation because it was thought to offer a solution to this problem by broadening the strict definition of virtue and, in a sense, rendering republican thinking suitable for the modern world.[122] Hume's

118. Ian Ross, 'Hume's language of skepticism', *Hume studies* 21 (1995), p.237.
119. Duncan Forbes, 'Review of Pocock's Machiavellian moment', *Historical journal* 19 (1976), p.555.
120. For an early account, see Moore, 'Hume's political science and the classical republican tradition', p.809-39. For a later challenge, but based on very different ideas, see Finlay, 'Hume's theory of civil society', p.369-91.
121. For a recent account of the concept of civil society in the Scottish Enlightenment that takes the Pocockian account as its explicit analytical framework, see Fania Oz-Salzberger, 'Civil society in the Scottish Enlightenment', in *Civil society: history and possibilities*, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge, 2001), p.58-83. For an emphasis on Montesquieu's influence on Scottish Enlightenment and Ferguson in particular in contrast with Pocockian republicanism, see Richard Sher, 'From Troglodytes to Americans: Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment on liberty, virtue and commerce', in *Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649-1776*, ed. David Wootton (Stanford, CA, 1994), p.368-402.
122. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition* (Princeton, NJ, 1975), p.462-505; Lawrence E. Klein, 'The third earl of Shaftesbury and the progress of politeness', *Eighteenth-century studies* 18 (1984), p.186-214; Klein, 'Liberty, manners and politeness in

political thought is considered to represent this modern version of the classical republican tradition that has efficiently solved certain problems of trade and commerce. It is believed that whatever criticism of republican principles Hume might have had came from within the tradition itself because he was operating in the 'Addisonian' political culture of virtuous sociability that expands the scope of civic virtue; and in which commerce functions as a central social factor that refines passions and polishes the manners explaining thus why it was part of republican political thought.[123]

Nicholas Phillipson explains that when Hume started to write essays a change took place and he 'turned to the business of Addisonian moralizing immediately after completing the *Treatise* in 1740'.[124] Phillipson's argument is tied to Pocock and Klein's interpretation.[125] This book will put forward a different interpretation linking Hume's conception of politeness to

early eighteenth-century England', *Historical journal* 32 (1989), p.583-605; Klein, *Shaftesbury and the culture of politeness: moral discourse and cultural politics in early eighteenth-century England* (Cambridge, 1994), p.121-212; Phillipson, *Hume*, p.17-34; and Phillipson, 'Politics and politeness in the reigns of Anne and the early Hannoverians', in *The Varieties of British political thought, 1500-1800*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock, Gordon J. Schochet and Lois G. Schwoerer (Cambridge, 1993), p.211-45.

123. J. G. A. Pocock, 'Hume and the American Revolution: the dying thoughts of a north Briton', in *Virtue, commerce and history: essays on political thought and history, chiefly in the eighteenth century* (Cambridge, 1985), p.126. On Addison, politeness and Hume, see Phillipson, 'Towards a definition of the Scottish Enlightenment', in *City and society in the eighteenth century*, ed. P. Fritz and D. Williams (Toronto, 1973), p.125-48; Phillipson, 'Culture and society in the eighteenth-century province', p.407-48; Phillipson, 'The Scottish Enlightenment', p.19-40; and Phillipson, *Hume*, p.26-34.

124. Phillipson, 'Hume as moralist: a social historian's perspective', in *The Philosophers of the Enlightenment*, ed. S. C. Brown (Brighton, 1979), p.147.

125. Klein's view has been largely accepted and emulated in secondary literature regarding eighteenth-century politeness; see Paul Langford, 'The uses of eighteenth-century politeness', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 12 (2002), p.311-31; Robert B. Shoemaker, 'The taming of the duel: masculinity, honour and ritual violence in London, 1660-1800', *Historical journal* 45 (2002), p.525-45; Iain Hampsher-Monk, 'From virtue to politeness', in *Republicanism: a shared European heritage: the values of republicanism in early modern Europe*, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 2002), vol.2, p.85-105; and Richard H. Watts, *Politeness* (Cambridge, 2003), p.27-46.

Mandeville.[126] The role of politeness is already central in the *Treatise* and there was no change in this respect in Hume's views when he advanced to writing essays. As this study is meant to establish, Hume's argument about politeness was, in fact, directed against Shaftesbury, Addison and others who tried to forge a link between politeness and certain qualities of the heart. The style he adopted in his essays might be that of Addison, but his views remained different.[127]

The polarisation of manners and morals has been acknowledged in some recent historical studies.[128] However, no effort has been made to re-examine this truism in the history of philosophy. Politeness, pride and hypocrisy are rarely taken up in analyses of the moral philosophy of the canonical philosophers. Moreover, when Hume's ideas of politeness are addressed, it is as if his treatment of it was a secluded historical phenomenon with no relevance to his 'real' philosophy.

Regarding method

Recent trend in Anglophone intellectual history is to encourage studies of macro-changes of traditions and concepts. David Armitage, for example, has written recently in the *Times literary supplement* about rediscovering 'big history' and intellectual history in the Anglo-American context.[129] This book operates on a

126. On criticism of the Pocockian view, see also Charles Prior, 'Introduction', in *Mandeville and Augustan ideas: new essays*, ed. Charles Prior (Victoria, 2000), p.9-15. The complex nature of politeness in the Scottish Enlightenment and the role Mandeville plays in it have been pointed out in John Robertson, 'The Scottish contribution to the Enlightenment', p.46-47. For a consideration of the civic tradition in Scotland, see also Robertson, 'The Scottish Enlightenment at the limits of the civic tradition', in *Wealth and virtue: the shaping of political economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge, 1983), p.137-78.

127. Because of this ideologically charged expression, I feel reluctant to call Hume an 'Addisonian essayist' as Adam Potkay, for example, does in his *The Fate of eloquence*, p.9.

128. See Jenny Davidson, *Hypocrisy and the politics of politeness: manners and morals from Locke to Austen* (Cambridge, 2004), p.1-14.

129. *Times literary supplement*, 20 September 2012. See also the work of John Dunn, for example, *Democracy: a history* (London, 2005), p.149-88. For an interpretation of Quentin Skinner's approach to political theory as part of

microscopic scale in seeking to establish that there are significant similarities between Mandeville and Hume, and further in offering the opportunity to understand what Hume was saying in comparison with Mandeville's later works. The key insight the book offers in these terms is also simple: the crucial development in Mandeville's works offering an interpretation of how young Hume's thinking evolved alongside the debate between Mandeville, Hutcheson and other writers disparaging the *Fable*. My claim is that one should appreciate the details of Mandeville's intellectual development in order to understand Hume and what it meant for him to be an anatomist of morals. In terms of historical causality, there is no need to assume that Hume understood the evolution of Mandeville's œuvre precisely as described in this book, but Hume's *Treatise* should be interpreted in the light of what Mandeville advances in his later works.

On the methodological level I believe the book has something new to offer in that the publishing history of the *Fable* supports my interpretation of Mandeville's intellectual development. It is still not very often that intellectual history and book history go hand in hand in any relevant sense.[130] Regarding the *Fable*, neither the existence nor the real influence of publishers is customarily acknowledged. The relevant commercial decisions are not only ignored, but miscellaneous details have given rise to the strange theory that Mandeville himself made the editorial choices without being notably influenced by the famous publishing house of Jacob Tonson, whose name is to be found in many imprints of his books. What I try to offer, in contrast to

Begriffsgeschichte movement with Weberian emphases on macro-changes, and with a link to Reinhart Koselleck's work, see Kari Palonen, 'Quentin Skinner's rhetoric of conceptual change', *History of human sciences* 10 (1997), p.72-76; Palonen, 'The history of concepts as a style of political theorizing: Quentin Skinner's and Reinhart Koselleck's subversion of normative political theory', *European journal of political theory* 1 (2002), p.91-106, and Palonen, *Quentin Skinner: history, politics, rhetoric* (Cambridge, 2003).

130. See, however, the works of Noel Malcolm, especially *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford, 2002), and the impact he has had on the post-Cambridge school era of intellectual history. See also Richard Sher, *The Enlightenment and the book: Scottish authors and their publisher in eighteenth-century Britain, Ireland and America* (Chicago, IL, 2006).

this view of an author crafting his works as he pleases and changing the commercial world around him, is a concrete and materialist way of looking at how the commercial aspects of the book trade shaped perhaps the most influential eighteenth-century satire of modern life, *The Fable of the bees*.

My account of the publishing history of the *Fable of the bees* includes corrections to F. B. Kaye's influential interpretation. It must be noted that this should not be taken as a challenge to Kaye's unrivalled contribution to Mandeville scholarship. The problem with Kaye's editorial work is that although it has many excellent virtues, it turns Mandeville into an unnecessarily modern author, occupying this rather fictitious place in which authorial intention dictates editorial and publishing choices. Kaye underestimated the crucial significance of publishers and the commercial aspects of the publishing business. My suggestion is that his decision to publish *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II* as a work of two volumes has distorted the way we read Mandeville. Even if scholars have noted that there are differences between the two different parts (or volumes as Kaye likes to call them), *Part II* is customarily read as an elaborated defence of the original *Fable* that is thought to reveal its real meaning, perhaps naturally from our perspective, because they share the same title and are said to be two volumes defining a single thesis. In fact, the two parts are different works and intended as such because they are intellectually separate. Supplementing textual and intellectual analysis with a description of the publishing history of Mandeville's works has made this clear.

Outline of the work

This book is comprised of three main chapters, two on Mandeville and a longer one on Hume. Each of the larger chapters is divided into smaller sections, as indicated in the contents page to this volume.

First, I argue that the relevance of Mandeville's intellectual development has not been fully articulated in previous scholarship. The book draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism in *The Fable of the bees* to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. I argue that what has been called

Part II of the *Fable* was in fact a new work, much closer in content to his *Enquiry into the origin of honour* (1732) than to *The Fable.* Whereas in the original *Fable* he characterised the origin of society in 'Hobbist' terms, in *Part II* he developed a much more sophisticated conjectural history of civil society. In his later works he crucially acknowledges the possibility of natural virtues, in contrast to his earlier thesis justifying the existence of non-arbitrary moral distinctions. The new account is based on the distinction between the two passions of 'self-love' and 'self-liking', which Mandeville used to explain how it was that justice and politeness emerged as the artifices that held political society together.

In the second chapter I undertake a re-examination of the publishing history of Mandeville's works that sheds light on his intellectual development. I give an account of his career and the publishing history of *The Fable of the bees.* My interpretation, which is based in part on previously unknown material, challenges F. B. Kaye's influential decision to publish the two parts of *The Fable* as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the account of Mandeville's intellectual development is to provide a context for the young David Hume when he encountered the new scene of thought in 1729.

After studying Mandeville's intellectual development I explore the social theory of the *Treatise.* I show how Hume put Mandeville's distinction between self-love and self-liking to work in his own conception of political sociability, the function of which he believed was to explain the respective roles of justice and politeness in the construction and preservation of civil societies over time. Even if in Book 3 of the *Treatise* Hume gives more attention to the artifice of justice that restrains men's self-love, self-liking and its corresponding artifice, politeness is no less important to the conceptual architecture of his history of civil society. This framework, I suggest, is what Mandeville and Hume sought to explain as anatomists of civil society.

2. Intellectual change in Bernard Mandeville

This chapter argues that there was a visible intellectual change in Mandeville's works from the original *Fable* to *Part II.* First I consider the Hobbist nature of the original *Fable* and the criticism that Hobbism received in Britain in the 1720s. I then show how the views expressed in *Part II* are different in this context, and how Mandeville used the distinction between self-love and self-liking to explain how civil societies remained intact. My claim is that this was a significant new development compared to the original *Fable,* especially in the light of its reception.

i. Hobbism in *The Fable of the bees*

Bernard Mandeville establishes his views on Hobbism in *The Fable.*[1] As Jon Parkin's *Taming the Leviathan* indicates, the history of Hobbism is complex, with many byways and highways. If one takes some distance from the particulars, however, the basic arguments directed against it in the eighteenth century appear to be rather simple. The accusations were principally two-fold: that it was atheism due to its inherent materialism, and that it was a political argument couched in terms of self-preservation.[2] As Noel Malcolm writes, on most occasions the charges 'had little to do with Hobbes's philosophical arguments'.[3] What is of interest in

1. Istvan Hont in a plausible and influential way has argued that *The Fable* was written against Fénelon's view of political society and the main issue at hand was luxury. The interpretation put forward here regards the foundation for Mandeville's argument and this does not contradict Hont's interpretation. The emphasis, however, is different; see Hont, 'The Early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury', p.379-418.
2. Regarding self-preservation see, for example, John Shafte, *The Great law of nature, or Self-preservation, examined, asserted and vindicated from Mr Hobbes his abuses. In a small discourse; part moral, part political, and part religious* (London, printed for the author, 1673). About Shafte and self-preservation, see also Jon Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan: the reception of the political and religious ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640-1700* (Cambridge, 2007), p.270-71.
3. Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes,* p.23.

the present work is how the accusations in the 1720s affected Mandeville's thinking. After the 1650s 'to call something Hobbist was to infer that it was heterodox, blasphemous and unacceptable'.[4] I do not use the umbrella term Hobbism in this sense, however. In fact, for clarity's sake, I leave the question of religion and theology aside for the most part.

For the current purposes Hobbism is best understood as a general theory that (a) claims that all moral distinctions are artificially invented; (b) is put forward to explain all human action by ultimately reducing it to self-love and self-preservation; and (c) based on the above two points, claims that fear is the only useful passion that civilises men. It might well be that this was not Thomas Hobbes's own stratagem in strongly emphasising the last point. He maintains in *Leviathan* that 'of all passions' fear is the one 'which enclineth men least to break the lawes'. Furthermore, 'it is the only' thing 'that makes men keep them'.[5] He may not have been advocating a doctrine that incorporated all three points. Perhaps he was simply describing the nature of a political society through hypothetical speculation. However, this was not how his contemporaries understood his theory. According to some calculations, by the turn of the century there were more than fifty accounts specifically arguing against Hobbes.[6] Many of these solely concerned religion and atheism, but there were also several interesting moral arguments showing how not only the obvious point (c), but also points (a) and (b) were closely linked to early conceptions of Hobbism. At the same time, it should be pointed out that there are also seventeenth-century British authors who openly praise Hobbes. Walter Charleton, an early member of the Royal Society, for example, was a public admirer of Hobbes. He writes that regarding 'the description of many of the *passions*' he has 'interwoven some threds taken from the webs of those three excellent men, *Gassendus*, *Des Cartes*, and our *Mr. Hobbes*; who have all written most judiciously of that obstruse theme'.[7] Charleton does not merely praise Hobbes, he acknowledges that English people should be proud that one of the contemporary greats is *their* Mr Hobbes.[8] This raises the question of whether there was a self-sustaining tradition of Hobbism among seventeenth-century physicians, not only on the Continent, but also in Britain.

4. Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*, p.202.
5. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.27, p.464.
6. Sterling P. Lamprecht, 'Hobbes and Hobbism', *The American political science review* 34 (1940), p.32. It is highly likely that this number would increase considerably in calculations that are more up-to-date. However, even if we allow that there were actually 300 critical accounts, this does not change anything. Hobbes simply created a lot of negative responses.

A mere look at the table of contents of *The Fable of the bees* suggests that Mandeville based his doctrine on Hobbism in the sense described above.[9] It includes entries such as 'The first rudiments of morality were broach'd for the ease of governors',[10] 'All desires tend to self-preservation' and 'Man is civiliz'd by his fear'.[11] In other words, it suggests that moral distinctions are artificially invented, that all human actions focus on self-preservation and, moreover, that fear plays an important role in taming the savage in a peculiarly Hobbist manner. To emphasise my general argument, I believe that Mandeville dropped these axioms in *Part II*, in which moral distinctions are no longer seen as artificial tricks played by politicians upon ignorant people. The role of politicians is different, the definition of self-preservation changes, fear is no longer staunchly emphasised and, what is more, Mandeville admits that all human actions cannot be reduced to self-love and self-preservation.

In *The Fable of the bees* Mandeville attempted to logically deduce all the passions from the preceding doctrine. What particularly

7. Walter Charleton, *Natural history of the passions* (London, printed for James Magnes, 1674), p.clv. Charlton's *Natural history of the passions* relies heavily, along with the abovementioned 'three excellent men', on the works of two of Hobbes's friends, namely Kenelm Digby and Thomas Willis. It is no news to scholars that Charleton publicly admired Hobbes; see Jon Parkin, 'Hobbism in the later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker', *Historical journal* 42 (1999), p.91. Parkin points out that C. D. Thorpe already lists Charleton's many references to Hobbes; see C. D. Thorpe, *The Aesthetic theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Michigan, MI 1940), p.176-88.
8. Regarding Hobbes's influence, in particular Charleton's understanding of laughter seems to be based on Hobbes's theory; see Charleton, *Natural history*, p.144-47.
9. It should be pointed out that the table of contents was not printed after the second edition; see Kaye, 'Descriptions of the editions', *Part II*, p.388.
10. Kaye, 'Descriptions of the editions', *Part II*, p.388.
11. Kaye, 'Descriptions of the editions', *Part II*, p.391.

caught the eyes of his critics, and perhaps later made him re-evaluate his position, was his treatment of natural affection. With an emphasis on the overriding presence of self-love he takes up the topic and maintains that a statement such as 'mothers naturally love their children' does not, in fact, mean anything more than saying that a man naturally loves his beautiful house. A mother's love for her child is 'a passion' among others, and since 'all passions center in self-love' it might just as well be subdued by a superior passion, to 'sooth that same self-love'.[12] He does not stop here, however, and goes on to deny the originality of natural affection and in particular its independence from self-love. He claims that 'our love to what never was within the reach of our senses is but poór and inconsiderable'. In other words, 'women have no natural love to what they bear' while pregnant and 'their affection begins' only 'after the birth'. Moreover, 'even when children first are born the mother's love is but weak'. Natural affection, according to the interpretation given in *The Fable*, only 'increases with the sensibility of the child' – once it starts to give a reciprocal response to the mother's affection. Thus, even a categorical, seemingly real virtue such as natural affection is directly linked to the idea of 'pleasing our selves' expressed in the first part of *The Fable*.[13] Furthermore, since there is 'no merit' in self-love, even natural affection is dubbed morally indifferent. Mandeville indicated that everything was to be explained away in terms of self-love.

Mandeville's description of other passions, such as envy, is also deduced from the same line of reasoning. He claims that 'it is impossible' that a man 'should wish better for another than he does for himself', if there is the slightest chance that he may 'attain to those wishes'. What this means is that 'when we observe something we like' and do not have, this causes 'sorrow in us for not having the thing we like'. According to Mandeville, 'this sorrow is incurable' when 'we' actually 'esteem' the 'thing we want'. Thus, since we are not able to get what we desire, 'self-defence' that is 'restless' and 'never suffers us to leave any means untried how to remove evil from us' steps in. In the end, 'experience teaches us, that nothing in nature more alleviates this sorrow than our anger against those who' have 'what we esteem and want'. Thus, our anger is working for our self-preservation and 'we cherish and cultivate' it in order 'to save or relieve our selves, at least in part, from the uneasiness we felt' because we did not get what we esteem.[14]

12. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.75.
13. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.76.

Envy is not the only passion that Mandeville reduces to self-preservation. In an analogous manner, he links more or less everything to self-love and there is no other end to his Hobbist doctrine. 'As every body would be happy, enjoy pleasure and avoid pain if he could, so self-love bids us look on every creature that seems satisfied, as a rival in happiness'.[15] He uses the same line of reasoning in explaining friendship, love[16] – even politeness,[17] and naturally considers love between the sexes analogous to his earlier examples in that it 'prompts us to labour for the preservation of our species'.[18]

Politicians, moral distinctions and civil society

The role of the politician is more concrete in *The Fable* than is usually acknowledged.[19] As mentioned in the introduction to this volume (see p.11-12), Goldsmith's account of Mandeville's use of politicians as a symbol of society has been quite generally accepted, but J. A. W. Gunn has pointed out with a reference to Goldsmith's works that there are also several occasions when Mandeville uses the term 'politician' in a narrow sense. Mandeville emphasises that it is the 'chief thing' of the 'lawgivers and other wise men, that have laboured for the establishment of society' to 'make the people they were to govern, believe that it

14. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.135.
15. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.139.
16. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.142.
17. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.342.
18. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.142.
19. See especially J. A. W. Gunn, 'Mandeville: poverty, luxury and the Whig theory of government', in *Beyond liberty and property*, p.102-103. On Mandeville's politics, see also H. T. Dickinson, 'Bernard Mandeville: an independent Whig', *SVEC* 15 (1976), p.559-70, and Thomas A. Horne, *The Social thought of Bernard Mandeville: virtue and commerce in early eighteenth-century England* (New York, 1978).

was more beneficial for every body to conquer than indulge his appetites, and much better to mind the publick than what seem'd his private interest'.[20] Whether it happens through use of language, manipulation or other means, it is still the politician that in concrete manner invents moral distinctions and what Mandeville calls 'real virtue'. As he so plainly put it, 'the first rudiments of morality' are 'broach'd by skilful politicians' in order 'to render men useful to each other as well as tractable'. These moral distinctions 'were chiefly contrived' so 'that the ambitious might reap the more benefit from, and govern vast numbers of them with the greater ease and security'.[21]

It is the politician who first tricks people into believing in the significance of real virtue. However, it is doubtful 'whether mankind would have ever believ'd' in it. In fact, Mandeville reminds us that it is unlikely 'that any body could have persuaded' people 'to disapprove of their natural inclinations, or prefer the good of others to their own, if at the same time he had not shew'd them an equivalent to be enjoy'd as a reward for the violence, which by doing so they of necessity must commit upon themselves'.[22] Hence the need for a scheme of 'counterfeited virtue' that sets out the dialectics of countervailing passions. It was for this very reason, Mandeville states, that the politician came to realise that 'flattery must be the most powerful argument that could be used to human creatures'. In other words, men are tricked into self-denial – to conquer their natural inclinations.[23] This is only a step away from the claim that what 'first put man upon crossing his appetites and subduing his dearest inclinations' was 'the skilful management of wary politicians', and 'the nearer we search into human nature, the more we shall be convinced, that the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride'.[24]

Mandeville starts his description of the origin of civil society by deriving all the principle appetites from self-preservation. Pride does not function as one of the original appetites in *The Fable*, nor

20. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.42.
21. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.47.
22. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.42.
23. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.42-43. See Heath, 'Mandeville's bewitching engine of praise', p.205-26.
24. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.51.

is it described as in any way characteristic of man in his original state. It only begins to operate at a later developmental stage. Furthermore, it is an instrument that politicians are thought to adopt in order to flatter subjects into subjection. It seems as if pride did not affect savage men. This is defined in Remark R[25] as well as in 'The search into nature of society', in which Mandeville writes that 'hunger, thirst and nakedness are the first tyrants that force us to stir' and only 'afterwards, our pride, sloth, sensuality and fickleness are the great patrons that promote all arts and sciences, trades, handicrafts and callings'.[26] This categorical distinction of the effects of the passions on the different stages of historical development adds up to a fair amount of confusion in Mandeville's first account of civil society.

Moreover, in what could be described as a Hobbist manner, Mandeville denominates 'Fear', 'laws' and 'self-preservation' as the predominant factors for the establishment of a civil society. The difference between a barbaric and a civilised state is that in the latter people do not vent their natural impulses of anger. Great trust has to be placed in the force of laws. Mandeville emphasises that it is 'the first care' of all governments to inflict 'severe punishments' in order to 'curb' man's hurtful anger. He continues, describing how laws are highly effective in increasing fear and preventing 'the mischief' that anger 'might produce'. 'When various laws' are 'strictly executed' in order to restrain a person 'from using force', we come to realise that 'self-preservation must teach him to be peaceable'. He then makes the point that, 'as it is every body's business to be as little disturbed as is possible, his fears will be continually augmented and enlarged as he advances in experience, understanding and foresight'. Thus, he reaches the conclusion that 'as the provocations' of 'anger will be infinite in the civilized state, so his fears to damp it will be the same, and thus in a little time he'll be taught by his fears to destroy his anger, and by art to consult in an opposite method the same self-preservation for which the nature before had furnished him with anger, as well as the rest of the passions'.[27]

25. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.205-10.
26. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.366.
27. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.206.

Within his initial system Mandeville faces a problem in explaining how an individual who is first suppressed by rigid laws finally starts to cultivate his passions and to benefit society at large. His solution is to furnish cunning politicians with even greater power. First they curb man's anger with inflexible laws. Then they have to alter the substance so as to benefit from the same passions they had suffocated. In stating the unavoidable fact that at some point in history a society 'may have occasion to extend their limits further, and enlarge their territories, or others may invade theirs, or something else will happen that man must be brought to fight', he provides a solution that is inconsistent with his initial theory. Later he quietly dismisses this first account and constructs a new system of sociability based on different principles, as described in various dialogues between Horatio and Cleomenes.

Nevertheless, politicians who manage to shake off man's natural anger are at this point in *The Fable* obliged to 'take off some of man's fears' in order to make him 'fight'.[28] Mandeville presses the point, in stark contrast with republican political ideals, that 'natural courage', anger, is not just brutal, but 'altogether useless in a war to be managed by stratagem'. Yet, something 'equivalent for courage' is needed to 'make men fight'.[29] This is, of course, honour. The 'principle of honour' is appointed as 'the tye of society'. 'There would be no living without it in a large nation', he insists.[30] The politician's task is to persuade men to believe that they possess a 'principle of valour distinct from anger'.[31] Given that the very principle is fully artificial, valiant men in reality feel 'nothing' of it and are in fact 'mistaking pride for courage'. Hence, a law-giver has 'to take all imaginable care to flatter the pride of those' who brag of valour. In due course 'the fear of discovering the reality of his heart, comes to be so great that it out-does the fear of death it self'. Mandeville rounds off this line of thought with a lesson to be learned: 'Do but increase man's pride, and his fear of shame will ever be proportioned to it; for

28. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.207.
29. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.208.
30. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.218.
31. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.208.

the greater value a man sets upon himself, the more pains he'll take and the greater hardships he'll undergo to avoid shame.'[32] Pride is not presented as a socially constructive passion. The cultivation of one's own worth is an object that society should pursue because it increases one's sense of shame. 'Artificial' courage is considered 'useful to the body politick', but only when it is thought of as consisting '*in a superlative horror against shame*'.[33]

Mandeville maintains that 'nature' is 'always the same, in the formation of animals', which in his first outline of civility simply means that 'men, whether they are born in courts or forests, are susceptible to anger'.[34] This anger might be useful to 'a single creature' living 'by himself', but 'society' has 'no manner of occasion for it'.[35] Structuring his primary analysis from the concepts of 'anger', 'appetites', 'pride' and 'fear', he concludes that 'fear' is 'the only useful passion then that man is possessed of toward the peace and quiet of a society', and that a man 'will be' more 'orderly and governable' the more you 'work upon it'.[36] Pride is only of instrumental value in this first outline of the origin of civil society, which is unsurprising. It is, after all, a Hobbist doctrine.

ii. The critique of Hobbism in the 1720s

At the core of the 1720s criticism of *The Fable* one finds William Law's *Remarks upon a late book, entituled 'The Fable of the bees'*.[37] Other well-known criticisms of *The Fable* include: Richard Fiddes, *General treatise of morality*;[38] John Dennis, *Vice and luxury publick mischief*;[39] George Bluet, *An Enquiry whether a general practice of virtue tends to the*

32. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.209.
33. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.210.
34. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.207.
35. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.206-207.
36. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.206.
37. (London, printed for Will[iam] and John Innys, 1724). Law's argument is followed, for example, in Robert Burrow, *Meletemata Darringtoniana: an essay upon divine providence with a particular view to its symmetry in reference to the natural, and more* (London, printed for John Clark and Richard Hett, 1725), p.99.
38. (London, printed for S. Billingsley, 1724)
39. (London, printed for W. Mears, 1724).

wealth or poverty[40] and John Disney, *A View of ancient laws, against immorality and profaneness.*[41] All of these made a lot of noise at the time, but none of them turned out to be as important challenges to Mandeville as Francis Hutcheson and Joseph Butler's commentaries discussed below. Generally more complex and interesting reaction to *The Fable* came from Archibald Campbell in his *Arete-logia, or an Enquiry into the original of moral virtue.*[42] Apart from general criticism, *The Fable* generated also different discussions upon particular issues, especially upon charity schools.[43] Not all books, however, criticised *The Fable.* A somewhat favourable opinion about 'private vices, public benefits' is given, for example, in Patrick Delany, *The Tribune.*[44]

The criticism of Mandeville in the 1720s had an inevitable impact on his thinking. The contemporary attack on Hobbism (not only on Mandeville, which I think is vital to understand) resulted in Mandeville's adding self-liking to his system, but also made him accept the possibility of fully natural other-regarding affections (of which parental affection for children is the prime example). What is more, these new ingredients amounted to a novel theory about the evolution of civil society and moral institutions.

The critique of Hobbism culminated in the question of whether there was any *de facto* other-regarding affection that was natural to man. The basic thinking behind it was that if it could be proved that such a passion existed, the Hobbist scheme of reducing all human action to self-love would be invalid. As Joseph Butler put it, if it could be shown that there was '*some degree*' of '*real* good-will in man towards man', it would be 'sufficient' to prove that 'the seeds of it' were 'implanted in our nature'.[45]

40. (London, printed for R. Wilkin, 1725).
41. (Cambridge, printed for Corn[elius] and John Crownfield, 1729).
42. (Westminster, printed for B. Creake, 1728). On Campbell and Mandeville, see Maurer, 'Self-love in early eighteenth-century British moral philosophy', p.318-78.
43. See, for example, William George Barnes, *Charity and charity schools defended: a sermon preach'd at St Martin's Palace, in Norwich, on March 6 1723* (London, printed for John Wyat, 1727); William Hendley, *A Defence of the charity-schools: wherein the many false, scandalous and malicious objections of those advocates for ignorance and irreligion* [...] (London, printed for W. Mears, 1725).
44. (Dublin, printed for S. Powell, 1729), p.66.

As I have emphasised, this discussion on Hobbism was an extensive process, starting from Hobbes and changing its stance through decades of debate. The significance of the first part of *The Fable* is that it epitomised Hobbism in the early eighteenth century, which is also why it provoked such a vast amount of negative response. Hobbes and Mandeville were indeed thought to share the same conception of human nature.[46] Poets alluded to 'the rank dregs of Hobbes and Mandeville'.[47] The matter of the natural affection that parents have for their children sums up the whole dispute of the 1720s: at the beginning of the eighteenth century natural affection was not as commonplace as it might appear to us.[48]

An interesting question is what Thomas Hobbes himself thought about this particular issue. The answer is that, at least in what is considered his most important political works, he did not think about it very much. It is true that he refers in *Leviathan* to some kind of 'natural inclination of the sexes one to another, and to their children'.[49] He also briefly touches upon the '*natural affection* of parents to their children' in *Elements of law*, explaining that it is 'contained' in the concept of '*good-will* and *charity*' and

45. Joseph Butler, *Fifteen sermons preached at the Rolls chapel* (London, printed for James and John Knapton, 1726), p.7.
46. See, for example, Thomas Jeffery, *Christianity the perfection of all religion, natural and revealed* (London, printed for J. Clark and R. Hett, 1728), p.80-81. The link between Hobbes and Mandeville was also established in Lucifer [pseud.], *The Doctrine and practice of Christianity, inconsistent with the happiness of mankind, clearly demonstrated in a letter to His Grace the* [...] (London, printed for G. Kearsly, 1760), p.60, and Philip Skelton, *Deism revealed, or the Attack on Christianity candidly reviewed in its real merits, as they stand in the celebrated writings of Lord Herbert* [...] (London, printed for A. Millar, 1751), vol.2, p.267-68.
47. *A Collection of poems in four volumes. By several hands*, 4th edn (London, printed for R. and J. Dodsley, 1755), vol.3, p.294.
48. I concentrate here on Hutcheson and Butler, but there are other significant authors that discuss this topic, for example Isaac Watts writes about natural affection at length in his *The Doctrine of the passions explained and improved, or a Brief and comprehensive scheme of the natural affections of mankind* (London, 1729), p.44-45, a work where he points out that to draw a 'system' of passions 'is not only desirable', it is 'part of the *science of human nature*'; Watts, *The Doctrine of the passions explained and improved*, p.iv.
49. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.20, p.308.

that 'the *Greeks*' explained it as 'that affection wherewith men seek to *assist* those that adhere unto them'.[50] Whatever Hobbes meant by this, however, it did not play any consequential role in his political or moral philosophy. Further, as indicated in *The Fable*, it could be explained away in a Hobbist system by claiming that it was just one passion arising from self-love that could be countered by any stronger passion arising from the same source. However, I do not think this was Hobbes's intention, and he certainly does not put forward clear and concise arguments pointing in that direction. In short, he did not trouble himself refuting natural other-regarding affections because he simply was not concerned with such issues. In deriving duties, rights and obligations from a jurisprudential perspective, the question of whether some inclinations or passions are natural is somewhat negligible.

The long discussion on parental dominion in chapter 9 of *De Cive* does not take into account the natural affection that parents might have for their children. If Hobbes had concerned himself with this matter, he would not have written: '*he* who is newly *born* is in the *Mothers* power before any others, insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own will, either breed him up, or adventure him to fortune'.[51] This does not necessarily mean that he was claiming that mothers do not really feel for their children, only for themselves. Hobbes's concern lay elsewhere. In *De Cive* he continuously equates a 'subject', 'sonne' and a 'servant', seeing no difference between their relationships with the authority in question.[52] In other words, because Hobbes wanted to point out the symmetry between the subjection of a son to his parent and a subject to a sovereign in order to illustrate the nature of institutional relations, the question of natural affection had no part to play in this project.

Moreover, the treatment of parental dominion in *Leviathan* solely concerns the question of who has the 'right of dominion'

50. Thomas Hobbes, 'Human nature, or the Fundamental elements of policy' [*Elements of law* (1640)] in *The Moral and political works of Thomas Hobbes* (London, 1750), IX.17, p.21.
51. Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: the English version*, ed. Howard Warrender (1652; Oxford, 1983), III, IX.2. See also Hobbes, *Elements of law*, XXIII.3 and Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.20, p.310.
52. Hobbes, *De Cive*, IX.9, see also Hobbes, *De Cive*, IX.7.

and what this sovereignty, in effect, means.[53] When Hobbes characterises a family he includes not only parents and children, but also servants. In fact, sons and servants are once more placed in equal positions towards the head of the family, and the 'sovereign power' is equally distributed over 'children, and servants'.[54] The idea that parents naturally love their children, and what that might imply, simply does not arise. It does not, of course, mean that Hobbes necessarily denied that such an affection might be *de facto* real, just that in his system it had no relevance.

My intention is not to analyse Hobbes's political theory in any further depth, it is rather to make the point that when Mandeville, who is often seen as a Hobbist psychological egoist, admits in *Part II* that parents have natural affection towards their children, he does something that Hobbes never did (regardless of what Hobbes's own position was in reality). The consequences of this as far as Mandeville's system is concerned are immediate and momentous. If one were of a speculative nature one might hypothesise that Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville (in his later works) were not Hobbists in this respect at all: Hobbes because this was not an issue for him, and Mandeville because he came to realise that his early Hobbist position was verifiably false. At the same time it needs to be noted that traditional interpretations of Hobbes are being constantly revisited. For example, one scholar has pointed out that his idea of state of nature was not set in stone from the start and there are many 'hesitations, uncertainties, and alterations' regarding the state of nature in his 'different works'.[55] For one of the most interesting interpretations of Hobbes's conception of state of nature, see the work of Kinch Hoekstra.[56] The view of Hobbes as a psychological egoist has also been recently placed under scrutiny.[57]

53. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.20, p.312.
54. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.26, p.446; see also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.22, p.368.
55. Francois Tricaud, 'Hobbes's conception of the state of nature from 1640 to 1651: evolution and ambiguities', in *Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes*, ed. G. A. J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, 1988), p.107-23.
56. For example, Kinch Hoekstra, 'Hobbes on the natural condition of mankind', in *Cambridge companion to Hobbes's 'Leviathan'*, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge, 2007), p.109-27.
57. See, for example, Bernard Gert, 'Hobbes's psychology', in *The Cambridge*

Whether based on the misconception of Hobbes's works or not, a Hobbist doctrine was coined by his critics and it immediately started to draw counter-arguments. One line of attack took the question of natural affection highly seriously. In 1675 one commentator accused Hobbes of being 'an atheistical fool' in denying that, generally speaking, all of God's creations 'love another better than ones self'. A simple look at 'bears, dogs, hens, bees, lions' and 'ants' shows that 'they die for their young-ones'. The same goes for 'fathers', 'mothers' and even 'friends'.[58] Most of these critical comments were just shots in the dark. It seems that late seventeenth-century authors were generally agitated about the possible existence of a system in which everything was reduced to self-love and self-interest.

Another characteristic and somewhat more constructive account came from a female philosopher towards the end of the century. Anne Conway used the notion of natural affection to prove a general point about universal benevolence. The foundation of her argument is the undeniable fact proved by experience that 'even wicked men and women' love 'their children'.[59] They do so because all creatures 'cherish' their offspring 'with a natural affection'. According to Conway, this sentiment is natural and you have to be 'extremely perverse' if you are 'void of parental love'. She goes further in her materialist philosophy, however. The reason why there is natural affection is that 'children are of the same nature and substance' as their parents, and parental love is therefore as real as loving oneself. Furthermore, since there is some kind of resemblance in everything, she concludes, there must also remain 'something of universal love in all

companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge, 1996), p.165-68. On relevance of glory and vanity in Hobbes, see Gabriella Slomp, 'Hobbes on glory and civil strife', in *The Cambridge companion to Hobbes's Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg, (Cambridge, 2007), p.181-99, and Gabriella Slomp, *Thomas Hobbes and the political philosophy of glory* (London, 2000).

58. Thomas Traherne, *Christian ethicks, or Divine morality: opening the way to blessedness, by the rules of vertue and reason* (London, printed for Jonathan Edwin, 1675), p.520.
59. Anne Conway, *The Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy* (London, 1692), p.98, paraphrased in Samuel I. Mintz, *The Hunting of 'Leviathan': seventeenth-century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1962), p.145.

creatures, one towards another' because 'in regard of their first substance and essence' everything is 'all one and the same thing, and as it were parts and members of one body'. In other words, everything in this world is somehow related, and thus universal benevolence is natural and real.[60]

Later on in the eighteenth century there was evidence of a general rupture among contract theorists regarding natural affection. Mathew Tindal, for example, departs from Hobbes's notion of parallel relationships between children and their parents, and between subjects and their sovereigns, pointing out that they are different in nature. The only 'relation' that 'is call'd a natural relation' is 'between parents and children', 'because it does not come by compact and agreement, as all others do which men enter into for their own sakes'. What this means is that 'the duty which children' owe 'to their parents' has a natural foundation and should not cease when the interest dies. He contrasts this family relationship with most other 'relations of life' that are 'reciprocal dutys' that 'oblige' men for 'no longer' than 'they receive' a 'suitable return'. In government, for example, 'the dutys are conditional'. When subjects do not 'receive' 'protection' from the 'government' they no longer have 'to pay obedience'. However, the 'gratitude' that children have for their parents does not end because the relationship is not founded on a compact or an agreement: it is natural and is not designed to serve mutual interests.[61]

From a wider perspective the critique of Hobbism in the 1720s was not so surprising. For example, Francis Hutcheson's target, considered in this earlier context, is a familiar one. Even if it was true that 'he could' not give a 'lecture from his chair at Glasgow without criticizing Mandeville', it should be pointed out that Mandeville was not his only target: in *Inquiry* in particular he was aiming at Hobbism in general.[62] As James Moore succinctly puts

60. Conway, *The Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy*, p.98-99.
61. Mathew Tindal, *Four discourses* (London, 1709), p.122. Also, of course, some Christian authors emphasised the importance of natural affection; see, for example, Richard Lucas, *Sermons on several occasions and subjects, in three volumes*, second edn (London, printed for John Wyat, 1722), vol.1, p.98.
62. Hundert, *Enlightenment's 'Fable'*, p.57. Hutcheson once noted that *The Fable* is 'unanswerable'; see Francis Hutcheson, *Reflections upon laughter, and remarks*

it, Hutcheson's 'project in his philosophical treatises of the 1720s was to prove that our ideas of beauty and virtue and our kind affections and desires were real ideas, perceived by internal senses whose sensibilia were quite distinct from the dependent and contingent sensations of the external senses'.[63] A major feature of this project was to argue against Hobbism and prove beyond any doubt that men had other-regarding affections. It is notable that on the subject of natural affection Hutcheson presents his argument with particular care.

We have, Hutcheson claims, 'practical dispositions to virtue *implanted in our* nature' and thus a Hobbist system is evidently false.[64] One of Hutcheson's strongest arguments concerns the existence of moral vocabulary: if all moral distinctions were artificial, as the Hobbists claimed, and there was no real notion of moral virtue, it would have been impossible to develop such an extensive moral vocabulary. Even Lucretius and Hobbes, he points out, 'are full of expressions of *admiration, gratitude, praise, desire of doing good;* and of *censure, disapprobation, aversion to some forms of vice*'. They plainly show 'themselves in innumerable instances struck with some *moral species*'.[65] This argument is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the idea of the undeniable existence of a moral vocabulary points directly towards Hobbes and Hobbism. Secondly, on several occasions when Hume touches upon this issue he plainly concurs with Hutcheson, which gives further reason to reconsider what his position was, in fact, and what simple concessions he made to Hutcheson and other like-minded moral philosophers.[66]

upon 'The Fable of the bees' (Glasgow, printed for Daniel Baxter, 1750), p.41. On David Fate Norton's interpretation of Hutcheson's morals with regard to Hobbes and Mandeville and influence on Hume, see Norton, *David Hume: common-sense moralist*, p.55-93.

63. James Moore, 'The two systems of Francis Hutcheson', in *Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990), p.49.
64. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue* (London, printed for Will[iam] and John Smith, 1725), p.195.
65. Francis Hutcheson, *An Essay on the nature and conduct of the passions and affections: with illustrations on the moral sense* (London, printed for John Smith and William Bruce, 1728), p.105.
66. For a further discussion on Hume's concessions towards Hutcheson, their

Hutcheson's list of virtues, which are always approved of and natural, includes 'natural affection', 'gratitude', 'pity' and 'friendship'.[67] However, of these it is 'natural affection' that is analysed with particular care. In *Inquiry* he takes it as his task to 'establish' a 'true' virtue that is '*some determination of our nature to study the good of others*; or *some instinct, antecendent to all reason from interest, which influences us to the love of others*'. He claims that 'this *disinterested affection* may appear strange to men impress'd with notions of *self-love* as the *sole* motive of action'.[68] To put it more bluntly, anyone who upholds a selfish hypothesis to explain human actions is a mere 'sophist'.[69] These Hobbists are a collection of confused 'philosophers' who do not rely on experience but on the basis of some far-fetched system try to deny what even a plain 'farmer' undoubtedly feels. A normal person 'studies the *preservation* and *happiness* of his children'. He indisputably 'loves them without any design of good to himself'.[70] Any argument claiming that this natural affection is caused by 'self-love' is futile. Hutcheson juxtaposes this disinterested love with a hypothetical example of 'merchants' whose 'partnership' occasions mutual 'gain'. Such a partnership is a 'plain' example of the 'conjunction of interest'. In no way is the 'affection' that 'parents' have towards their 'children' comparable to it.[71] In a similar vein, it would be absurd to claim that a 'child's *sensations*' could 'give pleasure or pain to the parent'. As Hutcheson concludes, natural affection is 'antecedent' to any 'conjunction of interest'. Parental love towards children

grave differences in philosophy, and, most significantly, Hume's alterations to the manuscript of Book 3 of *Treatise*, see James Moore, 'Hume and Hutcheson', in *Hume and Hume's connexions*, p.23-57. On the development of Moore's understanding between Hutcheson's and Hume's relationship, see also James Moore, 'Natural law and Pyrrhonian controversy', in *Philosophy and science in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh, 1988), p.33-34. On Hume's manuscript alterations, see R. W. Connon, 'The textual and philosophical significance of Hume's MS alterations to *Treatise III*', in *David Hume: bicentenary papers*, ed. G. P. Morice (Edinburgh, 1977), p.186-204.

67. Hutcheson, *An Essay on the nature and conduct of the passions and affections*, p.310.
68. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.143.
69. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.144.
70. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.143.
71. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.144.

is 'the cause of' a possible conjunction – 'not the effect' – and it 'then must be *disinterested*'.[72]

The argument (resembling what Anne Conway proposed) that 'children are *part* of our selves, and in loving them we but love *our selves* in them' was plain sophistry to Hutcheson. Turning it on its head he suggests that we do love our children as much as we love ourselves, but only because we have 'natural affection' that is an instinctive quality and not because we are 'conscious of their sensations'.[73] Neither can one argue that 'the *affection* of *parents*' is 'founded on *merit* or *acquaintance*'. Natural affection is not only 'antecedent to all acquaintance' that 'might occasion the *love* of *esteem*', but also 'operates where acquaintance would produce *hatred*'. No man would willingly associate with a malicious person, but parental affection points 'even toward *children*' who are 'apprehended to be *vitious*'.[74] Naturally, this does not mean that '*natural inclinations*' could not, 'in many cases', be 'overpower'd by *self-love*, where any *opposition* of interests' arises.[75] This is not the point, however. The point is that natural affection is an original passion – it cannot be reduced to self-love.

After arming himself with such a battery of arguments proving the existence of natural affection, Hutcheson turns his attention to the epitome of Hobbism – the first part of *The Fable*. He refutes Mandeville's derivative of the self-love system, namely that '*natural affection* in parents is *weak*, till the children begin to give evidences of *knowledge* and *affections*'.[76] Hutcheson's quip is that all that *The Fable* proves is that '*moral capacity* can be the occasion of increasing love without *self-interest*', which was of course contrary to Mandeville's own intentions.[77] By and large, Hutcheson's treatment of natural affection is conducted in a way that mocks Mandeville. He wittingly exposes his opponent to ridicule and forces him to reconsider his views.

Natural affection is only the starting point for Hutcheson, however. Taking it as his cue he proceeds further. Even if parental

72. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.156.
73. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.143-44.
74. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.196.
75. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.148.
76. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.145. This is a direct quote from *Fable*.
77. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.146.

affection is the most important example of an original other-regarding affection, he extends his analysis to include '*gratitude*' and 'some other', somewhat unspecified, '*disinterested tie*'.[78] For, 'there is the same kind of affection', as 'in *parents* towards *children*', 'among *collateral relations*, tho in a weaker degree'.[79] It is particularly the '*disinterested*' and '*strong determination* in our *nature* to *gratitude*, and *love* toward our *benefactors*' that supposedly proves Hutcheson's point about universal benevolence and a moral sense. As he put it, 'nothing will give us a juster idea of the *wise order* in which *human nature* is form'd for *universal love*, and *mutual good offices*, than considering *that strong attraction* of *benevolence*, which we call *gratitude*'.[80] He was thus of the impression that he had dismantled Hobbism, grounded moral virtue solely on man's internal and natural sense of morality, and made sure that the author of *The Fable* would not raise his ugly head ever again. Little did he know that an elaborate counter-attack was looming in his own backyard.

The most original and versatile eighteenth-century criticism of Hobbism came from Joseph Butler's pen.[81] Butler consciously directed his general argument against 'persons' advancing 'a system which excludes every affection' that 'tends to the good of our fellow-creatures'. He notes that these men had a 'pleasant method to solve' the affections that seemed to be of this kind. They 'tell you' that 'it is *not another* you are at all concerned about, but your *self only*'. Instead of admitting the existence of a 'manifest fact' the Hobbists 'substitute' the affection with '*another*, which is

78. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.179.
79. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.195-96.
80. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the original*, p.197.
81. On the connection between Butler and Hume, see John P. Wright, 'Butler and Hume on habit and moral character', in *Hume and Hume's connexions*, ed. M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright (Philadelphia, PA, 1995), p.105-18; Terence Penelhum, 'Butler and Hume', *Hume studies* 14 (1988), p.251-76; and Penelhum, *Butler* (London, 1985). See also Robert M. Stewart, 'Butler's argument against psychological hedonism', *Canadian journal of philosophy* 22 (1992), p.211-21, who wants to challenge the commonplace that Butler manages to counter psychological egoism. For a recent discussion of Butler's influence on Hume, see also Aaron Garrett, 'Reasoning about morals from Butler to Hume', in *Philosophy and religion in Enlightenment Britain. New case studies*, ed. Ruth Savage (Oxford, 2012), p.169-86.

reconcileable to their own scheme'. According to Butler, it was 'Hobbs' in particular who argued, for example, that 'fear and compassion are the same idea, and a fearful and a compassionate man the same character'.[82] The fact that he does not name Mandeville or *The Fable* as a target of his criticism indicates that his focus was not specifically on Mandeville, but on Hobbism in general.

Butler's refutation of psychological egoism comprises two parts. First, like Hutcheson, he aimed to show that experience proves there is real other-regarding affection in human nature. Second, unlike Hutcheson, he wanted to point out that human nature was more complex than philosophers had previously presumed: the question was not whether it was self-love or benevolence that explained human actions. Similarly, we have a number of different passions that cannot be reduced to either one of these.

Like many others, Butler took the seemingly obvious fact that parents disinterestedly loved their children as his point of departure. 'Affection of parents to their children', he writes, is the prime example of a 'natural' other-regarding passion.[83] This 'natural affection' manifestly 'leads' parents 'to take care of, to educate' and 'to make due provision for' their children.[84] He directed this argument particularly at Hobbes, apparently seeing him as a person who was attempting to reduce natural affection to the desire for power. The passage from which Butler takes this idea, and which he directly quotes, is the only section in the *Elements* (or the 1650s abridgement, 'Human nature', which he used) in which Hobbes discusses natural affection. He writes: 'there can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to *assist* men in theirs'.[85] Butler's contention is that it was ridiculous to claim that the appearance of 'good-will' or 'good-nature' could always be reduced to the 'desire of power'.[86] I do

82. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.80.
83. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.33.
84. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.14.
85. Hobbes, 'Of human nature', IX.17, p.21.
86. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.7. For another direct reference to Hobbes's 'Human nature', see Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.83. It should be noted that these quotes are the only direct critical quotes in that work.

not think that this was necessarily what Hobbes wanted to claim.[87] However, Butler's argument functions as a refutation of Hobbism in general. 'If there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections', Butler insists, 'if there be any affection in human nature' in which 'the object and end' is 'the good of another' then 'this is itself benevolence, or the love of another'. Thus, to show that natural affection exists is to show that benevolence is something real and natural. 'Be it ever so short, be it in even so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined', to Butler it 'proves' the 'assertion' that we have a 'natural principle of benevolence'.[88]

After establishing that men have natural affection towards their children, and generalising that this undoubtedly proves that men have natural other-regarding affections, Butler claims to have efficiently proved that self-love and benevolence are both natural passions – or as he calls them – two sides of an individual. His analysis is written in a style that gives the impression that the entire fuss about the issue had been futile. He sees no problem in reconciling self-love and benevolence. Man has two different natures: one obliging him to take care of himself and the other 'having respect to society, and tending to promote public good, the happiness of society'. Thus, 'these ends do indeed perfectly coincide'.[89] They 'are different', but 'we can scarce promote one without the other'.[90]

From here Butler proceeds to the original part of his analysis. In order to refute Hobbes and others who stressed the prevalence of self-love, it is not sufficient to prove that there evidently is a thing called benevolence. Additionally, one needs to show that one's inner frame is constituted of many other passions and affections that cannot be reduced to self-love or benevolence.[91]

87. For an account that treats this particular textual clause from the point of view of what Hobbes might have actually been saying with the conclusion that 'Butler's criticism is ill-founded', see Tom Sorell, *Hobbes* (London, 1986), p.97-98.
88. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.8-9.
89. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.5.
90. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.9.
91. Regarding Butler's understanding of moral approval, see also Joseph Butler,

In fact, there was no reason for Butler to refute that 'every man hath a general desire of his own happiness' that 'proceeds from, or is self-love'.[92] However, what is crucial to his argument is that self-love has to be understood in connection with reason, being directly linked to those 'sensible creatures' that have the ability to 'reflect upon themselves'.[93] This is also why he frequently refers to the 'cool principle of self-love'.[94] 'The object' of self-love 'is somewhat internal', namely 'our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction', but what is also required is the faculty of reason in order to choose the means by which to satisfy this general desire.[95] In making this point Butler brings a stark contrast to the surface. In addition to self-love there 'likewise' exists 'a variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites' that solely tend 'to particular external objects'.[96] These 'affections' are 'distinct from reason' and the '*pleasure arising from them*'. They are passions that seek their object without reflection. Indeed, at times they might serve one's interests, but the point is that this is not their end. 'The principle we call self-love never seeks any thing external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good', while 'particular affections rest in the external things themselves'. They are both an equally important 'part of humane nature', and we cannot possibly claim that all our passions originate in self-love even if we could explain away benevolence and natural affection.[97]

Butler constructs his own version of the argument emphasising the usage of common language.[98] If it was true that 'no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from self-love', this would also mean that 'we should want words to express the difference, between the principle of an action, proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage' and 'an action' proceeding from some passion seeking the external thing itself. However, 'this is not the language of mankind'. There is a clear difference in the way we discuss cool self-interest and, for example, 'revenge' or 'friendship', where 'a man runs' even 'upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another' without further reflection on his own interest.[99]

Thus, 'it is manifest' that 'the principles of these actions are totally different'. Indeed, it is true that both of them 'are done to gratify an inclination in man's self'. However, 'there is' a 'distinction between the cool principle of self-love, or general desire of our own happiness' and 'the particular affections toward particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and another principle of action'. Consequently, everything cannot possibly be 'allowed to self-love' or to 'be the whole of our inward constitution' since 'there are other parts or principles which come into it'.[100] These 'particular affections' that 'tend towards particular external things' function independently of the question of 'whether' their object is 'our interest or happiness'. We therefore make a distinction between 'an interested action' and 'an action' that is called 'passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengful, or any other' because it has some particular external object as its end. In short, Butler claims to have 'stated and shewn' that 'self-love' is 'one part of humane nature' and 'the several particular principles' (in 'themselves, their objects and ends') are 'the other part'.[101]

What is interesting about Butler's distinction between the passions that are inclined towards external objects and the self-love that aims at private advantage is that even when purporting to make a strong case against Hobbism he is also criticising the Hutchesonian idea that public virtues are solely founded on benevolence. Human nature is constituted of passions, tending to the private good, that cannot be reduced to 'self-love', but there are affections and passions that promote the 'public good' even if they are different from 'benevolence'.[102] In short, 'men

'Of the nature of virtue', in Butler, *Works*, ed. W. E. Gladstone (Oxford, 1898), vol.1, p.326.

92. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.203.
93. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.204.
94. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.206.
95. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.204.
96. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.203.
97. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.204.
98. On the existence of moral vocabulary, see also Butler, 'Of the nature of virtue', in *Works*, vol.1, p.327.
99. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.206.
100. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.206.
101. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.207.
102. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.13.

have various other passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love, and from benevolence'.[103]

This leads to the question of the unintentional effects of passions. Butler was very aware of the fact that men often act in order to gratify a certain passion, but unintentionally benefit the public and 'no body will call the principle of this action self-love'. His prime example is the 'desire of esteem', which is a 'publick passion' that is 'given to us' in order 'to regulate our behaviour towards society' and it cannot be reduced to 'self-love'.[104] He refers to it as a 'public passion' because he thought that it could not 'be gratified without contributing to the good of society'. When men act 'merely from regard' of 'reputation, without any consideration of the good of others', they commonly 'contribute to public good'. In this case men are 'plainly instruments' in the hands of 'providence, to carry on ends, the preservation of the individual and good of society, which they themselves have not in their view or intention'.[105]

Another passion closely linked to 'desire of esteem', which is natural and cannot be reduced to self-love is the 'emulation'. According to Butler, 'emulation is merely the desire or hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we compare our selves'.[106] Just as in the case of the desire for esteem, the desire for superiority often turns out to be a passion that has a positive public effect. 'If that peculiar regard to ourselves', Butler writes, 'leads us to examine our own character with this greater severity, in order really to improve and grow better, it is the most commendable turn of mind possible, and can scarce be to excess'.[107]

Thus, in Butler's argument of human nature sociability and civil society constitute a stronger case against Hobbism than Hutcheson was able to provide. Butler establishes benevolence as a natural passion, but avoids the pitfall of making a naïve case about man's naturally virtuous nature. Instead, he refutes

103. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.12-13.
104. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.11.
105. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.12.
106. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.19-20.
107. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.187.

Hobbism on its own ground by proving that a theory based on the prevalence of self-love is too simple and cannot possibly give an accurate analysis of the world.

The most original part of this refutation is that in giving the example of the desire for esteem and emulation Butler was able to prove that our idea of the self is dependent upon the opinion of others. Therefore, it turns out to be a 'speculative absurdity' to consider 'ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice'.[108] If the Hobbist argument is that man naturally avoids pain and desires pleasure, experience proves otherwise. As far as Butler was concerned, 'mankind is so closely united' that 'there is such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as much desired as any external goods'.[109] I would call this constructive criticism. Butler's account was designed to counter Hobbism – not to build a Newtonian system of human nature. The unintended effect it had on Mandeville was to provide a path along which to evolve from straightforward Hobbism into a system that could not be reduced to psychological egoism.

iii. *Part II* and the history of civil society

The starting point of Mandeville's history of civil society in his later works is a 'wild couple' in a 'state of simplicity'. Before embarking upon his conjectures he warns his readers that this austere state is a 'condition' that is hard to grasp for men 'born in society'. It is important to notice that Mandeville's use of the term 'society' clearly points to political society in the manner of Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf.[110] He was well aware of the theoretical confusion over the concept of the state of nature, and

108. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.18.
109. Butler, *Fifteen sermons*, p.16-17.
110. Although I have discussed this above in the introduction, it should be pointed out that my interpretation of Mandeville's and especially Hume's ideas of civil society differs from those putting a strong emphasis on a post-Hegelian use of society where it can be separated from political society. For a contrasting interpretation, see Finlay, 'Hume's theory of civil society', p.369-91.

the argument he was constructing referred directly to jurisprudential authors who were not concerned with the evolutionary aspect of civil society in their descriptions. Mandeville was making a point that earlier authors had described a savage man with qualities that were products of society and not original in human nature. Mandeville continues his novel deliberations, suggesting that people are so used to having various wants and needs that without training in 'abstract thinking' it is difficult to even imagine a man with 'so few desires, and no appetites roving beyond the immediate call of his untaught nature'.[111]

Mandeville's later theory of civil society focused particularly on amending the intellectual efforts of Thomas Hobbes and countering what one scholar came to describe as the idea 'that liberty itself engendered conflict and that the pursuit of natural rights produced a state of war'.[112] There are no natural rights among untaught animals and neither is there a state of war in nature. Moral distinctions arise from social relations and change as new needs and appetites are generated. The first savage pair was not aware of their social needs. Who would think, he asks, that 'such a couple', for example, 'would not only be destitute of language, but likewise never find out or imagine, that they stood in need of any; or that the want of it was any real inconvenience to them'? We acquire our knowledge from experience, and 'it is impossible, that any creature should know the want of what it can have no idea of'.[113]

It is equally important, he continues, to realise that a savage man would have had no use for spoken language because, although 'he has nothing to obey, but the simple dictates of nature, the want of speech is easily supply'd by dumb signs'[114] and 'our wild couple would at their first meeting intelligibly say more to one another without guile, than any civiliz'd pair would dare to name without blushing'.[115] There is a significant lesson in this

111. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.285.
112. Wokler, 'Rousseau's Pufendorf: natural law and the foundations of commercial society', p.386.
113. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.285.
114. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.286.
115. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.287.

tongue-in-cheek comparison. As I have mentioned, Mandeville's fundamental criticism of earlier theorists of natural law was that they furnished the savage man with artificial qualities that were the products of society. An essential point deriving from this insight is that a savage man does not need society for his self-preservation. He is, to a large extent, self-reliant, and it is 'civiliz'd people' who 'stand most in need of society'. There are 'none' who need society 'less than savages'.[116] Mandeville was at pains to point out that he was not making the same mistake that natural jurists made when talking about natural weakness or aggressiveness in men: these are social rather than natural traits. In order to make this as explicit as possible he has Horatio ask his spokesman: 'Don't you fall into the same error, which you say *Hobbes* has been guilty of, when you talk of man's necessitous and helpless condition?' Cleomenes quips in response, remarking on the progressive nature of society and spelling out that the more advanced men were in civility, 'the more necessitous and helpless they are in their nature'.[117] Nowhere does he claim that savages were unable to help themselves or that timidity was an original human quality.

Another significant aspect of Mandeville's criticism of the modern school of natural law concerned the role of reason, will and self-preservation in the history of civil society. He acknowledged that 'all passions and instincts in general were given to all animals for some wise end' and they all attended to 'the preservation and happiness' of the animal itself or its 'species'.[118] However, he did not believe that this happened as a result of rational calculation or a direct act of free will. This, he suggests, could already be inferred from the first savage, who did not choose to reproduce, but 'propagates, before he knows the consequence of it'.[119] He makes the point that the actions of an individual are dictated not by his innate ability to reason, but by his passions: 'A savage man multiplies his kind by instinct, as other animals do, without more thought or design of preserving his species, than a new-born infant has of keeping itself alive, in

116. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.181.
117. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.180.
118. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.91.
119. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.228.

the action of sucking.'[120] If this was true, how could we describe the step from a state of nature to a civil society as guided by the right use of reason and free will in the act of self-preservation? We could not. Our 'every action' cannot be 'determin'd by the will' if 'we are violently urg'd from within, and, in a manner, compell'd, not only to assist in, but likewise to long for', and even 'be highly pleased with, a performance, that infinitely surpasses our understanding'.[121] Mandeville's theory that passions, not reason control human actions posits that the question of free will is indifferent where the development of civil society is concerned. Even if man had been given a superior capacity for understanding than other animals, it would make little difference in the grand scheme of civil society. In nature there are no duties or conflicts of rights. A man in his uncultivated state is like any other animal. His wants are few, he has no use, desire or ability for artificial conventions, and the first principle that makes him associate with others is lust.

In describing the wild couple Mandeville was not addressing a hypothetical state of nature in order to explain how natural laws were derived through the right use of reason, he was rather laying the foundations for an anthropological analysis of society that would help to shed light on the nature of a civil society. If the preceding theories about natural law were erroneous in dressing savage men up in artificial clothing, in a similar manner the benevolent school (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson) was mistaken for taking artificial qualities as natural. Mandeville assigns both wild and civilised man the same natural human propensities. He insists that there is 'no difference between the original nature of a savage, and that of a civiliz'd man'[122] and 'what belongs to our nature, all men may justly be said to have actually or virtually in them at their birth', and 'whatever is not born with us, either the thing it self, or that which afterwards produces it, cannot be said to belong to our nature'.[123] Accordingly, the predominant natural human quality 'obliges us continually to assume every thing to

120. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.227.
121. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.229.
122. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.214.
123. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.121.

ourselves'.[124] If man had remained in a state of simplicity he could not have learned to be other-regarding. 'Whilst' men are 'uninstructed' and 'let alone', they 'will follow the impulse of their nature, without regard to others', and only art, education and communication with other people would change this.[125] What, then, is this 'impulse of nature' that men naturally follow? As noted, *The Fable* represented an attempt to draw all the passions from the concept of self-love, which turned out to be an inconsistent theoretical solution. In order to avoid the problems of his first theory of civil society, in *Part II* Mandeville refers to the natural impulse as 'the instinct of sovereignty'.[126]

The wild couple's actions were also bound to be motivated by this instinct, which naturally has some resonance in Hobbes's idea that '*nature had given all to all*'.[127] Like Hobbes, Mandeville concedes that this principle of selfishness when acting at liberty is the grand obstacle of society, but unlike Hobbes he wanted to remind his audience that at the same time this instinct was, for various reasons, necessary for the development of a civil society. He sought to define this instinctive principle, how it operated in human beings and what its precise role was in the conjectural history of civil society. Naturally (that is to say, without education and experience of society) 'man would have every thing he likes, without considering, whether he has any right to it or not; and he would do every thing he has a mind to do, without regard to the consequences it would be of to others'.[128] He describes this instinct in another way: paradoxically 'all men are born with a strong desire, and no capacity at all to govern'.[129]

The process of socialisation starts immediately after the wild couple propagates. Hypothetically, their children are born sociable. The plot of Mandeville's *Part II* is the perpetual clash between natural and artificial principles within every sociable being, as well as conflict between men, which can only be meliorated by living in a society, and by inventing and adapting

124. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.273.
125. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.269.
126. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.319-20.
127. Hobbes, *De Cive*, I.X.
128. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.271.
129. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.320.

conventions that are designed to cure the frailties of human nature. The problem is that we naturally have 'a desire of superiority' and if we followed the natural dictates of our nature we would grasp 'every thing' for ourselves, whereas 'the notions of right and wrong' are 'acquired' and arise artificially through social relations.[130] Furthermore, since 'the desire as well as aptness of man to associate' do not proceed from 'his love to others',[131] the only way 'we' can 'be cured of' this instinct of sovereignty is 'by our commerce with others, and the experience of facts, by which we are convinc'd, that we have no such right' that our selfishness bids us to claim.[132]

The natural stage in the conjectural development of society

The notion of a contract plays a marginal role in Mandeville's historical understanding of the origin of civil society.[133] It could not be based on the notion of an agreement as such because it would not hold among 'ill-bred and uncultivated' people, among which 'no man would keep a contract longer than interest lasted, which made him submit to it'.[134] It is worth pointing out that Mandeville distinguished between a man that is made 'merely sociable' and one that is 'civilised'.[135] In describing the origin of society one cannot leap from a wild couple in a state of simplicity to a civil society that has a government and is regulated by laws. In this he was deviating significantly from the view he advocated in the original *Fable*. In other words he was now arguing that, even if natural jurists were indisputably on the right path with their intellectual efforts, contract theories gave an inadequate and confused explanation of the origin of civil society. The story should be told as an evolutionary history, and more attention should be given to the preliminary social stage, the family society

130. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.223.
131. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.178.
132. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.223.
133. On Mandeville as a critic of the contract theory together with Hume and Smith with a reference to the development of civil society, see Gautier, *L'Invention de la société civile*, p.35-67.
134. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.267.
135. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.191.

that formed in accordance with the natural inclinations of human nature, before turning to the later stages of civilisation. Again, this goes against the theory Mandeville had advocated earlier.

When the origin of civil society is examined within the boundaries of a conjectural history, the confused argument about contract and sovereignty dissolves, even when the basic framework is intended to underline a distinction between family society and civil society, apparent also in Hobbes's *Leviathan*.[136] The emphasis in Mandeville's later theory is on the process and conventions that make men sociable, and which in turn form the basis of a civil society. Intriguingly, he made no distinction between social and moral progress. In this sense, morality, to a large extent, is artificial in nature, but this did not mean that the distinction between right and wrong was the arbitrary invention of a politician to trick men into self-denial, as he had argued earlier. In order to be social, men have to follow a coherent system of artificial moral principles that function in accordance with the propensities of human nature.

In the course of *Part II* Horatio offers every solution he can think of in trying to guess the origin of civil society, but Cleomenes turns all his suggestions down. If a contract could not explain the foundation, neither could the right use of reason. In fact, 'superiority of understanding in the state of nature' would 'serve to render man incurably averse to society, and more obstinately tenacious of his savage liberty, than any other creature'.[137] In another clarifying example of the role of reason in his theory Mandeville's speculates about whether a man in 'his savage consort' who is miraculously given perfect 'capacity in the art of reasoning' would come to entertain the 'same notions of right and wrong' that any man of middling capacity, without making an effort, holds in a civil society. His argument is that 'no man can reason but *à posteriori*, from something that he knows, or supposes to be true'. Thus, given that it is impossible to deduce an intelligible idea of justice from natural relations, only the 'persons' who remember 'their education' and live 'in society' with 'others

136. On Hobbes's understanding of 'difference between a family and a kingdom', see Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.20, p.314.
137. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.300.

of their own species' that are independent 'of them, and either their equals or superiours' may know the 'differences between right and wrong'.[138] Note how clearly Mandeville states that the idea of justice can only be learned through transactions between equals.

Mandeville elaborates his arguments about the impossibility of knowing anything *a priori* and the artificial nature of justice on several occasions. He spells out clearly that 'from nature' we do not have any 'thoughts of justice and injustice', and without a proper education and social relations a man 'would naturally, without much thinking in the case, take every thing to be his own, that he could lay his hands on'.[139] Cleomenes, despite his interlocutor's objections, remains categorical about the fact that there is no 'love of man for his species' implanted in the human breast,[140] and Horatio eventually raises his hands and sighs: 'How came society into the world?'[141]

Before going into Cleomenes's multifaceted answer that society came into the world 'from private families; but not without great difficulty, and the concurrence of many favourable accidents',[142] I should first stress that what Mandeville was eventually after was a civil society that was 'entirely built upon the variety of our wants'[143] and governed by written laws, which in turn would be modified and executed by magistracy. Thus, in one sense what he was aiming at is in line with the modern school of natural law. The problem with natural jurists is that they oversimplify and confuse the course of the development of society by paying no or only little attention to the differences between the natural and the artificial stages of this process. Mandeville persistently states that 'the undoubted basis of all societies is government'.[144] It is clear that on most occasions when he discusses the 'origin of society' he had a political society in mind, but he also points out that the authority that 'parents' hold 'over their children' is one form 'of

138. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.222-23.
139. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.200.
140. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.259.
141. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.200.
142. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.200.
143. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.349.
144. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.183-84.

government'.[145] In order to understand the origin of civil society one should realise that the first private family already constituted a form of society, even if the first wild couple were not sociable creatures, and were not even able to teach and govern their children.

The first savage couple were drawn together by lust, the first principle that makes humans associate. Mandeville stresses the fact that these first parents were entirely driven by their instinct of sovereignty and unable to govern their children. It should be pointed out that by the ability to govern he did not mean the power to hold authority, but the capacity to 'build upon the knowledge of human nature', which enables one 'to promote' and 'reward all good and useful actions on the one hand; and on the other, to punish, or at least discourage, every thing that is destructive or hurtful to society'.[146] It is equally important to understand that, in *Part II*, this 'art of governing' is not 'the work of one man, or of one generation', but the 'greatest part' of it is 'the product, the joynt labour of several ages'.[147] The first parents did not have experience of society, knowledge of different patterns of governing, or any idea what would promote or be destructive to the common good, thus they simply followed their natural instinct, considered their children their property and made them labour in order to satisfy their few needs.

However, this did not render the children helpless or without care. There is a difference between an artificial and a natural quality, namely the art of governing and 'natural affection', which 'prompts all mothers to take care of the offspring'.[148] According to Mandeville, 'all creatures naturally love their offspring, whilst they are helpless, and so does man'.[149] This 'natural affection' is such a powerful principle that it would force 'a wild man to love, and cherish his child' without any concern for his own interest.[150] It is noteworthy that, in stark contrast to the original *Fable*, Mandeville now characterises this natural affection as a pure

145. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.241.
146. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.321.
147. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.321-22.
148. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.189.
149. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.199.
150. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.201.

and durable passion. Regardless of self-love or self-liking, 'natural affection' can 'make wild men' and women 'sacrifice their lives, and die for their children'.[151] From his treatment of this original passion it is difficult, or in fact ineffective, to claim that Mandeville was now arguing that man was, by nature, wholly incapable of other-regarding affection. Thus, one cannot simply deduce his second thesis of sociability from an Augustinian/Epicurean perspective, according to which self-interest is the only motivating principle.[152] In the light of this evidence it is clear that Mandeville no longer supported such reasoning and self-interest-related arguments claiming that parents would take care of their children in the hope that when they grew old the children would return the favour.[153] What this also indicates is that one cannot simply dismiss Mandeville by labelling his moral system utterly selfish (any more than one can dismiss David Hume and his confined generosity), which has often served to justify paying little or no attention to what he was actually saying when Hume and the history of philosophy were under investigation.

What is remarkable about Mandeville's understanding of 'natural affection' in human beings is that it does not end when children are old and experienced enough to take care of themselves. Unlike 'the young ones of other animals' who, 'as soon as they can help themselves, are free', 'the authority, which parents pretend to have over their children, never ceases'. The reason is that the natural tenderness in human beings towards their offspring ultimately mixes with 'the desire of dominion', which is 'a never-failing consequence of the pride, that is common to all men'. As a consequence, 'our savage pair would' not only consider their own children their 'undoubted property', they would also naturally extend their 'title' over their 'grandchildren'.[154] Hypothetically, 'without intermixture of foreign blood, they would look upon the whole race to be their natural vassals'.[155] Cleomenes, Mandeville's spokesman, insists that he is 'persuaded, that the more knowledge and capacity of reasoning this first couple acquired, the more just and unquestionable their sovereignty over all their descendants would appear to them'.[156]

151. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.240.
152. Argued by Pierre Force in his *Self-interest before Adam Smith*, p.7-47. Also, Shelley Burtt writes that Mandeville 'brushes aside' also in *Part II* 'any suggestion that an inborn affection' might 'account for moral or sociable behavior'; see Burtt, *Virtue transformed*, p.139. On the relevance of natural affection, see also Welchman, 'Who rebutted Bernard Mandeville?', p.57-73 and Sheridan, 'Parental affection and self-interest', p.377-92.
153. An impression given by Force, *Self-interest before Adam Smith*, p.62-63.
154. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.204.

In making this intellectual move of integrating the 'instinct of sovereignty' with 'natural affection', Mandeville could explain how the first wild pair turned into a small clan following the natural principles universally implanted in man. This development is further supported by the fact that 'in the wild state of nature, man multiplies his kind much faster, than can be allow'd of in any regular society: No male at fourteen would be long without a female, if he could get one; and no female of twelve would be refractory, if applied to; or remain long uncourted, if there were men'.[157] On the one hand, Mandeville insists that this kind of natural family is the very counterpart of a civil society, the idea of which is to 'preserve peace and tranquillity among multitudes of different views' and not just among people who are related through blood or belong to the same race.[158] On the other hand, the strong affection that human beings naturally have for their children has a crucial role in his system, as it does in later stages of civil society: it not only 'renders' men 'solicitous about' the 'education' of their children, it also 'makes' them 'take pains to leave their children rich'.[159] The fact that Mandeville thought it natural for men to take care of the education of their children sheds light on his later ideas about social development. Nevertheless, despite all the sociable effects, 'this eternal claim' over their children that men 'naturally' have in their hearts is so 'general and unreasonable' that 'every civil society', he points out in his peculiar manner, 'is forced to make' particular 'laws' that limit 'paternal authority to a certain term of years' in order 'to prevent the usurpation of parents, and rescue children from

155. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.204-205.
156. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.205.
157. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.201.
158. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.318.
159. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.341.

their dominion'.[160] This, of course, does not necessarily mean that otherwise children are subjected to physical labour, servitude or material inconvenience of any kind. In a more advanced civil society it may be that some children feel the smothering affection of their parents, which is indeed natural, for the whole course of their lives, while the parents want to stick their noses in their children's business.[161] Nevertheless, what is evident in Mandeville's treatment of natural affection is that he endorsed the view that men have naturally confined generosity towards their family, possibly even outdoing their care for themselves.

The first wild couple was destined to live without the social abilities that would have enabled them to restrict their instinct of sovereignty, but this did not hold true for their children. According to Mandeville, it was 'very unworthy of a philosopher to say, as *Hobbes* did, that man is born unfit to society'.[162] It is noteworthy that here he was writing not only against Hobbes, but also against his own principal idea in *The Fable.*[163] In the table of contents that was dropped after 1714, for example, it clearly states, '*Man without government is of all creatures the most unfit for society*'.[164] After considering this foundational question anew, Mandeville accepted that every child could perfectly well learn to be sociable. There were also certain human propensities that supported and guided this course of action. First of all, every 'savage child would learn to love and fear his father', and 'these two passions, together with the esteem, which we naturally have for every thing that far excels us, will seldom fail of producing that compound, which we call

160. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.204.
161. This is a useful theoretical insight from Mandeville into the artificial moral principles, bringing clearly to the surface the difficulty of distinguishing between naturally amorous passions and instinct of sovereignty; a mixture, which makes one, at times, completely unable to see the possible misjudgements of one's own actions, which one cannot consider but as perfectly virtuous and justified.
162. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.177. On Goldsmith's understanding of the relationship between Mandeville and Hobbes regarding this remark, see Goldsmith, *Private vices, public benefits*, p.50.
163. Sterling P. Lamprecht points out that regarding the origin of civil society Mandeville differs from Hobbes; see Lamprecht, 'The *Fable of the bees*', p.567-68.
164. The index can be found in Kaye's commentary, Mandeville, *Part II*, p.388.

reverence'.[165] Thus, in *Part II* Mandeville is no longer obsessed with the idea that all passions are directly derived from self-love, which is already a leap away from Hobbism. 'Reverence to authority' is 'necessary, to make human creatures governable', he declares.[166] When Horatio complains to Cleomenes that they have not made any 'progress' towards the origin of civil society in their conversation, his interlocutor answers that 'the introduction of the reverence, which the wildest son must feel more or less for the most savage father, if he stays with him, had been a considerable step'.[167] If one considers the position of reverence in this overall system of sociability from a theoretical perspective, one realises that Mandeville was making an ambitious attempt to give an alternative account of voluntary servitude as presented in earlier contract theories, and this was a vital component in his challenging task of revising the works of Grotius, Pufendorf and Hobbes.[168]

Mandeville rejects the idea that men enter society by an explicit or tacit agreement that transfers the authority to a sovereign, for the simple reason that this is the wrong way of examining the question. Stressing his point he refers to the idea of 'two or three hundred single savages, men and women, that never had been under any subjection, and were above twenty years of age, could ever establish a society, and be united into one body' as futile, for the plain reason that 'societies never were made that way'.[169] Without any kind of agreement every child is born under the subjection of its parents, which is already one form 'of government'.[170] A creature is governable 'when, reconciled to submission, it has learned to construe his servitude to his own advantage; and rests satisfied with the account it finds for itself, in the labour it performs for others'.[171] Evidently, Mandeville's view of a governable creature includes the idea of voluntary

165. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.202.
166. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.278.
167. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.221.
168. On voluntary servitude for Hobbes, see Hobbes, *De Cive*, VIII, and especially, Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol.2, ch.20, p.312.
169. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.132.
170. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.241.
171. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.184.

servitude. However, instead of jumping to any conclusion about how men agree to this voluntary servitude in a civil society, he uses the same concept to explain how the first generation was naturally rendered governable – in other words, born into servitude, able to accept their condition and to make the best of it. In a later stage of development this same principle resolves the question of the original contract by explaining the foundation of civil government in historical terms.

In order to augment his point regarding respect for authority, referring to the Decalogue Mandeville also mentions that the 'best method is made use of' in order to 'inspire men with a deep sense of' fear, love and esteem, which are 'the three ingredients, that make up the compound of reverence'.[172] The law, or the fear of punishment for breaking it, does not create the original compound of reverence. It simply supports and strengthens the reverence that children naturally have for their parents. Thus, we have advanced a long way towards a civil society even if we are only one generation away from the first wild couple. 'The reverence of children to parents' is 'of the highest moment to all government, and sociableness itself'. However, 'experience teaches us, that this reverence may be overruled by stronger passions'. Furthermore, 'God thought fit to fortify and strengthen it in us, by a particular command of his own; and moreover to encourage it, by the promise of a reward for the keeping of it'.[173] Civil society cannot exist without laws, which does not mean that moral distinctions could be considered an invention of lawmakers or clever politicians. Laws fix the artificial conventions, but the conventions do not originate from these laws or their makers.

Unambiguously, 'the very first generation of the most brutish savages, was sufficient to produce sociable creatures'. Natural respect for authority plays a part in this scheme, but more importantly, 'children, who' simply 'conversed with their own species, though they were brought up by savages, would be governable', and when they come 'to maturity, would be fit for society, how ignorant and unskillful soever their parents might

172. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.279.
173. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.280.

have been'.[174] One of Mandeville's claims is that 'society' is 'entirely built upon the variety of our wants'.[175] He also notes the relation between the size of the society and the variety of wants and desires. In the natural state the wild couple only has to satisfy their immediate needs. Evidently, 'the smaller' the 'society', 'the more strictly the members of it' will 'confine themselves' to the 'wants' that are 'necessary for their subsistence', and consequently 'the larger the numbers are in a society, the more extensive they have rendered the variety of their desires'.[176] The process of creating artificial wants and desires is necessary for the advancement of a family society towards state formation, but how is this development triggered? Why is it that men in general, and particularly savage men who originally had no superfluous wants to satisfy, are first drawn towards society if they do not have 'a desire, out of a fondness' towards their 'species', superior 'to what other animals have for theirs', as Mandeville maintains?[177]

'Sufficient motives' to be 'fond of society', Mandeville claims, are a man's 'love' for 'ease and security' and his 'perpetual desire of meliorating his condition'.[178] The first savages were self-reliant, and since the 'condition' of human nature only becomes increasingly 'necessitous and helpless' as he advances in civility, the foundational motive to make a man desirous of society is his infinite desire to advance his circumstances. In other words, the conventional definition of self-preservation cannot explain the origin of society. Nevertheless, the claim that no one in reality needs society 'less than savages' does not mean that the first generation did not desire it in the hope of bettering their condition.[179] Mandeville strongly emphasises the argument that 'the first generation of the most brutish savages' produced 'sociable creatures'[180] and the 'desire of meliorating our condition' is 'so general' that 'not one that can be call'd a sociable creature' is

174. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.231; see also p.267.
175. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.349.
176. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.350.
177. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.183.
178. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.180.
179. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.181.
180. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.231.

'without it'.[181] In other words, the first generation that descended from the wild couple was sensible that it was within its interest to 'enter into society'.

Mandeville elaborates on this important point on different occasions: 'I am willing to allow', he confirms, 'that among the motives, that prompt man to enter into society, there is a desire which he has naturally after company.'[182] As I have already highlighted, close attention should be paid to what Mandeville calls natural and artificial. The cause of the desire for society is not fondness for the species, but it is nevertheless so strong that it is hard to tell whether it is natural or not. Instead of austerely dismissing the possibility that it is natural in a strict sense, he leaves the questión open and remarks that if a man were more 'desirous' of 'society' by nature 'than any other animal' this would not be anything 'to brag of'.[183] This argument is, of course, directed against writers emphasising the noble generosity of human nature. This is not natural benevolence, but rather that man has this desire 'for his own sake, in hopes of being better for it; and he would never wish for, either company or any thing else, but for some advantage or other he proposes to himself from it'.[184] Thus, certain authors were right in claiming that men who are born in a sociable condition desire society, but only for the sake of themselves.

The first children were already slowly learning how to turn their submission to their own advantage, curbing their natural instinct of sovereignty and starting to be contented with their situation. Mandeville's point about civil society arising 'from private families' over the course of 'many generations', with 'great difficulty' and the 'concurrence of many favourable accidents' simply means that even if the first children were sociable, 'much more' was 'required' to 'produce a man fit to govern others'.[185] This had nothing to do with the emergence of a clever politician who would trick ignorant men into self-denial. The particular

181. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.181.
182. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.183.
183. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.180.
184. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.183.
185. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.231.

question concerns state formation and moral progress: How are different family societies united into a civil society? In forming his second theory of society Mandeville takes painstaking care to point out that the role of a single individual is minimal in his view. What is required, and what renders a man fit to govern others, are several artificial conventions and social institutions that enable the mutual and peaceful existence of contrasting views and interests. These moral conventions can only be developed over an extensive period of time and through the accumulation of experience. Once the institutions have been established, any man of middling capacity is fit to govern others. To some it might seem 'inconceivable to what prodigious height, from next to nothing, some arts may be and have been raised by human industry and application, by the uninterrupted labour, and joint experience of many ages, tho' none but men of ordinary capacity should ever be employ'd in them'.[186]

One man does not make a difference in mankind's march towards a peaceful and amiable existence, which is the implicit purpose of civil society. The reason why Mandeville draws a striking contrast between family and civil society is that these conventions have to be established through written laws and executed by government in order to achieve a permanent status in a large society consisting of people who are not necessarily related or even acquainted with each other. Until some rigid rules are formed, men 'without doubt would encrease in knowledge and cunning' and 'in the particular things, to which they apply'd themselves, they would become as expert and ingenious as the most civiliz'd nations: but their unruly passions, and the discords occasioned by them, would never suffer them to be happy; their mutual contentions would be continually spoiling their improvements, destroying their inventions, and frustrating their designs'.[187] Nevertheless, the first children did, by trial and error, start building different artificial conventions designed to help them to live in social relations. Eventually this would form the framework of a civil society, even if their efforts, due to a lack of experience, were doomed to failure for generations to come.

186. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.141.
187. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.267.

The artificial stage in the conjectural development of society

In *Part II* Bernard Mandeville explains how a wild couple expanded into a relatively large family society following the natural inclinations of human nature without the help of moral or artificial institutions. What is noteworthy in the natural stage of his conjectural history is the change that occurred in the first children compared to their wild parents. As he explains, having been born into an existing society these children already had the most important attribute of human sociability, the 'desire of meliorating our condition', which is a sufficient motive for a human being to desire society.

If progress thus far had relied mainly on natural human propensities, the moral development launched in connection with the oblique search for society would have had to depend on artificial conventions. As a manifest slogan for his conjectural development of society Mandeville maintains that 'the restless industry of man to supply his wants, and his constant endeavours to meliorate his condition upon earth, have produced and brought to perfection many useful arts and sciences'. In this context he refers to a wide variety of artificial abilities and customs such as language, politeness, justice, law making, the art of governing, the distribution of land, the division of labour, monetary exchange, shipbuilding and viticulture, none of which was 'invented by reasoning *a priori*'.[188] He points out the flawed thinking by which we 'often ascribe to the excellency of man's genius, and the depth of his penetration, what is in reality owing to length of time, and the experience of many generations'.[189] All of the important conventions were founded in an 'uncertain era', and if we start pondering upon the reason behind them 'we can assign no other causes' to them but 'human sagacity in general, and the joynt labour of many ages, in which men have always employ'd themselves in studying and contriving ways and means to sooth their various appetites, and make the best of their infirmities'.[190] This is at the heart of the 'Mandevillean' notion

188. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.145.
189. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.142.
190. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.128.

of a civil society, which is a pivotal contribution to modern social thought. It initiated a plethora of positive analysis by Hume, Rousseau, Smith and several others.

Mandeville understood that the art of shipbuilding and making soap, as well as inventions such as iron and money, also took a long time to instigate and were co-products of many generations rather than the single stroke of a solitary genius. Technical innovations have contributed to the development of civil society in satisfying some of man's appetites, meliorating his condition and, simultaneously, creating several new appetites and needs. Nevertheless, the emphasis here is on the artificial conventions that enable the moral development of mankind in its everlasting battle against the instinct of sovereignty. As Mandeville unambiguously states, naturally, a 'man would have every thing he likes, without considering, whether he has any right to it or not; and he would do every thing he has a mind to do, without regard to the consequences it would be to others'.[191] Whether it is possible to overcome this infirmity is the crucial question for human happiness, because otherwise 'mutual contentions would be continually spoiling their improvements, destroying their inventions, and frustrating their designs'.[192] This cannot happen with the sudden appearance of a clever politician who tricks others into self-denial, or of an original contract to advance sociability.

The Fable of the bees presents necessary appetites and the anger aroused in their pursuit as the motivating passions. It is of prime importance for governments to suppress the anger caused in men as they attempt to gratify the passions arising from self-love. These passions are only perceived to be of secondary importance in the making of man in *Part II*, however. Pride is now described as the 'hidden spring, that gives life and motion to all' man's 'actions'.[193] Mandeville also adopts a different approach when contemplating how this motivating passion should be treated. Not a single step towards a civil society could have been taken before the realisation that 'pride was not to be destroyed by

191. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.271.
192. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.267.
193. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.79.

force', but was 'to be governed by stratagem', in other words 'by playing the passion against itself'.[194] This should be seen as a decisive turn away from Hobbism and Mandeville's first analysis of a civil society. It did not serve his purposes to try and modify the Hobbist idea according to which a civil society starts to function when the fear of death has taught men to use their rational capabilities and to seek peace. He had attempted to add pride at a later stage of society's historical development in support of the Hobbist scheme, but it proved unsatisfactory. The root of the system was still the strict idea of self-preservation.

Mandeville consumes a considerable amount of time and space redefining the concept of self-preservation in *Part II*. Cleomenes and Horatio deliberate over the matter at length in their third dialogue. Cleomenes carefully brings the familiar characterisation of the concept into their discussion. 'In the affair of self-preservation' even in the behaviour of a savage we commonly note that 'self-love would first make it scrape together every thing it wanted for sustenance, provide against the injuries of air, and do every thing to make itself and young ones secure'.[195] Horatio readily agrees that 'self-love' induces a man 'to labour for his maintenance and safety and makes him fond of every thing which he imagines to tend to his preservation'.[196] However, Cleomenes is not just pointing at a well-established fact. He is redefining the concept, arguing that not only self-love, but also 'self-liking' is a passion 'given to man for self-preservation'.[197] In order to stress the novelty and importance of this redefinition Horatio is made to express his doubts several times. It is plain to see that self-love plays a role in man's self-preservation, but 'what good does the self-liking to him?' Horatio cannot see what 'benefit' men 'could receive from it, either in a savage or a civilized state'. He rather thinks that 'self-liking' would be 'hurtful to men, because it must make them odious to one another'.[198] After all, Cleomenes claims that 'self-liking' forces a savage to 'seek for opportunities, by

194. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.78.
195. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.133.
196. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.134.
197. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.135.
198. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.134.

gestures, looks, and sounds, to display the value it has for itself, superiour to what it has for others'.[199]

Cleomenes' response is a deliberate attack on the Hobbist idea of a civil society. 'Self-liking' could easily be defined as a passion working in the interests of self-preservation. 'It is so necessary to the well-being of those that have been used to indulge it; that they can taste no pleasure without it.' 'It doubles our happiness in prosperity, and buoys us up against the frowns of adverse fortune.' Mandeville refers to self-liking as 'the mother of hopes, and the end as well as the foundation of our best wishes'. Furthermore, it is 'the strongest armour against despair, and as long as we can like any ways our situation, either in regard to present circumstances, or the prospect before us, we take care of ourselves; and no man can resolve upon suicide, whilst self-liking lasts'.[200] Nothing could be said to contribute more to self-preservation than the passion that produces the will to live.

These passages are significant because, in linking self-liking to the concept of self-preservation, Mandeville refutes the very core of Hobbism: self-preservation no longer means what it used to. Simultaneously, he points out that he was not altogether wrong in what he claimed in *The Fable of the bees*, although having changed the entire concept he expresses a view that was contrary to what he originally argued. He becomes bitterly conscious in *The Fable* that taking self-love as the starting point for an analysis of civil society leads to a dead end, and that there has to be a wholehearted shift in emphasis from self-love to self-liking. Referring to the 'instinct of sovereignty' he also emphasises that the 'principle of selfishness' is extremely 'difficult' to 'destroy' and 'pull out of the heart of man'. When any man, regardless of how learned or civilised he might be, 'heartily covets a thing, this instinct, this principle, will overrule and persuade him to leave no stone unturned, to compass his desires'. He tries to make sense of the fact that 'this innate principle, that bids us gratify every appetite' might easily lead us to do things we would not otherwise agree upon.[201] It may well be that we do not realise the consequences of our actions.

199. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.133.
200. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.136.
201. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.273.

What Mandeville makes evident in his treatment of the key passions is that self-love and self-liking as such cannot be described as vicious or virtuous. In stoic-like terms he suggests that 'all passions and instincts in general were given to all animals for some wise end'. They all aim at 'the preservation and happiness' of the animal itself or its 'species', and it is 'our duty to hinder' these passions and instincts 'from being detrimental or offensive to any part of the society', although there is no reason why we should 'be ashamed of having them'.[202] He defends the view that both self-love and self-liking, which are the principal passions that explain human actions, should be considered morally neutral. In order to make his science of human nature fit in with his scheme of a civil society he cites the instinct of sovereignty as the sole cause of manmade misery. Most laws, for example, are directed against it in one way or another. He claims that the 'regulations and prohibitions, that have been contrived for the temporal happiness of mankind' are designed for one reason: 'to cure and disappoint that natural instinct of sovereignty, which teaches man to look upon every thing as centring in himself, and prompts him to put in a claim to every thing, he can lay his hands on'.[203] This holds true for both self-love and self-liking when they are driven by the unrestrained power of sovereignty. What follows is very logical: the two redeeming principles that 'hinder' this instinct in connection with self-love or self-liking 'from being detrimental or offensive to any part' of a civil society are justice and politeness. Laws defining and securing justice protect the self-love of every individual, whereas politeness allows everyone to cultivate self-liking. These are the imperative moral conventions designed to make the best of our infirmities, developed over several generations and ultimately fixed by rigid rules.

Forming moral institutions

Mandeville's conception of a moral institution should be analysed in detail. The best way to do this is to carefully consider self-liking and politeness, which he discusses at length on several occasions

202. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.91.
203. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.271.

but particularly in the first half of *Part II*. Good manners, politeness, courtesy, civility and good breeding are all terms describing an artificial moral institution that in his view had one specific purpose, 'concealing' our 'pride'.[204] Politeness is an excellent illustration of his notion of a moral convention. First, it is a prime example of setting a passion 'against itself': only when men learn to hide their pride can they cultivate their self-esteem.[205] Second, all aspects of its formation in his conjectural history are covered in his treatment of self-liking. Politeness serves as an explicit example of the formation of a moral institution in the historical development of civil society.

The *sine qua non* of a moral institution is that it is accepted and adopted by most of the society in question, which only happens when it has proven to be of practical advantage to people. Politeness passes this test in that it enhances sociability among men. As Mandeville puts it, 'once the generality begin to conceal the high value they have for themselves, men must become more tolerable to one another'.[206] How is this accomplished? How do we advance from the savage state to a state in which the majority conceal their pride? Mandeville, once again, invokes conjectural history in his argument. Cleomenes asks Horatio to consider only 'two things' in order to understand that all civil societies are compelled to form a principle such as politeness, the aim being to teach men to disguise their true sentiments in the value they place on themselves: 'First, from the nature of that passion' called 'self-liking [...] it must follow, that all untaught men will ever be hateful to one another in conversation [...] if their thoughts were known to each other.' It is solely the passion of self-liking that needs to be redirected in order to render a conversation agreeable. It is significant that in his treatment of politeness Mandeville explicitly states that the moral institution is not meant to serve self-love. Where self-interest is concerned, uncivilised men might also be able to conceal their pride, but this cannot be considered

204. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.150.
205. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.125. The reciprocal process between politeness and self-liking has been analysed with particular clarity in Peltonen, *The Duel in early modern England*, p.268-85.
206. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.145.

politeness *qua* moral institution. Such a pattern of behaviour, when the mask falls once the interest dies, does not count as civility. A conversation here refers to a casual situation between 'equals [...] where neither interest nor superiority are consider'd'. What often happens in a conversation 'among un-civilized men' is an outward 'declaration of their sentiments' that 'renders them both insufferable to each other'. It is evident that 'without a mixture of art and trouble, the outward symptoms' of self-liking 'are not to be stifled'.[207] Men instinctively value themselves above their real worth. Thus, it automatically happens that the conversation between two equal, uncivilised men who have not learned to change the course of self-liking and to hide their sentiments is doomed to be unsatisfactory for both of them.

Cleomenes's second point is that a man is a creature 'endued with a great share of understanding', fond of his 'ease to the last degree, and as industrious to produce it'. Thus, 'in all human probability', the 'effect' this 'inconveniency arising from self-liking' has upon men is that they start searching for ways to ameliorate this frailty in their social relationships and eventually redirect their passion. What this means in relation to the conjectural development of a moral institution is spelled out in plain words: 'The disturbance and uneasiness, that must be caused by self-liking', 'must' in turn 'necessarily produce at long run, what we call good manners and politeness'.[208] Mandeville staunchly points out that the cause of this development is evident, but the historical progress is not straightforward. A moral institution is not established at a single stroke, and many 'strugglings and unsuccessful trials to remedy' the uneasiness of pride 'precede' this point of perfection.[209]

The ingenious design of Mandeville's conjectural development of moral institutions explains how an invaluable moral practice evolves without the actors being conscious of what is happening, nor is it their intention to contribute to the process. If the evolution of fundamental moral institutions is logical and is set to follow a certain course, the actual agents may be fully unaware

207. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.138.
208. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.138.
209. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.138.

of the process in which they are participating. This is a point that is difficult to over-emphasise when considering what is original in Mandeville's thinking. After Cleomenes makes the two points that explain how politeness is a natural product of the development of a civil society, Horatio recaps what he understands as the main part of the conjectural development of politeness:

> Everybody, in this undisciplin'd state, being affected with the high value he has for himself, and displaying the most natural symptoms, which you have describ'd, they would all be offended at the barefac'd pride of their neighbours: and it is impossible, that this should continue long among rational creatures, but the repeated experience of the uneasiness they received from such behaviour, would make some of them reflect on the cause of it; which, in tract of time, would make them find out, that their own barefaced pride must be as offensive to others, as that of others is to themselves.[210]

Horatio's summary is presented as informative, but he unfortunately misunderstands the role of reason and intention. One meta-text stratagem Mandeville employs is to flag a mistake his character makes. An example of this is when Cleomenes points out to Horatio that 'what you say is certainly the philosophical reason of the alterations, that are made in the behaviour of men, by their being civiliz'd: but all this is done without reflection'. Mandeville systematically insists, giving different examples, that even if the conjectural development of moral institutions is deemed to follow a certain course, it is not a conscious process. Men do not intentionally aim to establish moral conventions. Eventually, at some point in time, they will, because of the inconvenience caused by the passion in question, but they are unable to directly strive to do so because they are controlled by the very same passions that have to be redirected. As Cleomenes argues, 'by degrees, and great length of time' they 'fall as it were into these things spontaneously'.[211]

210. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.138-39.
211. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.139. The idea of spontaneous order has been stressed in relation to modern political principles, such as *laissez-faire*. See, for example, Hamowy, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the theory of spontaneous order* that discusses Mandeville as point of departure. I do not agree with this view about self-coordinating social patterns, because it misses the crucial role

One might assume that once politeness has become an established moral institution people would realise its worth and follow its principles because they understand that it is the reasonable thing to do. Mandeville did not think that a later stage of civilisation made any difference in this respect. 'Even now', Cleomenes states, when the art of good manners is 'brought to great perfection, the greatest part of those that are most expert, and daily making improvements' in it, 'know as little of the *Rationale*' behind it as their 'predecessors did at first'.[212] This is an intriguing point, because not only the role of reason, but also the question of proper motives and intentions vanish in conjectural history. It makes no difference why people are polite or just: 'In the choice of things we are more often directed by the caprice of fashions, and the custom of the age, than we are by solid reason, or our own understanding.'[213] What does make a difference is that there is politeness and justice; and people follow these general rules, whether out of habit, or because of self-liking, self-love or whatever wavering motive they might have at that fleeting moment in time.

Mandeville also gives his readers a step-by-step account of how a moral institution comes into being from a meagre, savage society. This is not presented as actual historical development such as happened in Britain, France or China, for example. As he puts it through the mouth of Cleomenes: 'I don't speak of our nation in particular, but of all states and kingdoms in general.'[214] The conjectural progress of politeness is set out in common terms in order to stress the fact that its development in all civil societies is bound to follow the very same lines. The first incentive in most primitive actions is self-interest. According to Mandeville, it is 'the most crafty and designing' that will 'be the first' to 'learn to conceal' the 'passion of pride' for 'interest-sake'. Imitation is a powerful social tool. Once an example has been given 'in little time no body' in this abstracted savage society 'will shew the least

assigned to the executive power of government by Mandeville, Hume and others, even when part of their argument is the idea that social institutions develop over time and correlate with human nature.

212. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.144.
213. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.247.
214. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.323.

symptom of self-liking 'whilst he is asking favours, or stands in need of help'.[215] Thus, the rudimentary progress of politeness starts in the pursuit of self-interest. However, this is just the beginning of the process, where the significance of the moral institution lies in self-liking rather than self-love.

Mandeville emphasises the fact that moral institutions are constantly developing and changing. Inept and uncivilised men first learn that when asking for favours it is in their interest not to show pride. This is a mean beginning, but more is to follow, for 'once the generality begin to conceal' their self-liking, 'new improvements must be made every day'. It will not be long, 'till some of them grow impudent enough, not only to deny the high value they have for themselves, but likewise to pretend that they have greater value for others, than they have for themselves'.[216] In turn, 'this will bring in complaisance, and now flattery will rush in upon them like a torrent'. This marks the turning point at which the most influential groups in society slowly start to shift their behaviour from securing self-love towards cultivating self-liking. The natural affection that parents feel for their children also has a role to play in this scheme, and 'as soon as' men 'are arrived at this pitch of insincerity, they will find the benefit of it, and teach it their children'.[217] In other words, they will teach their children what we call manners.

Mandeville underlines the importance of education in his social theory: the only 'reality' of 'the compliment we make to our species, of its being endued with speech and sociableness', is 'that by care and industry men may be taught to speak, and be made sociable, if the discipline begins when they are very young'.[218] He also emphasises that it takes several generations

215. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.141.
216. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.145; see also p.150.
217. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.145.
218. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.191. On Mandeville and social theory, see Marina Bianchi, 'How to learn sociality: true and false solutions to Mandeville's problem', *History of political economy* 25 (1993), p.209-40; Roy Pascal, 'Property or society: the Scottish historical school of the eighteenth century', *Modern quarterly* 1 (1938), p.167-79; Den Uyl, 'Passion, state and progress: Spinoza and Mandeville', p.369-95; and Louis Schneider, 'Mandeville as forerunner of modern sociology', *Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences* 6 (1970), p.219-30.

before a decent level of civility is reached, and that the process does not end when a civil state is established. Self-liking is far more difficult to redirect than self-love. Human nature is tremulous, and the first private 'family descending from such a stock, would be crumbled to pieces, re-united, and dispers'd again several times, before the whole or any part of it could be advanced to any degree of politeness'.[219] However, what happens in conjectural development is that 'the knowledge of parents', regardless of how useless it might be in practice, 'is communicated to their off-spring', because they have a natural affection concerning their well-being.[220] Only 'few parents are so bad as not to wish their offspring might be well accomplish'd',[221] and thus 'every one's experience in life, being added to what he learn'd in his youth, every generation after this must be better taught than the preceding; by which means, in two or three centuries, good manners must be brought to great perfection'.[222] Even after reaching a high level of politeness, moreover, most people who follow these guidelines do not reflect upon their actions. Mandeville skilfully separates the question of proper motivation from the idea of a beneficial moral institution. Who could deny that the 'doctrine of good manners' is 'taught and practised by millions, who never thought on the origin of politeness, or so much as knew the real benefit it is of to society'?[223]

This, then, is Mandeville's understanding of the conjectural development of a moral institution in a nutshell. He goes out of his way to explain that the development of the pivotal artificial moral conventions follows a somewhat natural course in all human societies because the common propensities of human nature are the same in a savage as in a civilised man: 'All the precepts of good manners throughout the world have the same tendency, and are no more than the various methods of making ourselves acceptable to others, with as little prejudice to ourselves as is possible.'[224] This, of course, does not mean that men in their

219. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.318.
220. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.145-46.
221. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.341.
222. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.145-46.
223. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.141.
224. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.147.

manners and morals are predestined to fit a certain mould. Methods of making 'ourselves acceptable to others' might, and do change, even if the semantic value of manners is fixed. In the sense that the inconvenience caused by self-liking sets men to seek to conceal their pride, and the disturbance caused by self-love makes them look for ways to restrict the unbound movement of their selfishness, the development of civil society is natural. 'The art of good manners', according to the Dutchman, is 'a science that is ever built on the same steady principle in our nature, whatever the age or the climate may be, in which it is practis'd'.[225] The convention is always established for the same reason and following the same basic principles: the inconvenience caused by self-liking forces all civil societies to look for a custom such as politeness, the idea being to redirect its course so that it is not converted into outward manifestations of pride. There is, of course, great variation in how this happens in practice in different places and at different times. For example, modern honour, for Mandeville, was the most important contribution to eighteenth-century European politeness, but it was not part of his general explanation of the development of civil society because it was strongly attached to the development of a particular society rather than a universal practice.

Establishing a civil state

All the main components of the 'Mandevillean' scheme of society are constructed in accordance with the conjectural development of moral institutions described in detail above. Without this process underlying the established conventions of politeness and justice, civil society could never have emerged. However, as far as its origin is concerned, one should be mindful of the monumental point in history at which these conventions became effectual. The point at which different multitudes apparently came to be governed by written laws is a defining moment in Mandeville's social philosophy.

The moral development of mankind naturally began with the children of the first wild couple being born into a pre-social

225. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.146.

condition. The oblique search for society made these savages indirectly form different conventions that would enable them to meliorate their condition. Mandeville explains how the first savages, following the natural principles of human nature, might have expanded into a relatively large clan while the first generation was making moral progress within this natural family society. Cleomenes's suggestion that society came into the world 'from private families; but not without great difficulty, and the concurrence of many favourable accidents; and many generations may pass, before there is any likelihood of their being form'd into a society' makes apparent reference to the formation of a state in which various family societies come to live together, eventually forming a civil society.[226] Thus, Mandeville's three renowned 'step[s] into society', rather than telling the whole story of its origin, which was much earlier, principally explains how these different families were eventually united in a civil state.[227] In short, steps into society, without the pivotal connection to the conjectural development of moral institutions, mean very little. In what follows I examine these three steps from this perspective.

According to Mandeville, the first step towards state formation is a 'common danger, which unites' even 'the greatest enemies'.[228] This has nothing to do with individuals who strive for society for the sake of self-preservation. Instead, 'it is possible', Cleomenes speculates, 'that several families of savages might unite, and the heads of them agree upon some sort of government or other, for their common good'.[229] It is very likely that an external threat from wild beasts encouraged 'different families' temporarily 'to live together', but they would have been of 'little use to one another when there was no longer a 'common enemy to oppose'.[230] Simultaneously, these families started to quarrel.

226. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.200.
227. One further line of investigating Mandeville's idea of the birth of society would be to consider it in accordance with Gassendi's theory of the birth of the state in three stages. On Hobbes and Gassendi on this point, see Gianni Paganini, 'Hobbes, Gassendi and the tradition of political Epicureanism', *Hobbes studies* 14 (2001), p.21-24.
228. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.230.
229. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.132.
230. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.266-67.

Cleomenes refers to this 'danger' that 'men are in from one another' as 'the second step to society', which deviates significantly from Mandeville's previous scheme of a civil society.[231]

One of the shortcomings of *The Fable* concerns the civilising method. Previously Mandeville had only used one explanatory device: the Hobbist idea of self-preservation countering the odious passions of self-love. This constituted a major flaw: the theory could not answer the foundational question of how and why anyone would become a law-giver or politician if all the original appetites concerned necessities or reproduction, and men wanted peacefully to cultivate their primal passions.

As soon as Cleomenes introduces self-liking to Horatio he gives a hypothetical example of how this passion affects the formation of a state. For 'a hundred' savage 'males', all 'equally free', coming together for the first time, having 'their bellies full' and no external reason for a dispute, it would take 'less than half an hour' for 'this liking in question' to 'appear in the desire of superiority'.[232] *The Fable* gives no indication of an original drive towards government. Like mushrooms, law-givers simply popped up at a certain point in history with their inflexible laws curbing men's self-love-induced anger. Cleomenes argues in *Part II* that the instinct of sovereignty and self-liking play a dual role in the formation of a civil society, since 'multitudes could never have been formed into societies, if some of them had not been possessed of this thirst of dominion'. Horatio agrees that there have to be some 'peculiar instincts' underlying a governed society 'that belong to a whole species', which could not be 'acquired by art or discipline'.[233] The second step to society thus meant that 'many families could not live long together', and until 'actuated by the principle' of self-liking some 'would strive for superiority'.[234] The apparent dilemma concerned how these families desiring to dominate others eventually maintained their superiority.

For once Cleomenes accepts his interlocutor's suggestion. Horatio is right in saying that the 'same ambition that made a

231. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.266.
232. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.132.
233. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.205.
234. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.267.

man aspire to be a leader, would make him likewise desirous of being obeyed in civil matters'. After an unspecified but considerably long period of time, leaders would eventually look into 'human nature' and realise that 'the more strife and discord there was amongst the people they headed, the less use they could make of them'.[235] Underlying this self-interested action is the artificial moral progress that started with the first generation of wild savages. A chieftain looking into human nature is simply an indication that the maturity of the moral institutions and the historical circumstances are sufficient to establish a civil state. Leaders create 'prohibitions and penalties' confirming the conjectural development of justice, which could be rendered effectual only when the laws were written down.[236] Thus, 'the third and last step to society' is 'the invention of letters'.[237]

This third step towards society formation could be seen as the point at which the main storylines come together. The moral institution of justice, which is a product of the conjoined experience of several generations, only becomes effectual when regulated through prohibitions and penalties executed by magistracy. At this point politeness is much further away from perfection than justice. This idealised moment of conjectural history marks the real origin of government. Mandeville's strong belief was that 'the undoubted basis of all societies is government', which means that in this sense he and Hume are early modern political theorists, which has a crucial impact on how we should read them.[238] 'It is inconsistent with the nature of human creatures', Mandeville writes, 'that any number of them should ever live together in tolerable concord, without laws or government'.[239] Plainly and simply, 'No multitudes can live peaceably without government; no government can subsist without laws; and no laws can be effectual long, unless they are wrote down'.[240] One cannot over-stress the importance of the plural form of the word 'multitude' here. Mandeville's focus is on the notion that

235. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.268.
236. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.268-69.
237. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.269.
238. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.183-84.
239. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.309.
240. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.269.

different family societies are united into a body politic in the formation of a civil state.

An important feature of the connection between the theory of state formation and the conjectural development of moral institutions is that the respective penalties and prohibitions are not arbitrary, but are in line with the moral progress made by previous generations. 'All sound politicks, and the whole art of governing', according to Mandeville, 'are entirely built upon the knowledge of human nature', which is the sole product of the conjectural development of moral institutions. 'The great business' of 'a politician is to promote, and, if he can, reward all good and useful actions on the one hand; and on the other, to punish, or at least discourage, every thing that is destructive or hurtful to society.'[241] The politician thus does not define what is right and wrong. His role is rather to think of different ways in which to promote sociability, but even this cannot be considered 'the work of one man, or of one generation': like all the other human conventions, the art of governing is 'the joynt labour of several ages'.[242] Laws cannot be arbitrary if they are based on preceding conventions that followed the universal principles of redirecting the passions.

What this in its simplicity means is that even if a perfect legal system is never to be found, and the 'best forms of government are subject to revolutions',[243] 'the principal laws of all countries have the same tendency'.[244] Every one of them is 'plainly design'd' to 'cure and disappoint that natural instinct of sovereignty, which teaches man to look upon every thing as centring in himself, and prompts him to put in a claim to every thing, he can lay his hands on'. The 'obstacles to society' should not be referred to as 'faults', but 'rather' as 'properties of our nature', and all 'the principal laws' point at 'some frailty, defect, or unfitness for society, that men are naturally subject to'.[245] Mandeville repeats on several occasions that the function of 'the principal laws of all countries' is that they 'are remedies against human frailties'. Drawing on his

241. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.321.
242. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.322.
243. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.318.
244. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.271.
245. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.271.

background as a physician, he explains that these laws 'are design'd as antidotes, to prevent the ill consequences of some properties, inseparable from our nature; which yet in themselves, without management or restraint, are obstructive and pernicious to society'.[246]

Mandeville specifically emphasises the centrality of the role of established civil order in the conjectural history of society. The slow and painstaking moral progress begins to speed up: 'once men come to be govern'd by written laws, all the rest comes on a-pace'.[247] This change in tempo is noteworthy for different reasons. The formation of a civil society that is controlled by written laws and executed by a government has a serious effect on people. They 'discover a restless endeavour to make themselves easy, which insensibly teaches them to avoid mischief on all emergencies'. What this means in this context is that 'when human creatures once submit to government, and are used to live under the restraint of laws, it is incredible, how many useful cautions, shifts, and stratagems, they will learn to practise by experience and imitation, from conversing together'. Moreover, this happens 'without' the particular people 'being aware of the natural causes, that oblige them to act as they do, *viz.* The passions within, that, unknown to themselves, govern their will and direct their behaviour'.[248]

The immediate outcome of having written laws is that a system of justice is rendered effective, and 'now property, and safety of life and limb, may be secured'. The primary purpose of a civil state is thus to provide security for every individual's self-love. In consequence, breakthroughs will occur on other fronts as well. The general security of individual self-interest 'naturally will forward the love of peace, and make it spread'. This mutual trust, in turn, considerably advances the commerce between reliable individuals, and 'no number of men, when once they enjoy quiet, and no man needs to fear his neighbour, will be long without learning to divide and subdivide their labour'.[249] A government

246. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.283.
247. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.284.
248. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.139.
249. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.284.

imposing regulations on self-love is able to stabilise society, and its numbers start to grow. This is also the first time that the faculty of reason is adopted in Mandeville's scheme: 'When laws begin to be well known, and the execution of them is facilitated by general approbation, multitudes may be kept in tolerable concord among themselves', and 'it is then that it appears, and not before, how much the superiority of man's understanding beyond other animals, contributes to his sociableness, which is only retarded by it in his savage state'.[250] As can be plausibly inferred, Mandeville placed much emphasis on the formation of a civil state that eventually taught men, as he called it, 'a method of thinking justly'.[251] No matter how crucial this artificial convention of justice might be, however, it only confirms one side of bilateral moral progress. Having reached the point of establishing laws and a government, we still have to establish how the overall shift from self-love to self-liking took place. The formation of a civil state was a crucial moment in history, but it was still far from a civilised state.

From self-love to self-liking

Moral progress did not end with the establishment of a civil society. An ever-developing legislative system that provides security for every individual's self-love was a landmark in the history of moral institutions, but there was still a long way to go before the emergence of a truly civilised person who has been 'educated in a society, a civil establishment, of several hundred years standing'.[252]

Being governable in Mandeville's terms means that man, in spite of everything, is given to servitude. People are 'reconciled to submission', but regardless of this they are able to take advantage of their condition and are satisfied in their servitude, thus they are not servile or slavish. How is this possible? In the light of the new concepts he coins – self-liking and the instinct of sovereignty

250. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.300.
251. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.219, see also p.236 where Mandeville talks about how long it will take until men are 'capable of thinking justly'.
252. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.301.

– it is easy to recognise the difference between being submissive and being governable that he was after. When a man is rendered governable he has to compromise his 'domineering spirit'. He cannot roam free and indulge his natural liberty at will. He has to curb the natural inclinations that arise from self-love. However, he still has his self-liking to indulge, and it does not mean that the instinct of sovereignty is pulled out of his heart. The cornerstone of civility is that men start to cultivate self-liking. It was 'the management of self-liking' that 'set forth the excellency of our species beyond all other animals'.[253]

In the original *Fable* Mandeville refers to politeness as a significant aid for an individual intending to promote his self-interest. Most importantly, it is represented as a technique that permits a person hypocritically to benefit from social relations. It is still perceived as artificial in *Part II*, but even if it could at times directly contribute to self-interest, this is not prescribed as its main function. The significance of the revisions Mandeville made to his theory of civility is that he was then able to give a plausible explanation of why politeness was the central moral institution that rendered people governable and upheld modern society. Politeness is a practice that benefits society as a whole. It is the only way to successfully control the instinct of sovereignty, and without it a multitude cannot possibly be governed as a body politic. It is an integral part of the process towards refinement, and the reason why one could talk about a civilised society in the first place.

Mandeville was still preoccupied with the concept of anger in *Part II*, but this time only when describing the break between barbarity and civility: 'Man in his anger behaves himself in the same manner as other animals'. In his 'pursuit of self-preservation' he will disturb those with whom he is angry. Thus, he will try to either 'destroy, or cause pain and displeasure to' his 'adversaries'.[254] This is natural for a man. Mandeville never changes his definition of anger, which he claims arises from self-love (mainly hunger or lust). According to Cleomenes, we may 'observe' even 'in infants of two or three months old' the

253. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.175.
254. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.271.

presence of an 'instinct, something implanted in the frame' that 'raises their anger, which is easily and at most times unaccountably provoked; often by hunger, pain, and other inward ailments'.[255] Mandeville was not suggesting that men in a civil society were sincerely peaceful: they were still affected by their instinct of sovereignty, and were continuously crossed in the business of self-preservation, but now their passions operated in a different way.

All men born into a society start to cultivate self-liking. As noted, Mandeville describes this passion as having two vital components. Men involuntarily value themselves above their real worth, but they have some notion of the fact that they misjudge their value, and this makes them yearn for approval.[256] The best way to obtain the good opinion of others is through mutual discretion. Because people, in one way or another, think too highly of themselves it is not advisable to reveal this passion in public. But when people follow the custom of politeness, there is room for everyone to find different ways to cultivate notions of their own worth. In short, Mandeville endorses the long-established tradition of renaissance court civility.[257] In his second attempt to theorise about civil society, he equates the advancement of politeness to the development of a civil society.

Mandeville emphasises that a man 'naturally loves to imitate what he sees others do'.[258] Human understanding has little to do with the civilising process. Most importantly, 'experience and imitation' teach men 'to act as they do'.[259] '*Beau monde*' functions 'in all countries' as 'the undoubted refiners of language', and most parts of society try to imitate their example as best they can.[260] The emphasis should be on 'most parts of the society' because self-liking could easily operate in other ways as well. 'Some men' might 'indulge their pride in being shameless'.[261] According to Cleomenes, it is self-evident that the 'man of honour and one that

255. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.295.
256. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.130.
257. Peltonen, *The Duel in early modern England*, p.1-16, 263-68.
258. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.284.
259. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.139.
260. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.292.
261. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.91.

has none,' both act 'from the same principle'. At the same time, the role of education and government turns out to be highly crucial in a civil society. 'There is nothing that some men may not be taught to be ashamed of. The same passion, that makes the well-bred man and prudent officer value and secretly admire themselves for the honour and fidelity they display, may make the rake and scoundrel brag of their vices and boast of their impudence.'[262]

Living in a society simply renders men dependent upon it. When even rogues are motivated through pride, the society must curb its outward expressions. Politeness is a custom that teaches men to 'play' pride 'against itself'. As Cleomenes states, men must be 'allowed to change the natural home-bred symptoms' of pride, 'for artificial foreign ones'.[263] When all possible efforts are made regarding dress and appearance, gentlefolk are also distanced from natural expressions of self-love. This does not mean that men are not affected by hunger or lust. They continuously use their understanding and look for different ways of pleasing themselves and making their lives easy.[264] It is when people appear pleasing in commerce with others that society is able to function. And, importantly, this is not a judgement of how people should live.

262. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.90.
263. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.125.
264. Mandeville, *Part II*, p. 300.

3. The publishing history of *The Fable of the bees*

In this chapter I undertake a re-examination of the publishing history of some of Mandeville's works that sheds crucial light on his intellectual development. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown material, challenges F. B. Kaye's influential decision to publish the two parts of the *Fable* as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the account is to function as the context for the young David Hume when he encountered a new line of thought in 1729.

F. B. Kaye's two volumes of the Fable

Scholarship on Bernard Mandeville has been profoundly influenced by F. B. Kaye's edition of *The Fable of the bees*.[1] Kaye, who edited the *Fable* as his doctoral dissertation when he was less than twenty-five years old, made a choice some time in the early 1920s that has had a deep impact on how Mandeville has been read and interpreted ever since. This simple choice served to establish as a tradition that the two parts were to be published together as two volumes, which first occurred towards the end of the eighteenth century.[2] As a result, *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II* are customarily considered two volumes of the same work, and its publishing history is taken to be a straightforward story. As will become obvious, from a book-historical perspective the matter is much more complicated. Shedding light on these bibliographical questions and the role of different publishers in the publishing process will also considerably enhance understanding of Mandeville's intellectual development. Thus the study also func-

1. Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees, or private vices, publick benefits*, with a commentary critical, historical and explanatory by F. B. Kaye, 2 vols (1924; Indianapolis, IN, 1988).
2. As Kaye wrote in his 'prefatory note', dated 31 December 1923, 'This edition is an elaboration of a dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Yale University in 1917', when Kaye was twenty-five years old; see Kaye, *The Fable of the bees*, p.xii.

tions as an example of how book history and intellectual history complement each other.

Perhaps the most significant review of Kaye's edition of the *Fable* focused on bibliographical questions. The review was written by R. B. McKerrow, and was published in *The Library* in 1925.[3] McKerrow compliments Kaye's bibliographical innovativeness on the one hand,[4] but on the other hand one of the most authoritative reviewers of *The Fable* criticised the edition for the use of miscellaneous, unidentified reproductions of early ornaments, for example, and the unorthodox description of the different editions in Kaye's work.[5] However, the noteworthy issue that McKerrow singles out is the question of whether there ever was a Tonson edition in 1734 in which both parts of *The Fable of the bees* were published together as two volumes. As he points out, 'the information which Mr. Kaye gives does not make it certain that he has got to the bottom of the matter'.[6] This raises the question of whether the two parts of the *Fable* should have been published as a work of two volumes.

After Kaye, very few scholars have made any effort to say something new about Mandeville regarding bibliography.[7] Kaye worked extensively in order to establish the Mandeville canon,[8] and there have been only a few later additions.[9] The crucial

3. R. B. McKerrow, '*Fable of the bees*: book review', *The Library*, s4, 6 (1925), p.109-11.
4. Kaye was the first person to use R. W. Chapman's argument about press figures in his discussion of the sheet O of the first edition of *Part II* of 1729; see McKerrow, '*Fable of the bees*: book review', p.110. On the printer's numbers or press figures, see Philip Gaskell, 'Eighteenth-century press numbers: their use and usefulness', *The Library*, s5, 4 (1950), p.249-61. Gaskell's point is that the use of press numbers had to do with calculating how many sheets each press had printed (when there was more than one in use).
5. McKerrow, '*Fable of the bees*: book review', p.109.
6. McKerrow, '*Fable of the bees*: book review', p.111.
7. The outstanding exceptions being Irwin Primer, Maurice Goldsmith and Francis McKee.
8. See Kaye's edition of the *Fable*, as well as his 'The writings of Bernard Mandeville', p.419-67 and Kaye, 'The Mandeville canon: a supplement', *Notes and queries* 146 (1924), p.317-21.
9. See Gordon H. Ward, 'An unnoted poem by Mandeville', *Review of English studies* 7 (1931), p.73-76. See also, M. M. Goldsmith, 'Two more works by Bernard Mandeville?', *Notes and queries* 23 (1976), p.346. On bibliography, see also Irwin Primer, 'A bibliographical note on Bernard Mandeville's *Free thoughts*', *Notes and queries* 16 (1969), p.187-88. Paulette Carrive has since correctly pointed out that the money motive was not the only reason to publish the second edition of the *Free thoughts* because the second edition does include original material as well.

and most visible development concerned the *Female tatler*.[10] Maurice Goldsmith in particular emphasised the significance of this work for understanding Mandeville.[11] Meanwhile, the most important question of Mandeville bibliography, the publishing history of *The Fable of the bees* and the unresolved puzzles McKerrow noted, have remained untouched. It is the purpose of this chapter to augment these omissions and tell a more complete story of Mandeville and the publishing of the *Fable*. This will considerably help to pinpoint the intellectual change in Mandeville's works from the original *Fable* to *Part II*.

Mandeville's early contacts

Some of Mandeville's earliest known literary works in Britain, *Pamphleteers* and (two editions of) translations or re-versifications of some of La Fontaine's *Fables*, came from the same publisher. Both *Some fables after the easie and familiar method of Monsieur de La Fontaine* and *Pamphleteers* of 1703 include advertisements from

10. Paul Bunyan Anderson, 'Splendor out of scandal: the Lucinda-Artesia papers in *Female tatler*', *Philological quarterly* 15 (1936), p.286-300. See also Anderson, 'Innocence and artifice, or Mrs Centlivre and *The Female tatler*', *Philological quarterly* 16 (1937), p.358-75. Anderson's more fanciful Mandeville attributions are: Anderson, 'Bernard Mandeville', *TLS* (28 November 1936), p.996; Anderson, 'Cato's obscure counterpart in the *British journal*, 1722-1725', *Studies in philology* 34 (1937), p.412-38, and Anderson, 'Bernard Mandeville on gin', *PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 54 (1939), p.775-84. Their relevance has been questioned by Gordon Stewart Vichert, 'Some recent Mandeville attributions', *Philological quarterly* 45 (1966), p.459.
11. On the *Female tatler*, see especially Goldsmith's lengthy and well-documented 'Introduction', in Mandeville, *By a society of ladies*, p.11-72. On the role of the *Female tatler* in Goldsmith's general interpretation of Mandeville, see especially M. M. Goldsmith, *Private vices, public benefits* (1985), which is further vindicated in the revised edition published in 2001. On more evidence provided by Goldsmith that Mandeville did write the Lucinda and Artesia papers, see Mandeville, *By a society of ladies: essays in the 'Female tatler'*, p.45. The *Female tatler* was also published by Everyman's Library in 1992. It was edited with an introduction by Fidelis Morgan.

Richard Wellington. The imprint does not give details of the author or publisher. The title-page of the 1704 edition of La Fontaine's *Fables* is a cancel. The explanation is the inclusion of the author and the bookseller.[12] It is possible, however, that Mandeville published more work before this time in London that we don't know of. The earliest literary undertaking by Mandeville in Britain that I have been able to find is a Latin epitaph published in 1695 (based on a signature 'B. D. Mandeville. Med. Doct.').[13]

No plausible conjecture regarding his early days in London can be made without reference to Richard Wellington. According to Plomer, Wellington started his career as a printer in 1693, around the time when Mandeville arrived in London.[14] He was one of the most influential and respected publishers of his time. John Dunton describes him as 'industrious and indefatigable in his calling', a publisher who 'has the intimate acquaintance of several excellent pens, and, therefore, can never want copies; and trust him for managing and improving them'. Unlike some other famous publishers, Wellington was also commended for being a man who 'has a pretty knack at keeping his word'.[15] What Plomer's *Dictionary* does not reveal is that Wellington was also a publisher of several medical treatises and translations.

One of the first and largest (based on the page count) of Mandeville's literary undertakings seems to have been a translation of François de la Calmette's *Riverius reformatus* from Latin

12. Mandeville, *Some fables after the easie and familiar method of Monsieur de La Fontaine, Aesop dress'd, or a Collection of fables writ in familiar verse* (London, printed for Richard Wellington, 1704).
13. Petrus Francius, *An Oration of Peter Francius, upon the funeral of the most august princess Mary II Queen of Great Britain, France and Ireland* (London, printed for John Dunton, 1695), p.24.
14. Henry Plomer, *et al., A Dictionary of the printers and booksellers who were at work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1668 to 1725*, ed. Arundell Esdaile (London, 1922). In other words, Wellington made his first entry into Stationer's Company's Term Catalogues in 1693; see Edward Arber (ed.), *The Term catalogues 1668-1709 A.D. with a number for Easter term 1711* (London, 1903-1906), vol.2, p.475.
15. John Dunton, *The Life and errors of John Dunton, citizen of London: with the lives and characters of more than a thousand contemporary divines and other persons of literary eminence*, ed. John Bowyer Nichols (London, 1818), vol.1, p.212.

into English in 1706.[16] Richard Wellington was an enthusiastic advertiser of the books he published. Many of his publications came with an added reference list of books to be published and, like many other publishers, he used the tails of the title pages and blank versos to advertise forthcoming titles. The third edition of *Etmullerus abridg'd*, printed for 'Andrew Bell; and Richard Wellington, 1712', includes advertisements from both publishers. The first book on Wellington's list is '*Riverius reformatus, or the Modern riverius [...] 'translated from the third edition, in Latin, by Dr Mandeville*'.[17] This 534-page English translation was issued twice – in 1706 and in 1713.[18] *Modern riverius* is a straightforward medical treatise, an attempt at 'a Compleat Practical System of Physick', as the translator Bernard Mandeville stressed in the 1706 preface.[19] Given the identification of Mandeville as the translator in the advertisement and the fact that Wellington was his early publisher, it is safe to conclude that this was one of Mandeville's most important early literary undertakings (that we know of).[20] It

16. The role of Mandeville translating *Modern riverius* has been analysed in Francis McKee, 'An anatomy of power: the early works of Bernard Mandeville', unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Glasgow, 1991). In this excellent piece of scholarship McKee looks at the classical theory of imitation and its relationship to the notion of digestion, and frames Mandeville's translations in this context as his main focus is on digestion.
17. The first Geneva edition of *Riverius reformatus* was published in 1688; the Lyons edition appeared in 1690, and the second Geneva edition, that Mandeville says that he used as his copytext, came out in 1696. Before an English translation appeared, there was also a second Lyons edition of 1704. New Latin editions of *Riverius reformatus* kept appearing well into the eighteenth century (at least in 1706, 1712, 1718 and 1735).
18. The book was entered into the Term Catalogues by Wellington in [May] Easter term 1706 under 'Physick'. Richard Wellington also published Michael Ettmüller, *Opera omnia in compendium redacta* (London, printed for Richard Wellington, 1701).
19. *Riverius reformatus, or the Modern Riverius: containing the Modern practice of physick; set down in a method very near the same with that of Riverius; but accommodated to the most receiv'd principles among the modern philosophers, as well as physicians; with practical observations annex'd to each head or chapter*, translated by Bernard Mandeville (London, printed for Richard Wellington, 1706), preface, p.A2r. On Mandeville's understanding of 'the great difference between the Speculative and Practical part of Physick', see Mandeville, *A Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick passions*, p.59.
20. There is only one other Dr Mandeville in the early eighteenth-century material that I have come across, namely Dr John Mandeville (not the

should also be borne in mind that *Riverius* was a favourite classic text in Leiden, where Mandeville earned his doctorate in medicine; and that there was a tradition of translating *Riverius* into the vernacular in Britain.[21]

Mandeville's relationship with Richard Wellington was influential as far as his literary career was concerned. It was a connection, it seems, that was decisive for his development as a literary figure and for his reputation as such. Publication of his works, both medical and literary, started under the aegis of Richard Wellington. It is noteworthy that even in a miscellaneous work published elsewhere Mandeville refers to Wellington as an authority. It was no other than 'Wel[ling]ton', who famously told Mandeville that his 'Dish of *Fables*' went 'down' with the general public 'like chopt Hay'.[22] Despite this commercial shortcoming, Mandeville was evidently one of the able scribes that Wellington had at his disposal. Their publishing relationship continued for a decade, from 1703 to 1713, but the link might well have been established some years earlier.

Richard Wellington was well connected to other publishers.[23] His deep involvement with the Tonson publishing house in particular deserves attention. One can trace the Wellington-Tonson co-operation through imprints. The two names appeared together on a title page at least as early as in 1697.[24] Richard

medieval namesake). He was, however, not a doctor of physic, but of divinity. Instead of translating medical works, he spent his time in the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in foreign parts.

21. I would like to thank Professor Harold Cook for reminding me of this.
22. Bernard Mandeville, *Typhon, or the Wars between the gods and giants: a burlesque poem in imitation of the comical Mons. Scarron* (London, printed for J. Pero and S. Illidge, 1704), p.A4r. Mandeville, as he said, did not publish the four remaining pieces of *Typhon* that he had already finished in 1704. They only appeared in the miscellaneous verse collection, *Wishes to a godson* (London, printed for J. Baker, 1712).
23. On the nature of the book industry in eighteenth-century England, see William St Clair, 'The high monopoly period in England', in *The Reading nation in the Romantic period* (Cambridge, 2004), p.84-102, and James Raven, 'London and the central sites of the English book trade', in *The Cambridge history of the book in Britain*, ed. Michael F. Suarez and Michael L. Turner (Cambridge, 2009), vol.5, p.293-308.
24. Timothy Nourse, *A Discourse upon the nature and faculties of man, in several essays: with some considerations upon the occurrences of humane life* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1697).

Wellington and Jacob Tonson, the elder, jointly published the collected plays of some of the most renowned authors of the time: Aphra Behn, John Vanbrugh and John Dryden. Among other things, they co-operated on Samuel Butler's *Hudibras* and Congreve's works, as well as on Milton. Their partnership is best remembered through the shared ownership of William Shakespeare's copyrights.[25] The mutually beneficial collaboration between Tonson's publishing house and Wellington's descendants lasted long after Richard Wellington died in 1715.[26] Question of copyright ownership was an important subject then and it is still much discussed in scholarship.[27] What has particularly caused debate is the relationship between printers in London and the provinces.[28]

F. B. Kaye, instead of acknowledging any of Mandeville's other publishers, followed the trend of seeing the two parts of the *Fable* as one work of two volumes, and put his faith in James

25. Regarding Shakespeare copyrights, see Terry Belanger, 'Tonson, Wellington and the Shakespeare copyrights', in *Studies in the book trade: in honour of Graham Pollard* (Oxford, 1975), p.195-210. For an earlier discussion of the same topic and a detailed analysis of the complicated nature of selling the Wellington copyrights, see Terry Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright: aspects of the London book trade, 1718-1768', unpublished doctoral dissertation (Columbia University, NY, 1970), CUL, pressmark Munby.b.88, p.123-33.
26. After 1715, as was customary, the Wellington books started to appear with an indication of M. Wellington (for Mary, Richard's widow) on the imprint before the business gradually transferred to their children and before a chaotic legal dispute took over some years later.
27. See St Clair, 'Appendix 2. Intellectual property and textual controls: custom, law and practice', in *The Reading nation*, p.480-87; Mark Rose, 'Copyright, authors and censorship', in *The Cambridge history of the book in Britain*, ed. Michael F. Suarez and Michael L. Turner (Cambridge, 2009), vol.5, p.118-32; Alfred W. Pollard, 'Some notes on the history of copyright in England, 1662-1775', *The Library*, s4, 3 (1922), p.97-114; Harry Ransom, 'The date of the first copyright law', *Studies in English* 20 (1940), p.117-22; and Donald W. Nichol, 'On the use of "copy" and "copyright": a Scriblerian coinage?', *The Library*, s6, 7 (1990), p.110-20.
28. On Irish and Scottish reprints regarding Scottish Enlightenment, see Sher, *The Enlightenment and the book*, p.445-66; on the Scottish reprint trade, see also Warren McDougall, 'Copyright and Scottishness', in *The Edinburgh history of the book in Scotland: Enlightenment and expansion 1707-1800*, ed. Stephen W. Brown and Warren McDougall (Edinburgh, 2012), vol.2, p.23-39. See also James Raven, *The Business of books: booksellers and the English book trade 1450-1850* (London and New Haven, CT, 2007).

Roberts.[29] The name James Roberts appears on the title page of the first editions of *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II*.[30] This, combined with the assumption that Mandeville owned the copyrights of his own works, seems neatly to justify the idea that the two books are complementary pieces and intended by Mandeville as such. This is, nevertheless, a false premise.

James Roberts, as Maurice Goldsmith emphasised, was a trade publisher and as such was not first in the pecking order of the London publishing industry.[31] It has been described as 'an appropriate occupation for a bankrupt bookseller' or a 'poor widow'.[32] Basically, a trade publisher published in bulk for others without serious input in the actual publishing process. To put it briefly, 'in the case of trade publishers there is no shortage of imprints'.[33] According to Michael Treadwell, 'in the period from about 1675 to 1750 a substantial proportion of the London retail book trade, particularly the part concerned with pamphlets and periodicals, was in the hands of a very small group of men and women known to their contemporaries in the trade as "publishers"'.[34]

What is relevant is that the trade publishing business seems, at least in part, to have been politically motivated. The 'major Whig' trade publishing shop at the beginning of the eighteenth century was located 'near the Oxford Arms in Warwick Lane', 'opened at the time of the Glorious Revolution by Richard Baldwin, and continued after his death in 1698 by his widow Abigail'.[35] James Roberts married into the business, and during 'the first twenty years after taking over the business in 1713, James Roberts put his

29. For a brief biography of James Roberts, see Michael Treadwell, 'London printers and printing houses in 1705', *Publishing history* 7 (1980), p.43-44.
30. Regarding the differences and difficulties of 'printer', 'bookseller' and 'publisher', see Peter W. M. Blayney, 'The publication of playbooks', in *A New history of early English drama*, ed. John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan (New York, 1997), p.389-92.
31. On Goldsmith's account of Mandeville and Roberts, see *By a society of ladies*, p.46-47.
32. Treadwell, Michael, 'London trade publishers 1675-1750', *The Library*, s6, IV (1982), p.102.
33. Treadwell, 'London trade publishers 1675-1750', p.107.
34. Treadwell, 'London trade publishers 1675-1750', p.99.
35. Treadwell, 'London trade publishers 1675-1750', p.108-109.

name to more books, pamphlets, and periodicals than anyone else in the trade'.[36] Among those imprints are the first edition of *The Fable of the bees* from 1714 and *The Fable of the bees. Part II* from 1729. The conclusion that Kaye reached was that Roberts was the printer behind the two parts of the *Fable*.[37]

It is indeed true that James Roberts's shop was a place through which many of Mandeville's books were distributed. In addition to *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II*, *Free thoughts on religion* in 1720, *An Enquiry into the causes of the frequent executions at Tyburn* in 1725 and *A Letter to Dion* in 1732 all passed through the shop, as did numerous other books by various authors.[38] It is also possible that Roberts distributed the Tonson editions of Mandeville's works at least in part, although this is not indicated on the title page.[39] However, this does not mean that he played a significant role in Mandeville's literary career. This question concerns various interpretations of Mandeville's philosophy because of the common assumption that the two separate parts of the *Fable* are to be read as one work.

Some significant facts have hitherto been ignored. First of all, on the subject of publishers, as already noted, the role of Richard Wellington as Mandeville's first publisher was crucial, but has been ignored in previous scholarship due to the attention paid to Roberts. In addition to this, many familiar names in eighteenth-

36. Treadwell, 'London trade publishers 1675-1750', p.110.
37. Goldsmith follows Kaye's interpretation by only making a few reservations to the idea that 'the Baldwin-Roberts dynasty was closely connected with virtually all of Mandeville's important writings' and that 'Mandeville himself owned the copyright of his works'; see Goldsmith, *By a society of ladies*, p.47.
38. Bernard Mandeville, *An Enquiry into the causes of the frequent executions at Tyburn: and a proposal for some regulations concerning felons in prison, and the good effects to be expected from them. To which is added, A Discourse on transportation, and a method to render that punishment more effectual* (London, 1725) was first printed between the end of February and the beginning of April in 1725 as six chapters in the *British journal*. These communications are signed: 'Philantropos' and there are further similarly signed letters in the newspaper; see Kaye, *Fable*, p.439. Mandeville's *Tyburn* piece was still discussed in Robert Hovenden, *Crime and punishment, or the Question how should we treat our criminals, practically considered* (London, 1849) p.35-36.
39. On imprints, see M. A. Shaaber, 'The meaning of the imprint in early printed books', *The Library*, s4, 24 (1944), p.120-41, and A. T. Hazen, 'One meaning of the imprint', *The Library*, s5, 6 (1951), p.120-23.

century publishing appear on the imprints of Mandeville's miscellaneous works: Pero, Illidge, Nutt, Morphew, Leach, Taylor, Woodward, Baker, Dodd, Rivington, Jauncy, Strahan, Mears, Stagg and Peele. In this light, Mandeville's involvement with Abigail Baldwin when *The Grumbling hive* was published in 1705 indicates nothing else than the evident Whiggishness of the piece. It certainly does not indicate any lasting commitment between the two parties. Mandeville did publish through the Baldwin-Roberts establishment, but other works were published by other printers.

Secondly, it is somewhat striking that whereas investigations regarding James Roberts and Abigail Baldwin have been rather extensive, Jacob Tónson's role in publishing *The Fable of the bees* and Mandeville's other works has been virtually ignored. Tonson's was the largest publishing house in eighteenth-century London. Younger Tonson's career as a publisher was nothing short of remarkable,[40] and it was certainly Tonson who played the most significant role in Mandeville's publishing career.

Thirdly, the role of Mandeville's later publisher, John Brotherton, who was after all the witness to his will, has been given little consideration. He played the same kind of role towards the end of Mandeville's publishing career as Richard Wellington did in the early stages. Brotherton was the publisher of the second edition of *Free thoughts on religion* in 1729 and, most importantly, he was also the publisher of the second part of *Part II* in 1732, entitled *An Enquiry into the origin of honour*.[41] However, because Kaye chose to argue that *The Fable of the bees* was a work of two volumes, these points have not been fully established in Mandeville scholarship.

I have already pointed out that there is a strong link between Richard Wellington's and Tonson's publishing businesses regarding the copyrights of Shakespeare's collected works. As Terry Belanger notes, these were 'among the most valuable of the

40. Mentioned, for example, in Thomas F. Bonnell, 'The reprint trade', in *The Cambridge history of the book in Britain*, ed. Michael F. Suarez and Michael L. Turner (Cambridge, 2009), vol.5, p.700.
41. Mandeville, *Free thoughts on religion, the church and national happiness*, 2nd edn (London, printed for John Brotherton, 1729), and Mandeville, *Origin of honour*.

Tonsons" literary copyrights. It is also possible that Mandeville was involved with the Tonsons before the first Tonson edition of the *Fable* was published in 1724. His evident skill as a translator might have reached Tonson senior's ears through Wellington years before, for example. In the light of the evidence discussed thus far, it is perfectly possible that Mandeville played a subordinate role in one of the large and numerous translation projects orchestrated by Tonson. The one that specifically comes to mind is, of course, Bayle's *Dictionary*, set for printing in 1701 and eventually finished in 1710.[42] It is worth pointing out that several people would have been involved in translating a work such as Bayle's *Dictionary*.

Mandeville's *Free thoughts on religion, the church and national happiness* (London, 1720) is largely constructed with direct quotes from 1710 translation of Bayle's *Dictionary*. A comparison between the 1710 edition of the *Dictionary* and *Free thoughts* confirms this point.[43] The only known letter addressed to Mandeville concerns *Free thoughts*. The anonymous author says to 'have read your book' and 'wish for your own sake, you had write nothing but y^{e} preface'. Among other things, the author claims that what 'is good or solid in your book has been a thousand times said before you' and all 'y^{e} facts you mention' are 'from Bailes Dictionary'.[44] The letter is written in the same handwriting as Dr Daniel Waterland's defence of Samuel Clarke in the same collection.[45] The letter to Mandeville seems to be a transcript. Since Mandeville's correspondence does not survive, we have no way of knowing whether the letter was actually sent. It is addressed to the author of *Free thoughts*. The nature of the letter suggests that it was written shortly after the book was published in 1720. I have

42. Front-matter of the first volume has a royal licence granted to Tonson for printing the *Dictionary* on 21 April 1701; see Pierre Bayle, *An Historical and critical dictionary* (London, printed for C. Harper, D. Brown, J. Tonson, A. and J. Churchill, T. Horne, T. Goodwin, R. Knaplock, J. Taylor, A. Bell, B. Tooke, D. Midwinter, B. Lintott and W. Lewis, 1710), vol.1.
43. See also, Primer, *Free thoughts on religion, the church and national happiness*, ed. Irwin Primer (New Brunswick, NJ, 2001), p.xviii.
44. Bodl., Rawlinson D. 1302 f.152, 'A letter to Bernard Mandeville containing animadversions of his *Free thought on religion*'.
45. Bodl., Rawlinson D. 1302.f.50

never seen a reference to this or any other letter addressed to Mandeville before finding this letter.

One of the most disquieting contemporary criticisms on the *Fable* is Bluet's *Enquiry* from 1725.[46] Bluet begs his audience to compare the *Fable* to Bayle. He calls Mandeville 'a blind follower of this *Frenchman*' – adding a rider – 'When I say Mr. Bayle, I would not be understood to mean Mr. Bayle in the original; no, he must go one step further, and take the *English* translator of him'.[47] Indeed, this argument that Mandeville has not copied the original Bayle, but 'his *English* translator', is repeated twice in Bluet's *Enquiry*.[48] Is he insinuating that Mandeville was himself this '*English* translator' in the same way he insinuated that the author of the *Fable* had also written *Treatise of hypochondria* and *Free thoughts*?

i. Mandeville's publishers and the question of copyright ownership

The prevailing theory concerning the copyrights of Mandeville's works is that he probably retained them all. This was not the case, however. His first literary undertakings were translations that he undertook for Richard Wellington, and among Wellington's literary remains were the copyrights of *Riverius reformatus*. For example, in a sale of William Feales's remains on 17 November 1737, lot sixty-one included the whole copyright of *Riverius reformatus*.[49] It is unlikely that Mandeville owned the copyright of any work published through Wellington, including La Fontaine's *Fables*. Richard Wellington was a serious copyright-owning publisher, and a publisher of such character would have been very unlikely to act as a trade publisher on behalf of an author.

However, Mandeville did own the copyright of his medical treatise of 1711. He did not publish the book that introduced his

46. I follow Kaye's example here; other ways to spell the name are Blewitt and Bluett
47. Bluet, *Enquiry*, p.127-28.
48. Bluet, *Enquiry*, p.132, 121-38.
49. John Johnson Collection, Ward catalogues, Bodleian Library, Oxford. The Wellington copies feature in both Ward and Longman catalogues so frequently that there is no use in indicating all of the occasions.

own character as a doctor with Wellington: Mandeville's publishing association with him ended with the second issue of *Riverius reformatus* in 1713 (as noted, the advertisement for this book identified Mandeville as the translator). A look at Richard Wellington's publishing profile towards the end of his life (he died in 1715) reveals that he only published a few works in which his own name appeared on the title page, and Mandeville's medical treatise does not really fit into this profile.

Keith Maslen describes the practice of printing for authors in the eighteenth century. The procedure from the author-as-a-publisher perspective was not the easiest. An author 'who wished for whatever reason to become his own publisher' would 'deal directly with the printer, relying on the latter to lay in paper, which was a costly commodity that would otherwise have been sent in and paid for by the bookseller'. What was also needed was a 'distributor', often 'one or more of the "topping" booksellers whose prime function he had just usurped'. The other choice the author had was to distribute the book himself (as Mandeville did, to some extent, because of the nature of his medical treatise, a work that advertised his medical practice). More 'often' than not in the eighteenth century the author 'shared the venture with the bookseller'.[50] This kind of practice was by no means unusual. Gentlemen often published their own books, relying on publishing through subscription. Aspiring authors often had difficulties finding booksellers willing to publish their work. The 'booksellers may have been the more ready to oblige a new author who had shouldered all the financial risk, in the hope of the future business. Later editions of works first printed for the author were often taken over by the bookseller, as imprints indicate.'[51] Mandeville's medical treatise could have been such a case.

Mandeville also owned the copyright of the first edition of *The Fable of the bees*.[52] The Baldwin-Roberts establishment was a natu-

50. Keith Maslen, 'Printing for the author: from the Bowyer printing ledgers, 1710-1775', *The Library*, s5, 27 (1972), p.303.
51. Maslen, 'Printing for the author', p.305.
52. James Roberts entered the *Fable* for Mandeville into the register at the Stationer's Hall in 1714. It should be noted that not all licensed books were systematically registered at the Stationer's Company. For example, a royal

ral choice for such a Whiggish work: after all, *The Grumbling hive* had also been printed in the same shop. Because the book came through a trade publisher, it is understandable that Mandeville owned the copyright. He also owned the copyright of the second edition, this time published by Edmund Parker. Parker, whose publishing profile consisted mainly of theological works, entered the book into the Stationer's Hall register on behalf of Mandeville.[53]

Nine years lapsed from the publishing of the original *Fable of the bees* to the second edition of 1723. Kaye's basic assumption is that *The Fable of the bees* was not known before the 1723 Parker edition.[54] This is, however, not entirely accurate. In a list advertising 'Books printed for T. Jauncy' included in the second, corrected edition of a poem entitled 'The last guinea', with the year 1720 on the title-page, *Free thoughts* is advertised as a book 'by the author of the *The Fable of the bees*'. Since Jauncy died in 1720, it would be difficult to see why his books would be advertised in 1723 (assuming that *The Fable of the bees* was not known before that year and that the publication date of the second edition of 'Last guinea' could be false). Hence, it is quite likely that *The Fable of the bees* was known before the 1723 edition, since *Free thoughts* was advertised as a book 'by the author of the *Fable of the bees*'. Francis McKee has found out that *Grumbling hive* was noted already in *Queen Zarah* in 1705.[55]

Yet, it is obvious that the attention the *Fable* received was nothing compared to the second edition. After the second edition had been published in 1723, it seems to have become customary to advertise Mandeville's other works by mentioning Mandeville's name and that he was the author of the *The Fable of the bees*: 'This Day is publish'd, The Virgin unmask'd, or Female dialogues. Betwixt an elderly maiden lady and her niece, on several diverting discourses: On love, marriage, memoirs and morals, &c. of the

licence did at times operate as an alternative. On the royal licences in general, see Shef Rogers, 'The use of royal licences for printing in England, 1695-1760: a bibliography', *The Library*, s7, 1 (2000), p.133-243.

53. The sign of his shop was an ornament of Bible and Crown.
54. See also Shelley Burtt, *Virtue transformed*, p.129.
55. Francis McKee, 'Early criticism of the *Grumbling hive*', *Notes and queries* 35 (1988), p.176-77.

times. By Bernard Mandeville, author of the Fable of the bees. Printed and sold by J. Stag in Westminster-Hall; W. Mears at the Lamb without Temple-bar; and G. Strahan at the Golden Buck in Cornhill. Price 4*s*'.[56]

There is heavy emphasis in Mandeville scholarship on his ownership of the copyright of the first two editions of the *Fable*. This, however, is of minor consequence compared to the question of what happened when the younger Jacob Tonson took over the business of publishing *The Fable of the bees*. 'The most substantial profits in the eighteenth-century London bookselling world' – according to Terry Belanger – 'lay in the ownership of copyrights, not the retailing of books whose copyrights were owned by other men'.[57] The rule of thumb is that a major bookseller was most likely to own entirely or in part the copyright of a book in which his name was mentioned.[58] Quite naturally, 'the booksellers whose names are the most familiar [...] The Tonsons, the Lintots, [...] Andrew Millar, and so forth – all were large copyright owners (and thus wholesalers), even though they all had substantial retail shops as well'.[59] These booksellers were also very conscious and proud of their profession. John Peele, for example, insists in his private memoires that his 'proper business is that of a Publisher', not a printer.[60] Among the familiar London booksellers, 'there is, perhaps, no name recorded in literary history of one who contributed so little directly, and yet is so inseparably connected with certain and important parts of' the history of English bookselling than that of Tonson.[61] The Tonsons represent a textbook case of a copyright-owning publisher.[62] Their pub-

56. *The Daily journal* (London, printed for T[homas] Bickerton, 17 February 1723-24, 1733).
57. Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', p.3.
58. Belanger, 'Booksellers' trade sales, 1718-1768', *The Library*, s5, 30 (1975), p.281-302.
59. Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', p.3.
60. CUL, pressmark P75 15.
61. William Roberts, *The Earlier history of English bookselling* (London, 1889), p.150. For an account of Tonson, see Roberts, *The Earlier history of English bookselling*, p.159-87.
62. Tonson's copyrights did not only consist of books registered at the Stationer's Hall. Tonson's royal licences from 1701 to 1728 included such major works of the time as Bayle's *Dictionary*, Selden's Latin works, Echard's *History*, Nicholson's

lishing business made the most significant part of its fortune from copyright ownership rather than printing or distributing books.[63] The elder Tonson kept a voluminous correspondence with his nephew.[64] However, most of the letters are very topical, having more to do with the retirement of the elder Tonson and brewing cider.[65] They do not reveal much about their publishing business.[66] Scholarship on the elder Tonson is rather thin, but the younger Tonson is an even less studied figure in publishing history.[67] But what we do know is that 'the Tonson copyrights were sold in 1767 for about £10,000' and this was when the dynasty was coming to an end, not at the height of its glory.[68]

The story about the two eighteenth-century generations of Tonson publishing – Tonson, the elder and the younger (his nephew) – seems to be an epic saga. The older Kit-Cat publisher is often depicted as a literary patron who cared for his authors, whereas the younger Tonson seems to have been more of an opportunist. Perhaps the most famous of his signings was Joseph Addison. According to one source, 'the purchase of the *Spectator* was concluded in three different bargains; Joseph Addison and Richard Steele sealed at the Fountain Tavern on 10 November 1712 the surrender of a part of their rights in the first seven

poems and posthumous work of Newton; see Rogers, 'The use of royal licences', p.149-50.

63. Regarding the elder Tonson, see Raymond MacKenzie, 'Tonson, Jacob, the elder 1655/6-1736', in *The Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004); Harry M. Geduld, *Prince of publishers: a study of the work and career of Jacob Tonson* (Bloomington, IN, 1969); and George F. Papali, *Jacob Tonson, publisher: his life and work 1656-1736* (Auckland, 1968). These books have been critically reviewed by Terry Belanger, 'Book reviews', *The Library*, s5, 25 (1970), p.166-68. See also K. M. Lynch, *Jacob Tonson: Kit-Cat publisher* (Knoxville, TN, 1971).
64. See John C. Hodges, *William Congreve: letters and documents* (London, 1964), p.78.
65. At least the letters included in BL, Add. 28275.
66. Few other letters have been edited in Sarah Lewis Carol Clapp, *Jacob Tonson in ten letters by and about him* (Austin, TX, 1948).
67. Michael F. Suarez, S.J., 'Mining the archive: a guide to present and future book-historical research sources', in *The Cambridge history of the book in Britain*, ed. Michael F. Suarez and Michael L. Turner (Cambridge, 2009), vol.5, p.855. I would like to thank Professor Raymond N. MacKenzie for confirming my ideas regarding the scholarship on the Tonsons, and for discussing other matter regarding the Tonsons in personal correspondence.
68. Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', p.5.

volumes of the periodical to Jacob Tonson Junior for a consideration of 575 pounds'.[69] At the same time, they had sold the other 'moiety' for an equal amount to Sam Buckley.[70] Buckley sold his right to this work to younger Jacob Tonson for 500 pounds, paid to him on 13 October 1714.[71] And Joseph Addison did, by a further deed-poll dated 27 August 1715, 'bargain, sell and sign to the said Jacob Tonson all that his full and sole right in and to the copy of the eighth volume of the *Spectator* from no.556 inclusive to no.635 inclusive which said copy to be and remain unto the said Jacob Tonson Junior, his heirs, assigns for ever'.[72] The money that Tonson paid to Addison at the height of his fame was hence substantial. As a result, after 1715 the Tonson publishing house thought to remain the *Spectator's* sole owners, reprinting it in its entirety or in part several times. The price was remarkably high at the time, and raised specific questions about the new copyright act. According to a contemporary source, 'there is a reason to think that it would belong to him [Tonson] for ever'.[73] Immediately after Joseph Addison died, the younger Tonson also published his *Works*.[74] This was a controversial move because Tonson did not possess the copyrights of all Addison's titles, but printed them nonetheless. A similar scenario seems to have been developing also in the case of Mandeville. In the late 1720s, the elder Tonson had written a letter to his nephew reminding him

69. Historical Manuscript Commission, *Report II: Appendix*, The Bayfordbury manuscripts (1871), p.71.
70. BL, Add. 21110.
71. Endorsement on the reverse of BL, Add. 21110.
72. BL, Add. 36193. See also Papali, *Jacob Tonson, publisher*, p.40. In comparison, fly leaves inserted in BL, Add. 38728 from *Gentleman's magazine* (London, April 1824) read: 'Joseph Addison on 7 April, 1713, received of Tonson £107 10*s*. for the copyright of Cato'. For Tonson's agreements with Alexander Pope, see BL, Egerton 1951.
73. BL, Add. 36193, f.100. *The Spectator* is also discussed in detail regarding its printing and selling of the copyright in BL, Add. 36193, f.109. On the disagreements regarding the common law and Queen Anne's act in general, see BL, Add. 36193, f.93-146. And for arguments such as 'the common law knows no thing of Literary property', see BL, Add 36193, f.110. See also St Clair, 'Intellectual property', in *The Reading nation*, p.43-65, and St Clair, 'Appendix 2. Intellectual property and textual controls: custom, law and practice', in *The Reading nation*, p.480-87.
74. Papali, *Jacob Tonson, publisher*, p.41-42. See also, BL, Add. 28275, f.86.

that one needs to act quickly after an author's death because the value of the literary works starts to drop once people forget the author. 'Let a mans worth be nevour soe great after Death', Tonson wrote, 'it gets strangely out of ye minds of his Surviving acquaintance'. The best example of this was that 'if mr Addisons works were now to bee published there woud not, I beleive, be the same number of Subscribers'.[75] It is highly unlikely that the Tonson publishing house would not have owned the copyrights to the *Fable* once they started printing it.

Edmund Parker's first advertisement for the second edition of *The Fable of the bees* appeared in *The British journal* on 20 April 1723. Cato's essay 'Of charity schools' appeared in the same journal, on 15 June 1723. The news section in *The British journal* on 13 July announced that, 'The last day of the term the Grand Jury of Middlesex, of which Sir Thomas Clarges was foreman, presented *The British journal*, no.26, 35, 36, and 39, and *The Fable of the bees*'.[76] When the second edition of the *Fable* was published, it took less than three months for it to be presented to the Grand Jury. Once the second Parker edition of 1723 had become famous, started selling and was cleared of the charges by the Grand Jury, in all likelihood the younger Tonson stepped in, bought the copyright and printed the *Fable* so that it appeared late in 1723 (the imprint indicates 1724).[77]

ii. Jacob Tonson the younger and *The Fable of the bees*

An author working for Tonson joined something resembling a publishing 'factory' that followed certain general practices. F. B. Kaye attempted to emphasise the unique nature of the various editions of *The Fable of the bees*. He was so charmed by the book that

75. Elder Tonson to younger, 3 February 1729. In 1721, two years after Addison's death, Tonson had completed a design started during the author's lifetime, the publication of his *Works*, under the editorship of Thomas Tickell, in four quarto volumes. The list of subscribers is over sixteen pages long; see Clapp, *Jacob Tonson in ten letters*, p.16.
76. The Grand Jury indictment and advertisement of the second edition of the *Fable* can be found in the same issue of *The Evening post*, from Saturday 13 July to Tuesday 16 July 1723.
77. *Applebee's original weekly journal* (London, John Applebee, 18 Jan 1723/4), p.3198 has an advertisement of the 1724 edition of the *Fable* by Tonson.

he included some of the early eighteenth-century ornaments in his 1924 edition for Oxford University Press. However, it is noticeable that it looks like any other of Tonson's books. Particularly striking upon comparison are the similarities between *The Fable of the bees* of 1724 (and 1725) and Laurence Echard's *The History of the revolution* of 1725.[78] The latter work was entered in the register of the Stationer's Hall on 24 May 1725 for Jacob Tonson, thus we know for a fact that the younger Jacob Tonson owned the copyright. These two different volumes were printed as if from the same mould. Apart from the content, the front-matter of each one could easily be taken to be from the other.

The preface in Echard's *The History* commences on p.A2r with the same ornament of two angels looking away from a triumph in the middle that is to be found in the *Fable* on top of the preface of the 1724 edition. Also the contents pages end with a nonchalant decorated ornament that is to be found on p.44 of the 1725 printing of the *Fable*. But, above all, the sheet that would have first been printed (that came after the front-matter in a bound book), B1r of *The Fable of the bees* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1724 and 1725) and B1r in *The History of the revolution* (1725) are strikingly similar. The ornament is the same and the decorated letter has the same pattern ('I' in *The History of revolution*, 'A' in the *Fable*). There are also other similarities between the works. The paper quality, however, is different. It should also be pointed out that only the preface of *The History of the revolution* resembles the *Fable*. Also, the type seems different. It might be that *The Fable of the bees* and *The History of the revolution* came from different printers, but the publisher was Tonson. It could also be that the preface of the *History* was printed by the same printer as *The Fable of the bees* and for the rest of the book Tonson used a different printer or printers. It is evident that the Tonson printing establishment reused different moulds and skeletons in works published at around the same time. The end result that is still evident today is that the bound books look very much alike.[79] There are also

78. Laurence Echard, *The History of the revolution, and the establishment of England in the year 1688* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1725).
79. The part of the book that was printed last, but read first by the buyer was of course the front-matter, which was hence the most relevant part of the book

other works of which Tonson owned the copyright, and which resemble Tonson's edition of the *Fable*.[80]

One book that is particularly interesting with regard to the publishing history of Mandeville's works is *Satire III* of *The Universal passion* by Edward Young. It states on the title page that it was 'printed for J. Roberts' in 1725. Tonson owned the copyright, and the later editions in the 1740s were printed for J. and R. Tonson. The similarities to Tonson's *The Fable of the bees* are striking. The ornamented L that commences the *Universal passion* on page 1 is precisely the same as the 'L' at the beginning of the sentence 'Laws and government are to the Political Bodies...' in the preface to the 1725 edition of the *Fable*. It is likely that Tonson was the owner of the copyright and the actual publisher of these works, even though the title page states: 'printed for J. Roberts'. It may be that Roberts acted as the printer: if the Tonson publishing house divided its work among different printing shops, this would indeed have been possible. It is evident that Tonson employed several printers rather than exclusively using his own press.[81] However, it is also possible that the reason why the name of James Roberts is on the title page of so many Tonson books is that he was the main retailer, nothing more and nothing less. As Michael Treadwell points out, 'vastly the most important group to make use of the trade publishers was formed by copyright-owning booksellers, and the two principal motives which inspired them were concealment and convenience'.[82] Indeed, according to W.

from the publisher's perspective. The beginning of the book had to be appealing. Hence, it might be that a better printer, more lavish ornaments etc. were used for printing the front-matter and the actual text was given to a cheaper press with fewer ornaments and inferior type. This could be, for example, the case with Echard's *The History of the revolution*.

80. For example, Thomas Southerne's play *Money the mistress* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1726) that was entered into the Stationer's Hall register on 11 March 1725/6 for Jacob Tonson; see Stationers' Company, *Index of titles and proprietors of books entered in the book of registry of the Stationers' Company ... from 28 April 1710 to 30 Dec. 1773* (London, 1910). Also, the seventh edition of *The Spectator* of 1724 fulfills these criteria and includes some of the same decorated letters as the Tonson *Fable*; see *The Spectator*, 7th edn (London, printed for J. Tonson, 1724).
81. Papali, *Jacob Tonson, publisher*, p.51.
82. Treadwell, 'London trade publishers 1675-1750', p.120.

W. Greg, it is always safest to assume that '*any* work bearing the imprint of a known trade publisher was published for someone else'.[83] Tonson evidently used trade publishers, and might have been involved with different congers.[84] There are also other clear examples of the name of Roberts appearing in works belonging to Tonson.[85] It therefore seems likely that Tonson owned the copyright of *The Fable of the bees* after 1724, and that Mandeville was no longer in control of what happened to it.

I studied the 1724 edition of the *Fable* rather extensively in the process of preparing this study.[86] It is worth noting at the outset that the paper and general quality of the book improved considerably between the second (Parker) edition of 1723 and the printing of the first Tonson edition in 1724.[87] The paper used for the 1724 edition was presumably Italian,[88] and with the exception of the two last gatherings came from a stock with an IO watermark and a CC countermark or cornermark on the same half of the sheet. The paper in the last two gatherings (after page 449) differs visibly in quality from that in the rest of the edition. It is thinner, and in many copies the pages have yellowed more than elsewhere in the book (or the paper is noticeably darker and is rather blotchy). It is evidently of inferior quality and has many more impurities, and there is more show-through from the printing on the other side. The main paper stock used for the third edition of the *Fable* could be described as fine, whereas the

83. W. W. Greg, *Some aspects and problems of London publishing: between 1550 and 1650* (Oxford, 1956), p.34.
84. On jobbing and use of several printing houses, see also Raven, *The Business of books*, p.310-13.
85. Treadwell, 'London trade publishers 1675-1750', p.117.
86. I am grateful to the staff of various institutions (see p.xi) who have helped me with my inquiries regarding their copies of the third edition of *The Fable of the bees* of 1724. The ESTC lists a little over sixty known copies of the first Tonson edition of the *Fable*. However, a smaller portion of the edition is enough for us to make a plausible conjecture regarding the edition as a whole. I have confirmed information regarding thirty-five copies , all of these match the description regarding the paper.
87. I examined a copy of the 1723 edition of the *Fable* in CUL, pressmark Nn.17.24. The paper is of worse quality than the Tonson *Fable* and the quality of the printing clearly inferior.
88. I would like to thank Richard Noble of Brown University for the suggestion that the paper of the work is most likely Italian.

last two gatherings are of ordinary (British) quality at best.[89] The watermarks are also missing from the two last quires. The CC cornermark shows in the gatherings, on the fore-edge of the tail in one of the four leaves with a signature [B1, B2, B3, B4...F1, F2, F3, F4... etc.].[90] The CC is missing from the two last gatherings (2G-2H).[91] And the wire lines do not match with earlier quires.[92]

What does this tell us? In *A Letter to Dion* Mandeville quite surprisingly brings up his own role in publishing the *Vindication*: 'I took care', he declares, 'to have this printed in such a manner, as to the letter and form, that for the benefit of the buyers, it might conveniently be bound up, and look of a piece with then the last, which was the second edition'.[93] Kaye took this possibility seriously and assumed that the *Vindication* would be published as a sixpenny pamphlet to be bound in with the second (Parker) edition.[94] This is a relevant argument for Kaye's interpretation because it shifts attention from the third edition to the second of which Mandeville had owned the copyright, and which was more directly related to him. However, there is no evidence that it was published immediately after it appeared in *The London journal*, reissued in a format matching that of the *Fable* and then incorporated into subsequent editions. There are no known copies of the second edition that include the *Vindication*

89. Three main qualities of eighteenth-century paper defined by Gaskell are 'fine, second, and ordinary'; see Philip Gaskell, 'Notes on eighteenth-century British paper', *The Library*, s5, 12 (1957), p.34.
90. CC countermarks in the BL copy [pressmark 8405.e.31], for example, are on leaves A3, B4, C4, D2, [E missing], F4, G1, H4, I2, K3, L3, M1, N3, O3, P2, Q4, R1, [S missing], T1, U2, X4, Y4, Z4, 2A4, 2B3, 2C1, 2D1, 2E1, 2F4.
91. The CC corner- (or countermark) itself is most likely a meaningless set of initials 'generally chosen from among ten or a dozen conventional and apparently meaningless ciphers, names and initials', which does not necessarily indicate a connection between the countermark and quality; see Gaskell, 'Notes on eighteenth-century British paper', p.37.
92. The wire lines in the bulk of the pages are approximately 26-27 mm apart. In the two last gatherings the difference is 29-30 mm. I would like to thank Richard Serjeanston for reminding me to check this.
93. Bernard Mandeville, *Letter to Dion* (London, 1732), p.7.
94. On 10 August 1723 a *Vindication* of the *Fable* was published in *The London journal*. Kaye's stipulation about the *Vindication* is to be found in Kaye, *The Fable of the bees*, p.xxxiv.

either.[95] What we do have is the entire third edition with the *Vindication* published on different paper than the rest of the work. The last part of a book to be printed was the front-matter. The title page and the introduction of the 1724 edition were presumably printed on Italian paper, because enough of it had been reserved for this purpose. This also explains why the title page is not a cancel, even if the *Vindication* was added to the book after the bulk of the text had been printed. It is also noticeable that the errata appear at the end of the *Vindication*, which was thus by no means bound with the third edition. It also seems likely that Mandeville prepared the errata to this particular work, and while doing so came to the conclusion that the *Vindication* should be printed with it, mainly for the purpose of defending his character. Hence, it may just have been that at the time of writing *A Letter to Dion* Mandeville's memory was hazy or, what is more likely, that when he referred to the second edition he actually meant the first Tonson edition of 1724.

What the use of inferior paper indicates, above all, is that the *Vindication* was not originally planned for the third edition. Had it been, surely enough paper would have been reserved for it (and if for some reason they had run out of the original stock, surely the last two quires would not systematically have been on different paper in the entire edition). Percy Simpson in his classic account recalls that a new custom was introduced in the printing industry in the eighteenth century, that of charging for extra corrections from the author. 'These extra charges', Simpson writes, 'must have been made for author's revision of the proof-sheets, especially for additions and cancels.'[96] In other words, if an author wanted to add or change anything at a late stage in the publishing process he would end up paying for the additions and changes himself. Simpson gives a number of examples of this practice, when in order to get later corrections in a printed book the author had to go through a painstaking and costly process. This is

95. I would like to thank Richard Noble for discussing this with me in private correspondence. He pointed out to me that we have good grounds to question whether the *Vindication* was ever published separately as a sixpenny pamphlet.
96. Percy Simpson, *Proof-reading in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (Oxford, 1935), p.165-66.

probably why the *Vindication* was added at a late stage in the printing of the third edition of the *Fable* in 1724. Mandeville paid in order to get it published in such a form that it would be incorporated into subsequent editions of the *Fable,* and the third edition of 1724 in particular. It was not a sixpenny pamphlet, however, and because Mandeville paid for it himself, it is of little wonder that he underlined his role in his description of the incident in his *Letter to Dion.*

The matter of the paper also says something about the intentions of the author. My suggestion is that it was in fact the author, Mandeville (not Tonson, the publisher) who wished to add the *Vindication* to the third edition of *The Fable of the bees* at a very late stage of the printing process, which explains why the last two gatherings came from different stock than the rest of the book. It is also possible that Mandeville started to worry about his own reputation and what the *Fable* might be doing to it. Adding two quires of paper to a work at his own expense would not have been a small matter for someone like him. It is also significant that there are no relevant author's changes or corrections to the *Fable* in the editions that came after 1724. Hence, if this hypothesis is true, adding the *Vindication* to *The Fable of the bees* must have been Mandeville's biggest editorial contribution when it had been cleared from the charges of the Grand Jury.

There are two significant differences between the 1724 and the 1725 octavo editions of the Tonson *Fable.* The 1725 (fourth) edition was printed in full on the paper that was used for the sheets of the 1724 edition (except for the last two quires).[97] The use of this particular paper was not standard practice in the Tonson printing house.[98] The fifth edition of 1728 was printed on

97. The CC countermarks can be found for example in a copy of the 1725 edition in CUL, pressmark 7720.d.444, from the leaves: A1, B4, C?, D2, E1, F2, G3, H1, I2, K3, L2, M4, N1, O1, P1, Q3, R3, S4, T1, U4, X1, Y4, Z3, 2A3, 2B3, 2C3, 2D2, 2E2, 2F1, 2G4, 2H4.

98. Other Tonson octavo-books in CUL from 1723 to 1725 that I have examined were not printed on the same kind of paper, and they do not have the water- or CC-cornermarks: Richard Steele, *The Conscious lovers: a comedy* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1723), CUL, pressmark Williams.667; John Gay, *The Captives: a tragedy* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1724), CUL, pressmark 5721.d.70.20(3); John Windus, *A Journey to Mequnez: the residence of the present emperor of Fez and Morocco. On the occasion of Commodore Stewart's embassy thither for the redemption of the British captives in the year 1721* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1725), CUL, pressmark Ll.35.16 and Laurence Echard, *The History of the revolution,* CUL, pressmark 7540.d.58.

different paper, albeit of similar quality.[99] The most notable change between the 1724 and the 1725 editions is on page 465 where there is one line less of text in the later edition, hence the pages from thereon run in a different order until the end of the book. Kaye points out that the 'next edition, in 1725, was identical except for a number of slight verbal alterations, some of which are probably by Mandeville'.[100] The significance of the alterations is, in fact, very slight, and the evidence pointing to Mandeville as the author is also thin.

It appears that Mandeville did not make any substantial alterations to the 1725 edition that required resetting the type and would thus increase the price of printing. He must have been extremely anxious to make alterations and corrections because this was the time when the *Fable* and Mandeville's character were under the most intense scrutiny. John Dennis's direct offensive against *The Fable of the bees* was published in April 1724,[101] for example, and later, in August 1724, *A Defence of charity schools* addressing *The Fable of the bees* also appeared (not in 1725 as the imprint and ESTC indicate).[102] The end result did not bring any substantial changes to the subsequently published edition of *The Fable of the bees,* however. What is significant in terms of the fourth edition is simply the purposeful alteration of the order in which the text ran towards the end of the book. It was a logical way of establishing that it was a different edition from the 1724 printing, even if the same skeletons were used for the most part. The fourth edition had everything to do with sales, and nothing to do with editing the book in order to defend the character of the author. Mandeville's defence was enacted on a very different front.

The *Fable* sold rapidly in 1724 and 1725, and it was of vital importance to get a new edition out as soon as possible. If Mandeville had sold the copyright to Tonson, he would not have had much say regarding further editions and possible

99. CUL, pressmark 1028.c.1.

100. Kaye, *The Fable of the bees,* p.xxxv.

101. Advertisement in *The Evening post,* 9 April to 11 April 1724.

102. Advertisement in *The Evening post,* 25 August to 27 August 1724.

changes. It may well be that the picture of the younger Tonson and his money-grabbing hand is not completely inaccurate. Making corrections or additions would have required resetting the type in an entire gathering, which would have cost money and delayed the printing. It is noteworthy that the third edition of *The Fable of the bees*, which was the first Tonson edition, was in effect the last edition of the work, thus no further additions or changes were made. The remaining editions are merely reprints, with some typographical changes that do not affect the copy-text. From the printer's and the publisher's perspectives, there was no need to reorganise the type after the first Tonson edition in order to print subsequent editions. Mandeville had to find different channels through which to voice his opinions.[103]

As F. B. Kaye writes, 'the editions of 1728 and 1729 are unchanged except for small variations which are probably due to the compositor'.[104] Would it not be better to point out that there were hardly any changes to *The Fable of the bees* after the first Tonson edition had been published in 1724? It is certain that the variants in the 1729 edition did not originate in Mandeville or Tonson's printing house because the 'first' sixth edition of 1729 is most likely an unauthorised offshore printing that includes an advertisement on an otherwise blank verso after the preface: 'Just published, the tenth edition of Pufendorf's introduction to the history of the principal kingdoms and states of *Europe*'.[105] This was a book published by Samuel Fairbrother in Dublin.[106] Any-

103. For a general overview of the commercial aspects of book publishing in eighteenth-century Britain, see James Raven, 'The book as a commodity', in *The Cambridge history of the book in Britain*, ed. Michael F. Suarez and Michael L. Turner (Cambridge, 2009), vol.5, p.85-117, and St Clair, 'Economic characteristics of the printed-book industry', in *The Reading nation*, p.19-42.
104. Kaye, *The Fable of the bees*, p.xxxv.
105. I have consulted the 1729 edition in BL, pressmark 8407.bb.29. On the use of the term 'offshore printing' and the complicated question of pirated editions, see St Clair, *The Reading nation*, p.43-65, 293-306.
106. Samuel Fairbrother has an entry in M. Pollard, *A Dictionary of members of the Dublin book trade 1550-1800: based on the records of the Guild of St Luke the Evangelist, Dublin* (London, 2000), p.195. For a balanced account arguing that the importance of eighteenth-century Dublin publishing has unnecessarily been ignored as mere pirated editions, see also Sher, *The Enlightenment and the book*, p.443-502.

one examining the 1729 edition would soon realise that the title page is false and that it did not have anything to do with Tonson. The ornaments are few and the printing cheap, as it sometimes is in unlicensed editions. This Dublin edition is accompanied by a duodecimo version of *Part II* in 1730, which also includes an advertisement for Samuel Fairbrother.[107]

By and large, in that it became famous, *The Fable of the bees* offers clear evidence of the fact that 'the London Trade owned the copyrights of the most important and widely sold books and maintained a near monopoly over their distribution nationally'.[108] The battle for literary property was mainly between London copyright-owning booksellers and the printers of Scottish and Irish editions. The authors were usually mere pawns in this game. That the *Fable* was still topping sales in the latter half of the century is proved by the fact that it was included in John Whiston's list of the most likely pirated works.[109] However, after relinquishing copyright, Mandeville had very little to do with the work.

Instead of pointing this out, Kaye incorporated textual changes from a pirated printing of the *Fable* into his edition, simultaneously omitting most of the changes derived from the errata. Of Mandeville as an editor, Kaye writes: 'the variations between the editions show Mandeville to have been a conscious stylist, carefully polishing'.[110] This is an exaggeration. There are only a few significant changes after the first Tonson edition was published, and most of them are so slight that it is impossible

107. I have consulted the offshore edition of *Part II* of 1730 in Bodl., pressmark Vet.A4f.403. This 1729 edition cannot be an approved Dublin reprint of Tonson's sixth edition, because the sixth edition does not appear before 1732.
108. Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', p.4.
109. John Whiston's list runs: 'Spectators, Tatlers, Guardians, Shakespear, Prior, Gay's fables and poems, Swift's works, Temple's works, Prideaux's connection, Barrow's works, Rollin's ancient history, etc. Gil Blas, Whiston's Josephus, Burnet's theory, 2 vols, Young's works, Thomson's seasons, etc. Milton's poetical works, Parnell's poems, Hudibras, Waller's poems, Fable of the bees, 2 vols, Young's night-thoughts, Turkish Spy, Travels of Cyrus'; see J. Whiston, *Some thoughts on the state of literary property*, p.18, quoted in Gwyn Walters, *The booksellers* in 1759 and 1774: the battle for literary property', *Library*, s5, 29 (1974), p.292.
110. Kaye, *The Fable of the bees*, p.xxxv.

to say whether the printer or the author made them. Unlike David Hume, for example, Mandeville did not act as the editor of his own works. In short, he finished the work, sold it to the publisher and moved on. This was what he did with *The Fable of the bees* in 1724.

iii. *Part II* and *Origin of honour*

Mandeville frequently found himself defending his character after 1724. The preface of *Part II* dated 20 October 1728 commences with the sentence: 'Considering the manifold clamours, that have been rais'd from several quarters, against *The Fable of the bees*, even after I had publish'd the *Vindication* of it, many of my readers will wonder to see me come out with a Second Part, before I have taken any further notice of what has been said against the First'.[111] He was disappointed that the *Vindication* had not served the purpose he had intended. He wanted to defend himself, and it was not the first time he tried. Indeed, 'from the appendix that has been added to the First Part ever since the third edition', Mandeville announced, referring to the *Vindication*, 'it is manifest, that I have been far from endeavouring to stifle, either the arguments or the invectives that were made against me'. Concerning his different forms of self-defence he mentions that he 'once thought' of compiling 'a list of the adversaries that have appeared in print', but he gave it up, he said, because his adversaries were too many and the points they made were too few. The reason he gave for his apparent five-year retreat was that simply reading 'some part or other, either of the *Vindication* or the book it self' should prove the accusations levelled against the *Fable* wrong.[112]

Despite his public silence as the author of *The Fable of the bees*, Mandeville had compiled a full manuscript in defence of himself in 1726. It is surprising how little attention this has attracted in Mandeville scholarship. 'I have wrote', Mandeville exclaims in the preface, 'and had by me near two years, a Defence of *The Fable of the bees*, in which I have stated and endeavour'd to solve all the

111. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.i.
112. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.ii. The *Vindication* is mentioned for the third time on p.iv of the preface.

objections that might reasonably be made against it, as to the doctrine contain'd in it, and the detriment it might be of to others'.[113] Hence, one simple explanation why he did not feel the need to make alterations to the first part of the *Fable* was that he had started writing a separate defence.[114] He clearly wanted to explain his thinking. Rather than editing *The Fable of the bees* in response to his critics, he turned to writing a whole new book. It would nevertheless be important to verify the existence of this manuscript defence.[115] What Mandeville said about it was that 'a considerable part of the Defence I mention'd, has been seen by several of my friends, who have been in expectation of it for some time'. It is doubtful that he would have lied about many of his friends seeing the manuscript. He also clearly stated that his intention was to publish the defence. 'I have stay'd', he says, 'neither for types nor paper, and yet I have several reasons why I

113. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.ii. Kaye argues that [Anon.] *Remarks upon two late presentments of the Grand-Jury of the county of Middlesex* (London, 1729) would be the defence of the *Fable* that Mandeville is discussing in the preface; see Kaye, 'The writings of Bernard Mandeville', p.457-58. I find this unlikely, particularly because Mandeville's main point is that it is a work that has not been published and *Remarks* was already published in 1724.
114. Kaye has proofs that Mandeville was not the author of *The true meaning of the 'Fable of the bees'* of 1726, and this is not the defence of the *Fable* that Mandeville refers to. This work has been mistakenly attributed to Mandeville, for the correction, see Kaye, 'The writings of Bernard Mandeville', p.463-64. The anonymous author of *The true meaning of the 'Fable of the bees'* defends a view that all moral distinctions are made by politicians tricking men to act against their passions; see [Anon.], *The true meaning of the 'Fable of the bees'* (London, printed for William and John Innys, 1726), p.10. He also tries to reduce all the passions to self-love; see [Anon.], *The true meaning of the 'Fable of the bees'*, p.71. These are the kind of claims that Mandeville wanted to take distance from by writing *Part II*.
115. I have no knowledge of previous efforts to locate it. While studying the matter, I found out that there is a manuscript in Yale University, James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library entitled '*The Fable of the bees* accompanied with explanatory notes' in which the author defends himself against the charges brought against the work by the interested clergy and others who had commenced a prosecution against him because he had affirmed that no 'nation was ever great and powerful without being at the same time wicked'. This partial transcript of the first part of the *The Fable of the bees* does not include any of the explanatory notes mentioned in the title. I would like to thank Richard Serjeantson for enabling me to acquire a microfilm of the manuscript.

do not yet publish it'. But 'whenever it comes out', 'most of my adversaries' will 'think it soon enough, and no body suffers by the delay but my self'.[116] Even if it proves impossible to recover this manuscript, what is clear is that Mandeville felt the need to defend himself, and he was more than willing to take action. At the end of the preface to *Part II*, for example, he spends five pages denying accusations that he had publicly burned *The Fable of the bees*.[117]

One affiliated and possible point of interest is that Malcolm Jack has identified passages in Hutcheson's *Inquiry* that are not to be found in *The Fable of the bees*, even when they are indicated by Hutcheson as passages from the *Fable*. It is thus possible that Mandeville's manuscripts relating to *The Fable of the bees* were in circulation, if Hutcheson is not in fact quoting from some other work.[118] Further evidence that Mandeville might have been personally acquainted with eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers has been provided by Christian Maurer, who has found a letter in which Archibald Campbell discusses his possible meeting with Mandeville. Campbell's letter of 23 May 1730 indicates that he was contacted by Mandeville when staying in London. Campbell wrote to his wife: 'In the mean time I cannot but tell you that, among other People that have enquir'd after me, Doctor Mandeville, the Author of the Fable of the bees, has for some Weeks passt, been seeking to meet with me, but hitherto I have had the Misfortune not to see him. However I design by all Means to gratify that Gentleman, & to have a Meeting with him before I leave this place.'[119]

Part II was published in mid-December 1728 (the title page indicates the year 1729, the preface is dated 20 October 1728).[120] It is also evident that Mandeville did not write *Part II* before he

116. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.iv.
117. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.xxvi-xxx.
118. Malcom Jack, 'Hutcheson and Mandeville', *Notes and queries* 24 (1977), p.221-22.
119. National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh, GD461/14. Quoted in Maurer, 'Self-love in early eighteenth-century British moral philosophy', p.321. I am very grateful to Christian Maurer for communicating this information to me.
120. Kaye, *The Fable of the bees*, p.xxxvi; Mandeville, *Fable of the bees. Part II* (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1729).

was able to react to most of the vast amount of criticism in his defence of the *Fable* manuscript. He probably composed the bulk of *Part II* between 1727 and 1728. As Kaye perceptively notes, 'Mandeville was writing the second dialogue' of *Part II* after 'Gibraltar was fruitlessly besieged by Spain' from 'Feb. 1727 to Mar. 1728',[121] and there is more evidence confirming this as the likely time of the composition.[122] Assuming this was the case, the new work was therefore composed after Mandeville had finished his manuscript in defence of the *Fable*, which he clearly found insufficient for one reason or another – he did not go to the trouble of publishing it, although he had published different kinds of literary works at this point in his career.

What one should understand about eighteenth-century publishing is the impact of the printer and the publisher on the final decisions about the end product (the printed book): they often had more influence than the author. Interestingly, too, it seems that there were fewer opportunities for the ordinary author to affect the printing process. As Percy Simpson notes, it was the 'normal practice' of 'the ruthless determination of the printer to treat the author as an intruder if he offered to set foot inside the printing-house'. Simpson also discusses the case of Charles Viner in the eighteenth century, who stated that 'the *State of authors*', when dealing with printers, 'I find by experience is *like the State of war*'.[123] Authors were not always able to have their say in terms of how their work was presented in print. W. W. Greg discusses the case of a seventeenth-century play that included autograph corrections, a new title and staging instructions. To the surprise of many, it turned out that the author was responsible for the corrections and annotations, but it was the theatre director who had added the instructions and the new title.[124] Hence, things may not have been that different in the seventeenth

121. Kaye, *Part II*, p.73, n.1.
122. For example, Kaye makes a comment about the Royal Academy of Music that also implies that the *Part II* was composed in 1728; see Kaye, *Part II*, p.105, n.2. Later in the text of *Part II*, there is a 'Handel' incident that also points to time after 1726; see Kaye, *Part II*, p.155, n.1.
123. Simpson, *Proof-reading in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, p.43.
124. W. W. Greg, 'Massinger's autograph corrections in *The Duke of Milan*, 1623', *The Library*, s4, 4 (1923), p.207-18.

century either. There is also the case of James Roberts, the trade publisher, altering the title of a work. This happened during the process of publishing a theological pamphlet. The first earl of Egmont complains in his diary that the 'title I gave it was, *A Dialogue between a Church of England man affectionate to the government and a dissenter concerning the taking off the test*; but the publisher has given it' a completely different title for publication.[125]

Hence, in the case of *Part II* it should be borne in mind that the publisher and the printer could easily have influenced the title. After the enormous publicity of *The Fable of the bees* they were keen to profit from it once again. The most likely reason why the book was entitled *Part II* of *The Fable of the bees* was the money motive. What is also significant about the title is that although the memorable part of the *Fable* was the subtitle, *Private vices, public benefits*, it does not feature in *Part II*. It was this aspect from which Mandeville wanted to distance himself. In all likelihood, both the publisher and the author profited from *Part II*, and I am not claiming that Mandeville would not have been at least partly responsible for the title. Nevertheless, upon comparison *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II* do not appear to have that much in common apart from the title and the author.

It was customary in eighteenth-century publishing to use famous titles in different ways to prop up sales. For example, William Taylor printed a second edition of a translation of Bernard Lamy, *The Art of speaking: written in French by Messieurs Du Port Royal in pursuance of a former treatise, intituled, 'The Art of thinking'. Rendred into English*.[126] This was advertised on the title page as a book 'written in French by Messieurs Du Port Royal: in pursuance of a former Treatise, Intituled, *The Art of thinking*'. The authors of the French work were not Nicole and Arnauld, but Bernard Lamy. The connection between this work and the original was mostly imaginary. The obvious reason for advertising the

125. John Percival, *Manuscripts of the earl of Egmont: diary of the first earl of Egmont (Viscount Percival) 1734-1738* (London, 1923), vol.1, p.303-304. The publisher had changed the title to *The Controversy in relation to the test and corporation acts clearly disputed, in a dialogue between a dissenter and a member of the established church: the arguments on both sides containing a full explanation of everything relating to this important question.*

126. See the second edition, corrected (London, printed for W. Taylor, 1708).

work as a sequence to *The Art of thinking* was of course to increase sales. This was not uncommon at all in the eighteenth century.

Who, then, was the publisher of *Part II*? In Pierro Sraffa's collection in Trinity College, Cambridge, there is an interesting re-bound set consisting of the first Tonson edition of *The Fable of the bees* of 1724 and *Part II* of 1729.[127] The back of the books read 'Fable of the bees, Vol. I' and 'Vol. II', a clear indication that they were bound anew at a later date. The notes that Sraffa made regarding the cancelled title page of *Part II* are interesting. He wrote that, apart from the obvious indication of the stubs after the title page, the wire lines on the title page and the following leaf did not match, thus the title page 'is certainly a cancel'.[128] Further research took Sraffa to Keynes's library where he found a copy of the same book, including evidence of the original, cancelled title page.[129] Sraffa did not find out what the imprint in the original title page was, but he assumed that it concerned the role of James Roberts. A copy in the National Library of Finland confirms Sraffa's assumptions.[130] This is also a re-bound set of the 1724 *Fable* and 1729 *Part II*. The fact that the title-page is a cancel is obvious. The partly torn, original title-page is to be found on the last page of the book before the index (ee8v; p.432). In a copy in the National Library of Scotland, pressmark L.C. 2092, the impression of the title page is on p.xiv (a8v). The copy in the National Library of Finland is more legible, giving the details of the missing words. The word 'Printed' is about half a centimetre closer to the border than the cancellandum. Also the year, 'MDCC...', partly ripped, is much closer to the centre of the

127. Cambridge, Trinity College Library, pressmarks Sraffa 344/1 and Sraffa 344/2.

128. 'Wire lines of A1 (t.-p.) and A2 (i-ii) should coincide *exactly* (as they do between A3 and A4). But they do *not*: and actually A1, has a *different* wire (see two close vertical lines near edge) from all other pages of A. Therefore, t.-page is certainly a cancel'. Sraffa also noted that 'offcast at the back of the title-page is *doubled*'; see Sraffa 344/2.

129. In the words of Sraffa: 'at the back of t.-p. the set-off is partly of a t.p. and partly of p. i of Preface (sig A2) showing clearly that when the present t.p. was superimposed there was still in position part of a torn t.-p'. What Sraffa noticed was that the 'main difference in what is left is in the imprint: the word "printed" is much closer to the left vertical rule and is not followed by a colon. Also difference in the vertical spacing of the counterparts: the top comp. (title) being shorter + the bottom one (imprint) longer.' Sraffa 344/2.

130. National Library of Finland, pressmark H69.VI.22.

page, which means that 'Warwick-Lane' was not set on the same line with the publishing year, MDCCXXIX. After the word 'Printed' there is a recognisable 'o', from 'for'. Also, there is an upper-case 'R' and lower-case 'b', which stands for 'Roberts'. Measurement of the different words on the cancellandum[131] reveals that the line originally read: 'Printed for J. Roberts in Warwick-lane'.[132] Thus, what is different in the original page and the title-page that ended in the published book is that the original page reads: 'Printed for J. Roberts in *Warwick-Lane.* / MDCCXXIX.' The cancellandum reads: 'London, Printed: And Sold by J. Roberts in / *Warwick-Lane.* MDCCXXIX.'

One definition of 'a misleading imprint' is that 'while containing actual place, date, names, and addresses' it 'presents the information in such a way as to misrepresent, deliberately or not, the actual roles of the various people involved'.[133] Accordingly, the imprint of *Part II* could be considered misleading because it conceals the actual publisher. The original imprint, 'printed for J. Roberts', indicates that Roberts was both printer and publisher, but this was cancelled. Why? Clearly, the form 'London: printed and sold by A. B.' does not necessarily indicate 'Printed by A. B.' but more often simply means 'Printed in London and sold by A. B.'. The use of the phrase 'London printed' was common in the eighteenth-century book trade.[134] Moreover, 'there exist a large number of imprints which describe a work as 'printed for' someone who neither owned the copyright nor in any sense financed the operation of its publication'.[135] If the original imprint ('Printed for J. Roberts') had been left standing, it would indeed have been misleading. Roberts was not the publisher of *Part II*, as he was not the publisher of the Tonson editions of *The Fable of the bees*. The cancellandum ('London, Printed: And Sold by J. Roberts') is more accurate, because according to general

131. Cancellandum: 'Warwick-lane' (2.5 cm), 'J. Roberts in' (3.3 cm). If you place these (5.8 cm) on the line of the cancelled title-page, it fits precisely.
132. After this there would have been a border and the year 'MDCCXXIX' would have been on its own line. The measurements fit. The year is more or less in the centre.
133. Greg, *Some Aspects and problems*, p.30.
134. See Hazen, 'One meaning of the imprint', p.120.
135. Greg, *Some aspects and problems*, p.32.

eighteenth-century standards it simply indicates that the main distributor of the book was Roberts. Nevertheless, it is also misleading because it does not reveal the actual publisher. My assumption is that, just as in the case of *The Fable of the bees* after 1724, the real publisher of *Part II* was Jacob Tonson. The similarity between the Tonson editions of the *Fable* and *Part II* is strong enough to support the assumption that they came from the same publisher or press. Further, the fact that Tonson did publish the third edition of Mandeville's medical treatise in 1730 (as the imprint indicates) is a reason to assume that the publishing relationship between Mandeville and Tonson continued in 1729-1730.

Tonson had plenty of reason to conceal the fact that he was the publisher of *Part II*. *The Fable of the bees* was presented to the Grand Jury not once, but twice. One needs to understand that the people who were tried in such cases were the authors, printers and publishers – not the distributors of the book. The second time the *Fable* was presented was in 1728, concerning the fifth edition published in the same year.[136] This time the presentment concerned not only Mandeville but also the publisher, the younger Tonson, who was named.[137] The reasons given for the charge were just as vague as the first time. This time, however, there was also a reference to the first presentment:

> we beg leave humbly to observe, that this infamous and scandalous book, entituled, The Fable of the bees, etc. was presented by the Grand-Jury of this county, to this honourable court, in the year 1723, yet notwithstanding the said presentment, and in contempt therof, an edition of this book has been published, together with the presentment of the said Grand-Jury, with scandalous and infamous Reflections thereon, in the present year 1728.

Because of Tonson's involvement the second presentation was naturally a serious matter. Tonson was an important figure,

136. W. A. Speck does not discuss a second time that *The Fable of the bees* was presented in 1728 in 'Bernard Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury', *Eighteenth-century studies* 11 (1978), p.362-74.
137. *The Presentment of the Grand-Jury for the county of Middlesex, to his Majesty's court of King's-bench, at Westminster, against infidels and sodomites, and impious books* (London, 1728), p.4.

having been 'made the Prince's Stationer' in 1729.[138] It was only natural for him, at the same time, to push for publishing Mandeville's new work, thus riding on the fame of the *Fable* while leaving out his own involvement in the imprint.

Origin of honour and the 1755 Edinburgh edition of the Fable

A vital piece of bibliographical evidence suggesting that the two parts of the *Fable* are different works and intellectually apart is that *Part II* has a sequel whereas *The Fable of the bees* does not. *An Enquiry into the origin of honour, and the usefulness of Christianity in war* of 1732 is volume two of *Part II*. It continues the dialogues between the same characters as in *Part II*, but most importantly, it elaborates the same theory about the correspondence between human nature and civil society that Mandeville first put forward in *Part II* (not in *The Fable of the bees*). Kaye published his edition of *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II* as a work of two volumes. At the same time, he left *Origin of honour* without a single mention in the section of his edition entitled 'History of the text'. He made no mention of the fact that *Origin of honour* was a continuation of *Part II*. One might think that anyone publishing the different 'parts' of *The Fable of the bees* in more than one volume would also include the third volume, *Origin of honour*.

Why isn't *Origin of honour* entitled *The Fable of the bees, Part III*? Maurice Goldsmith considers the matter. He regards it as a 'mystery' and speculates that 'perhaps Mandeville thought that a new title would catch new trade'.[139] A new title would not seem to be such a mystery given that *Part II* should have had a different title to fit the content: Mandeville and the publisher were apparently driven by the money motive. It was only natural that Mandeville should seek to distance himself further from *The Fable of the bees* by giving the sequel a different title: it was sufficient to acknowledge that the author was the same.

What Mandeville did in *Origin of honour* was expand the theory presented in *Part II* to consider the phenomenon of honour in more detail. This is a book about manliness, courage and greatness of mind. The theory on which the analysis is based is a direct continuation of *Part II*, and it is these two works that ought to be read together. This is what the young David Hume did, for example, quite naturally because of his age. He was eighteen years old when *Part II* was published and twenty-one when *Origin of honour* emerged from the printing press. The publishing of *Origin of honour* under a different title also marks the final step that Mandeville took to distance himself from *The Fable of the bees*. He hints, at times, that these thoughts would be in line with the first work, which often in reality they were not. It should be remembered that Mandeville was, above all, defending his own character in defending *The Fable of the bees*. It seems only natural for him not to publicly announce that he had changed his mind. What happened with the *Origin of honour* was inevitable, however: in the end, a new thesis resulted in a new title.

Another factor contributing to the fact that *Origin of honour* is not *The Fable of the bees, Part III*, is the change of publisher. Tonson did not publish *Origin of honour*, and it was not printed in the same press as Tonson's editions of the *Fable*.[140] There is no reason to doubt the imprint (printed for J. Brotherton) or that the most likely publisher of *Origin of honour* was John Brotherton, and that, if so, Tonson did not own the copyright of the latter. For one reason or another, Mandeville had parted ways with Tonson and started working for Brotherton, who was after all also the publisher of the second edition of *Free thoughts* from 1729. A different publisher in this case probably meant a different copyright holder.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the practice of rebinding *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II* with matching covers developed.[141] It is, nevertheless, debatable whether this is an

138. *Flying post, or the Weekly medley* (London, 18 January 1728-1729).
139. Goldsmith, *Private vices, publick benefits*, p.121.

140. I have examined three copies in BL, pressmarks 1028.c.4(2); 855.d.26; G.16237 and two copies in Keynes Library in King's College Cambridge, pressmarks Keynes.F.19.51 and Keynes.F.19.52. Bibliographical details in all of the copies match. In all of the copies K4r, the last piece of the text is on the same line as the leaf number and the catchword. Upon comparison, the style of printing is very different from Tonson's books. Also, there are no printers' numbers in Mandeville's *An Enquiry into the origin of honour*.
141. Such re-bound copies can be found for example in Cambridge, Trinity College, pressmarks Sraffa 344/1 and Sraffa 344/2 and National Library of Finland, pressmark H69.VI.22.

indication that the two different parts were commonly read as two volumes outlining a unitary thesis. For example, when the *Fable* was translated for the first time into German in 1761 it was 'a translation of Part Two of the *Fable* only'. The original *Fable of the bees* was not published in German until 1818.[142] There are other British eighteenth-century comments noting the difference between the two parts: one commentator noted that 'in the preface to the Pastoral Letters of the Bishop of London' it is pointed out that Mandeville published a 'second part, in which the author endeavours to soften what he said in the first' part.[143]

F. B. Kaye came to a different conclusion. In his 'Writings of Bernard Mandeville' he puts a strong emphasis on the alleged fact that 'after 1732, the two volumes were published together'. For him this seems to have been the decisive evidence and justification for publishing the two parts as two volumes. Kaye stresses the fact that Jacob Tonson advertised 'The two-volume edition' of the *Fable* 'under the date of 1734' in *London magazine* in December 1733.[144] This, however, does not mean that the two-volume edition was actually published. R. B. McKerrow, in his review of Kaye's *Fable* raised doubts about Kaye's decisions.[145] Kaye, after all, had not seen an actual copy of the 1734 edition, basing his information about the two-volume edition solely on the advertisement. One might doubt that 'after 1732, the two volumes were published together', and consider the fact that during Mandeville's lifetime the two parts of the *Fable* were never published together. It seems that the first time they were both published at the same time was in 1755 in an Edinburgh

142. Bernhard Fabian, 'The reception of Bernard Mandeville in eighteenth-century Germany', *SVEC* 152 (1976), p.697. *Free thoughts*, without a reference to Mandeville, was translated already in 1726 and again in 1765. It should perhaps be pointed out that none of these were a commercial success.
143. Antonio Valsecchi, *Of the foundations of religion, and the fountains of impiety* (Dublin, 1800), vol.3, p.456.
144. Kaye, 'The writings of Bernard Mandeville', p.433. Also, in an issue of *Daily journal* of December 6 (London, 1733) there is an advertisement of an octavo, 'New edition of *The Fable of the bees* [...] Printed for J Tonson'. This small advertisement was not repeated in further issues of the journal. Most of the 'next week will be published' advertisements were printed for many weeks in a row (and hence were not all fully accurate).
145. McKerrow, '*Fable of the bees*: book review', p.109-11.

edition.[146] One could also point out that *Part II* is called *Part II* and not 'volume two' in this edition.

It is nevertheless true that Tonson advertised the 1734 two-volume set, thus there was at least an indication that the intention was to publish it. There are a handful of copies in which the title page indicates that it is a copy of this edition.[147] The title leaves in all of these books, however, are cancels. The available facts about these existing copies of the supposed 1734 edition suggest that it was not published.[148] The text in all the known copies precisely matches that in the 1755 edition, and the physical description of the book is the same as the one given in the English short title catalogue.[149] The few ornaments in it also precisely match the 1755 edition. Most importantly, it is a duodecimo (except for the title leaves), with horizontal chain lines, gathered in twelves just like the 1755 Edinburgh printing of the *Fable*. All the Tonson editions of the *Fable* (and other Mandeville titles) were octavo books, with vertical chain lines, gathered in eights. Tonson also advertised the forthcoming 1734 edition as an octavo edition of two volumes. There is no reason to think that he would have suddenly changed the format in 1734.

It is most likely that all the copies in question are copies of the 1755 edition with its fictional title page. Furthermore, between 1724 and 1732 Tonson published four editions of *The Fable of the bees* (his name did not appear in the imprint of *Part II* before this '1734-Edinburgh edition'), and he also published several other Mandeville items. Of all the genuine Tonson editions dozens, if

146. Mandeville, *Fable of the bees*, 2 vols (Edinburgh, printed for W. Gray and W. Peter, 1755).
147. There are three known copies of a complete set of the supposed 1734 edition in Amherst College Library, Guelph McLaughlin Rare Books Collection and Arizona State University Libraries. Different catalogues also indicate a fourth copy in Walter H., and Leonore Annenberg Rare Book & Manuscript Library University of Pennsylvania, but this is an incomplete set, only containing the first 'volume'.
148. The edition was not entered into the Stationer's Hall's register. Many magazines and journals had registers of books published every month. At least in the register of *Gentleman's magazine* for December 1733 and January-April 1734 there is no sign of the 1734 two-volume edition of the *Fable*. The index for the volume of 1734 does not register the book either.
149. Namely: vol.1: ix, [1], 374 p.; vol.2: [2], xxii, 345, [27] p.

not hundreds of copies have survived. Given that Mandeville, one of the great controversialists of all time, passed away in 1733, it would be natural to assume that Tonson (a businessman) would round things off with an extensive edition (as he did when Joseph Addison died, and which clearly was his intention). If Tonson had published the two-volume set of the *Fable* after Mandeville's death, it is certain that many copies would be available now. There is no real evidence that it was actually printed, or that it was distributed to booksellers. Hence, the conclusion is that the 1734 edition was not put on the market alongside other Tonson editions of the *Fable*.

What is interesting is the question of the cancelled title leaves in the handful of copies. It does seem, as McKerrow points out, that the publisher of the 1755 edition went to an unusual amount of trouble in the process.[150] It is somewhat of a mystery that the title leaves are probably octavo because of the vertical chain lines, unlike the bulk of the book with the horizontal chain lines of a duodecimo book. Why is this the case?

As noted above, the *Fable* was one of the books mentioned in the continuing publishing war between London and Dublin-Edinburgh booksellers in the 1760s. Although twenty-one years had lapsed since the supposed 1734 edition, it is clear that the questions regarding the copyright of the 1755 Edinburgh edition were not completely clear, and some sort of a cover-up from the publisher was seen necessary. However, to come up with the ingenious plan of issuing the pirated edition with the cancelled title page of an edition that was advertised but never printed was quite amazing. In order to do that, the Edinburgh printer had to have access to the 1734 title page. However far-fetched this seems, it is a possibility that should be taken into account, given that the title leaves probably came from an octavo-sized book.

Another possibility is that the printer went to the trouble of printing fake title leaves on a different stock of paper than the rest of the book in order to make it appear to be an octavo printing. This, while of course possible, would indeed have been a very unusual sign of determination in a printer. If one looked at some of the pirated editions (such as the Dublin printing of the

150. McKerrow, '*Fable of the bees*: book review', p.111.

Fable in 1729) one would realise that no particular care was taken in the printing process: the quality of the printing tended to be far inferior to that of an original work.

The seller of the 1755 edition saw it necessary to cancel the title-page in some of the copies and to insert a fictitious page from a previous edition. What would be better for counterfeiting purposes than that the fake title-pages originated from an original printing? This seems more plausible than assuming that the printer would go to the trouble of producing them. It is possible that the 1734 Tonson edition was printed but not distributed to the booksellers, and therefore that the bulk of the title leaves were saved. This is hardly likely, however, given that the paper would probably have been recycled by 1755.

Thus, the mystery remains, and there exist copies of the 1755 edition with 1734 title leaves. How is this possible? It is a fact that Tonson advertised this edition as forthcoming: he seems to have been an efficient advertiser of his products.[151] His intention, in fact, was to publish the two volumes in 1734. This did not happen: perhaps the actual printing never took place or was stopped during the print run, or the copies were destroyed before they reached the customers. Given that there was advertising in the newspapers, perhaps there was also title-page advertising, referring to the practice of printing extra sets of title leaves to be used as posters and circulating them in coffee shops, for example.[152] Publishing the two parts of the *Fable* together for the very first time immediately after the author died would have been a major

151. This is also indicated in a letter from Lawrence Theobald to Jacob Tonson on 2 January 1733. Theobald writes to Tonson: 'As I have very few days left before I must close my list, I beg for these next six days, Shakespeare may every day be advertis'd in Daily Post, Daily Journal and Daily Advertiser, & in Evening Posts. (These infrequent & scattering advertisements do me no manner of service.) I have sent a number of my printed advertisements herewith for this purpose'; see BL, Add. 28275.

152. For a general introduction to the question of title and book itself stressing the commercial significance of a title-page in early modern history, see Eleanor F. Shevlin, '"To reconcile *book* and title, and make 'em kin to one another": the evolution of the title's contractual functions', *Book history* 2 (1999), p.52: 'Since published titles were typically devised not by the author but by the publisher they were frequently generated with solely sales - and not the subject - in mind.'

literary event. It clearly did not go through as planned given that there are no surviving, real copies of the edition. Nevertheless, if it had been widely advertised some of the title-page advertisements might have survived, which would explain how copies of the 1734 title page reached the Edinburgh bookseller. Thus, if there was a tradition of printing extra copies of title-pages and using them to advertise the books, the puzzle would be solved. Offshore printers in Dublin and Edinburgh would then have been eager to get their hands on original title-pages so as to insert them in some of their copies in order to prove that their stock was legitimate (for example when they were in the act of transporting the books to London). The war against offshore printing and debate about copyright and counterfeiting was fierce in the eighteenth century. The puzzle still remains, but this is one hypothesis that seems quite logical.

Aftermath

Quite evidently, when he first published *The Fable of the bees* in 1724, the younger Jacob Tonson owned the copyright. He is also the most likely person to have originally owned the copyright of *Part II*. Why then, did he not print the two volumes together in 1734? He may well have sold shares in the copyrights to other publishers by this time, it being common practice to sell, divide and resell the copyrights one had.[153] In fact, 'joint ownership of copyrights was if anything more common after 1710 than before; the more booksellers concerned in a copyright, the less chance that a pirate would risk the wrath of its owners by infringing their rights',[154] and 'small shares of popular books were commonplace'.[155] This idea of dividing the copyright into smaller pieces seems to be a likely later distribution pattern of *The Fable of the bees*.

The Tonsons gradually dispensed with their Shakespeare copyrights: the remaining 'Tonson copyrights were sold in 1767 for about £10,000'.[156] The records of the sale reveal that the copyrights they formerly owned had already been distributed to several booksellers. It was probably a similar pattern in the case of *The Fable of the bees*. One reason why the famous Tonson sale of 1767 did not include the *Fable* or *Part II* may have been that the copyrights had already been divided and sold to other booksellers. Mandeville's works, including the *Fable*, occasionally feature in sales of books in quires in Longman and Ward catalogues, but the only conclusion to be drawn from this is that the two parts were sold separately by many different booksellers in the 1730s and 1740s.[157] There are no traces of copyright sales of Mandeville's works in these catalogues. The only larger related item in the Tonson sale comprised 350 books in quires of the Tonson edition of 'Mandeville's diseases' [Mandeville's medical treatise].[158] It should be borne in mind, however, that the public sale of copyrights was only the tip of the iceberg. Much more was going on behind closed doors.

In any case, the idea of Mandeville owning the copyrights himself seems highly fanciful (after the first Tonson edition). A plausible scenario is that they were handed over through Tonson to a printing conger, which could explain the controversy over the 1734 edition that remained unpublished. Thus, one major reason why the two parts of the *Fable* were not published as two volumes was business related. Tonson did not own the right to publish the two parts as a posthumous edition. Hence, the other copyright holders stopped him before the 1734 edition had been published and distributed to customers. The irony is that this is probably what Mandeville would have desired. After all, the two parts are intellectually apart.

Mandeville defended his own character until the end of his

153. Belanger, 'Booksellers' trade sales, 1718-1768', p.281-302.
154. Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', p.3.
155. Belanger, 'Booksellers' trade sales, 1718-1768', p.285.
156. Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', p.5.

157. When bookseller Edward Symon's stock was sold in 1741, he had six copies of *Part II* in his stock, and none of the first part. Evidence that they were, indeed, separate books. See *A Catalogue of books in quires, and copies, being the stock of Mr Edward Symon, deceased. Which will be sold by auction to a select number of booksellers of London and Westminster only, at the Queen's-Head Tavern in Pater-noster-Row, on Tuesday the first of September* (London, 1741).
158. BL, pressmark C.170.aa.1(156), Longman sale catalogues, *Catalogue of books in quires, being the genuine stock of Jacob and Richard Tonson, Esqrs. which will be sold by auction, to a select number of the booksellers of London and Westminster...* (London, 1767), p.2.

publishing career. Tonson's vision of bookselling was quite different. For him, controversy was good business. It is of little wonder that he was the publisher of George Berkeley's *Alciphron, or the Minute philosopher* in 1732. It was the first Berkeley book that he published, and he also owned the copyright.[159] Mandeville once more attempted to defend himself in 1732, and answered Berkeley in print with his *Letter to Dion*. This time, however, he did not need to point out that his *Fable* did not promote private vices but instead recommended goodness as the first principle. This time, he was able to draw from the arguments presented in *Part II* and *Origin of honour*. In other words, he was still facing the same accusations as in 1724, but now he was defending a different thesis. History has not been as kind to Mandeville as it has been to Berkeley, however. As an indication of this irony, the day after Mandeville died 'his Majesty' promoted 'Dr George Berkeley, Dean of Derry, to the Bishoprick of Cloyne'.[160]

159. Indicated in the Longman sale records.
160. *London gazette*, Saturday 19 to Tuesday January 22, 1733.

4. Social theory in *A Treatise of human nature*

The idea of this chapter is to analyse the argument that Hume set forward regarding the nature and the development of civil society.[1] I show how Hume put Mandeville's distinction between self-love and self-liking to work in his own conception of political sociability. For Hume it explained the respective roles of justice and politeness in the construction and preservation of civil societies across time. Even when Hume gives more attention in Book 3 of the *Treatise* to the artifice of justice, which restrains men's self-love, self-liking and its corresponding artifice, politeness is no less important to the conceptual architecture of Hume's history of civil society.

i. Hutchesonian leanings and anatomy of morals

Modern scholars tend to be quick to trivialise Mandeville's influence on Hume, although the only serious criticism Hume directs towards the Dutchman in the *Treatise* is that not all moral distinctions are inventions of clever politicians. As mentioned, Mandeville's position changed considerably as he moved on to theorise about civil society in the dialogues between Cleomenes and Horatio. In previous chapters I have argued that he may well have revised his opinion about the arbitrary role of politicians in *Part II*, and developed a hypothesis positing that justice and politeness are decisive, artificial moral institutions based on previous human conventions. It is the nature of artificial virtues which in Hume's words plainly 'arise from interest and education' that is the vital question of political sociability.[2]

One reason why politeness – which is the artificial virtue that concerns pride – has attracted such trifling attention is that artificial virtues were generally neglected in Hume scholarship

1. A shorter analysis of the relevance of politeness for Hume's intellectual development has been published in Mikko Tolonen, 'Politeness, Paris and the *Treatise*', *Hume studies* 34 (2008), p.21-42.
2. T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.

for a long time.[3] Although Hume's philosophy has been the object of extensive scholarship since Kemp Smith, it is nevertheless possible to read an article published as recently as 1979 stating that 'a generally accepted view holds that the distinction' between 'natural and artificial virtue' is 'of little importance'.[4] At the time, Knud Haakonssen had published an original article defending the relevance of the difference between natural and artificial virtues. He argued that since there is no natural obligation for artificial virtues as there is for natural virtues and given that we lack the motive to be 'artificially virtuous', we begin to dislike ourselves for lacking the original motive, and this self-hate functions as a motive for acquiring artificial virtues.[5] Yet, there is still much work to be done on the subject of artificial virtues; as Ted A. Ponko put it: 'In essence, I shall urge that a sharper distinction is needed between the artificial and natural virtues.'[6]

Virtues in general have, needless to say, always generated overwhelming interest in Hume scholarship. There are many modern philosophers discussing him from the perspective of virtue ethics, for example.[7] It has been estimated that 'Hume discusses about 70 different virtues in his moral theory'.[8] My point is that this approach often misses the rather simple, but all the more important point of what he was trying to establish in his discussion on artificial virtues in *Treatise*. As John Mackie writes regarding 'artificial virtue', those 'who came closest to anticipating this insight were other sceptically inclined writers like Mandeville and Hobbes'. However, in some ways, 'Hume's thought is subtler than that of either of these predecessors'[9] – which is certainly true. Mackie's problem, as I discuss in more detail later, is that he underestimates the importance of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues, stating that 'Hume's treatment of the natural virtues is both less interesting and less defensible than his treatment of the artificial ones'.[10] Although Mackie is correct to emphasise artificial virtues, it is nevertheless also important to accept the existence of natural virtues. Artificial virtues have of late attracted increasing attention in the history of philosophy, but the emphasis has almost exclusively been on the importance of justice.[11]

David Fate Norton has remained faithful throughout his career to his interpretation of Hume. He has made painstaking efforts to establish that one of Hume's main concerns was to publish a second edition of the *Treatise*, for which purpose he made some pen-and-ink corrections to certain copies of this work.[12] Norton, together with his co-editor Mary Norton, has also sought to establish a hybrid 'second edition' of the *Treatise*, the critical Clarendon edition, which is a thoroughly researched piece of scholarship.[13] A problem that is relevant to my argument, how-

3. About politeness in Hume scholarship, see Peter Johnson, 'Hume on manners and the civil condition', *British journal for the history of philosophy* 6 (1998), p.209-22. Another account where politeness gets central stage is Box, *The Suasive art of David Hume*, p.142-48. Regarding politeness, one needs to also consult Moore, 'The social background of Hume's science of human nature', p.23-42.
4. Charles E. Cottle, 'Justice as artificial virtue in Hume's *Treatise*', *Journal of the history of ideas* 40 (1979), p.457.
5. Knud Haakonssen, 'Hume's obligations', *Hume studies* 4 (1978), p.7-17.
6. Ted A. Ponko, 'Artificial virtue, self-interest and acquired social concern', *Hume studies* 9 (1983), p.46. About the distinction between natural and artificial virtues in Mandeville, see p.82-86 of this volume.
7. See, for example, Rosalind Hursthouse, 'Virtue ethics and human nature', *Hume studies* 25 (1999), p.67-82.
8. James Fieser, 'Hume's wide view of the virtues: an analysis of his early critics', *Hume studies* 24 (1998), p.295-312.

9. Mackie, *Hume's moral theory*, p.82.
10. Mackie, *Hume's moral theory*, p.129.
11. There are many useful general discussions of justice as an artificial virtue; regarding the more philosophical ones, see for example, Marcia Baron, 'Hume's noble lie: an account of his artificial virtues', *Canadian journal of philosophy* 12 (1982), p.539-55; Sharon R. Krause, 'Hume and the (false) luster of justice', *Political theory* 32 (2004), p.628-55; and especially the work of Rachel Cohon. Regarding the other artificial virtues, chastity has received attention with the due rise of interest in women in philosophy; see, for example, Ann Levey, 'Under constraint: chastity and modesty in Hume', *Hume studies* 23 (1997), p.213-26.
12. David Fate Norton, 'Historical account of *A Treatise of human nature* from its beginnings to the time of Hume's death', in David Hume, *A Treatise of human nature: a critical edition*, Clarendon edition, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford, 2007), p.433-588.
13. For the lengths that Norton has gone trying to find new information regarding the *Treatise* for a new edition, see, for example, NLS Acc.9254, 'Hume archive' that includes part of his correspondence with different libraries and other depositories.

ever, is that it incorporates Hume's supposed corrections into the Clarendon edition silently, without indicating them in the text. The corrections replace the original published text as if there had been a second edition. The original text of the first and only edition that was, in fact, published now has to be tediously sought in a supplementary volume.[14]

The previous editor of the *Treatise* also pondered on the possibility of a second edition. P. H. Nidditch writes, 'I assume that Hume had the intention of getting all the manuscript amendments incorporated in their appropriate places in a corrected new edition of the *Treatise* that would be published in the early 1740's'.[15] Yet, Nidditch's choice was to publish the amendments as an appendix instead of altering the original text. He also gives his learned opinion about them:

> although the majority of Hume's new alterations in the Hume copy are minor ones by way of corrections of incidental misprints or of solecisms, intended stylistic improvements, or rewording for the sake of somewhat greater precision or clearness, some others appear to *represent changes of substance in his doctrines, especially in regard to his views of public interest and of self-interest.*[16]

This is no small concern, especially given the influence of Hutcheson and Mandeville on Hume.

Some of these alterations and additions indicate an apparent leaning towards Hutcheson. Regarding chastity, for example, Hume first simply wrote that 'those, who have an interest in the fidelity of women, naturally disapprove of their infidelity' and 'those, who have no interest, are carried along with the stream'. In a pen-and-ink addition, Hume supplemented this thought with a note that reads: 'and are also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interests of society' – a sentence that is not in any

14. This and some other problems with the critical Clarendon edition of the *Treatise* have been noticed by its reviewers: for example, James Harris, Eric Schliesser and Frits van Holthoon.
15. Nidditch, 'An apparatus of variant readings for Hume's *Treatise*: including a catalogue of Hume's manuscript amendments', unpublished manuscript (BL, 1976), p.15.
16. Emphases added.

particular way connected to the point he was making.[17] By and large, the word 'sympathy' features four more times in the recently published critical edition than in the originally published *Treatise*. Public interest and the general interest of society are terms that were also added to the text following publication in 1739-1740.

These added 'Hutchesonian leanings' do not however necessarily mean that Hume was in any particular way close to Hutcheson in his moral theory. They might equally well mean that (after having gone through a series of arguments with a senior Scottish philosopher) he was making some changes and additions that helped to give the impression that his views were not that far from Hutcheson after all – when in reality they were. In brief, the influence of Hutcheson could also be interpreted as pressure on a young man to be politically correct, while much of his intellectual debt was due to Bernard Mandeville, a polemist Hutcheson would not acknowledge as an authority.

I believe that Hume had a clear pattern in editing his works, which suggests that this kind of practice was rather common for him.[18] Of course, as is evident from Nidditch's remarks, like all editing, Hume's was mainly stylistic. He rarely changed his mind, but tended to mitigate some of his expressions, thereby making some of his thoughts more difficult to grasp. Hence, it is quite crucial to be acquainted with the originally published text because, at times, it is the clearest indication of what he really wanted to say. This is best shown in the subsequent editions of his *Essays*. On several occasions, what first appeared in a rather radical form of expression is restated in a much milder form later on.

For example, Hume argued in 1741 that 'so great is the Force of Laws, and of particular Forms of Government, and so little Dependence have they on the Humours and Temper of Men,

17. T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572.
18. For examples revealing how Hume edits his *History of England* from one edition to another, see John Hill Burton, *Life and correspondence of David Hume* (Edinburgh, 1846), vol.2, p.79. The best currently available edition of Hume's *History* is Frits van Holthoon's ad variorum edition (Charlottesville, VA, 2000), available online in Past Masters series: http://www.nlx.com/collections/64.

that Consequences as general and as certain may be deduced from them, on most Occasions, as any which the Mathematical Sciences can afford us'.[19] Later Hume edited his text so that the argument becomes more lenient. He talked of 'consequences *almost* as general and certain may be *sometimes* deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us'.[20] In the 'Of liberty and despotism' of 1741, Hume wrote that 'the World is still too young to fix any general stable Truths in Politics, which will remain true to the latest Posterity'.[21] Regarding this passage, Hume later polished the edges of the argument by turning 'any' into 'many'. In 1741, 'The most eminent Instance of the flourishing of Learning in despotic Governments', according to Hume, 'is that of France, which *never* enjoy'd *any Shadow* of Liberty, and yet has carried the Arts and Sciences *nearer Perfection than any other* Nation of the Universe'.[22] He later changed the wording so that 'never' turns into 'scarcely ever' and 'any Shadow' became 'established' and 'nearer Perfection than any other Nation' became 'as near perfection as any other nation'. In the same volume, Hume also stated that in a civilised monarchy there is no 'Danger ever apprehended' from 'the Violence of the Sovereign'.[23] Hume later softened his argument by changing 'fully' into 'almost as' and 'any danger ever' into 'danger much' apprehended.[24] These changes are not noted in the Liberty Fund or the Green and Grose editions of the *Essays* and have gone almost unnoticed because of the poor standard of the modern editions of Hume's *Essays*.

The point I wish to make is that some caution must be exercised in stating that a supposed second edition of the *Treatise* would take us closer to what Hume really wanted to say. What this mainly concerns is the influence of Bernard Mandeville on the

19. Hume, 'That politics may be reduced to a science', in *Essays, moral and political* (Edinburgh, printed for A. Kincaid, 1741), p.29-30.
20. Hume, 'That politics may be reduced to a science', in *Essays*, p.16. Emphasis added.
21. Hume, 'Of liberty and despotism', in *Essays, moral and political*, p.173
22. Hume, 'Of liberty and despotism', in *Essays, moral and political*, 2nd edn, corrected (Edinburgh, printed for A. Kincaid, 1742), p.178. Emphasis added.
23. Hume, 'Of liberty and despotism', in *Essays, moral and political* (1742), p.181.
24. Hume, 'Of civil liberty', in *Essays*, p.92-93.

young Hume. He had had the occasion to take the radical edge off his wording before this supposed second edition and the later editions of his *Essays*. Perhaps the most frequently cited evidence of the nature of his moral philosophy is a letter he wrote to Hutcheson dated 17 September 1739, in which he first makes his famous comparison between an anatomist and a painter of morals. The original letter is preserved in the National Library of Scotland and includes important wordings that Hume decided to strike out.

On the subject of the anatomist-painter letter, first it should be pointed out that it is a proper letter, not a polished fair copy (like the famous 'letter to the doctor' of 1734). As the text indicates, there is an acknowledged, major dispute about moral philosophy at stake. Hume already outright and clearly opposes Hutcheson, and given that he was writing to Hutcheson about their dispute it would have been natural to be a little cautious in order not to align himself too squarely with the authors that Hutcheson had opposed throughout his career. Hume originally wrote: 'Where you pull off the Skin, & display all the minute Parts, there appears something trivial if not hideous, even in the noblest Attitudes'. He deleted the words 'if not hideous' (but did not make them illegible).[25] These deleted words are not mentioned in Greig's edition of the letters.[26]

Hume's original statement that there was 'something trivial if not hideous, even in the noblest attitudes' puts his original wording more towards Mandeville than one might assume from reading the modern edition of his letters. Mandeville's *Fable of the bees* begins with an analogy of 'those who study the anatomy of dead carcases' and 'they that examine into the nature of man'. The explicit point that Mandeville makes is that as the 'small trifling films and little pipes' that 'seem inconsiderable to the vulgar eye' are 'immediately required to continue the motion' of the body instead of 'the smooth white skin that so beautifully

25. I would like to thank Professor M. A. Stewart for confirming in private correspondence that my transcription of the deleted words in the manuscript is correct. I am also grateful to Professor Stewart for the astute point that Hume was not deliberately covering his views when deleting these words, otherwise he would surely have made them illegible.
26. Hume to Hutcheson, 17 September 1739, NLS, MS.23151 f. 55.

covers' bones, muscles and nerves; in an analogous manner it is often the 'vilest and most hateful qualities' that make men sociable.[27] Hence, it is at the same time revealing and understandable that Hume deleted 'if not hideous' from the text, even if he did not go to any lengths to make it illegible. He was already expressing outright opposition to Hutcheson's way of doing things (and perhaps even questioning the purpose of his moral philosophy). However, he was thoughtful enough to moderate his opinions by deleting the words he thought would unnecessarily widen the already large gap between their points of view. This need not be the deliberate disguising of an opinion, but it seems that Hume was not eager to put his Mandevillean ideas too bluntly in front of Hutcheson either, especially when his idea of anatomist of morals is derived from Mandeville's works.

Perhaps the most significant deletion revealing something relevant about Hume's thinking regards the manuscript concluding Book 3 of the *Treatise* (T 3.3.6), which, it is supposed, was sent to Hutcheson. In the draft Hume originally wrote: 'The same system may help us to form a just notion of the *happiness*, as well as of the *dignity* of virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature, both our selfishness and pride, in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality.'[28] Previously in a letter to Hutcheson he had deleted the crucial thought that there is something hideous in the noblest attitudes. In the conclusion of Book 3 he deleted 'both our Selfishness & Pride' from the sentence indicating the principles of human nature (and hence not revealing what he meant by such principles).

The fact that Hume deleted 'both our Selfishness & Pride' (and not just selfishness or pride) is important. Selfishness and pride include an analogy and it is vital that they are analysed together. The deletion was made after the manuscript was finished (judging by how it looks). However, the problem is that the wording of the sentence seems a little curious.[29] Selfishness and pride are surely not the only principles of human nature that appear in Hume's

27. Mandeville, *The Fable of the bees*, p.3-4.
28. NLS, MS. 23159, f.15, 'Conclusion of this book' [T 3.3.6].
29. Professor M. A. Stewart alerted me to this.

system. One should perhaps read his use of 'every Principle of our Nature' in a different manner, as not referring to all possible principles in the widest meaning of the expression, but only to the most important ones. In any case, the sentence should be read so as to make clear Hume's intention to mention only selfishness and pride. In other words, he was not saying that selfishness and pride were the only principles of human nature, but he singled them out because together they play a crucial role in his moral and political philosophy. Moreover, the word 'both' in adjunction to 'our Selfishness & Pride' gives additional weight to his point about linking the two principles together.

Regardless of whether or not these are the only principles of human nature they are the only ones that are indicated in the text, which also supports the case I make in this book. My main argument is that Hume was following Mandeville in his distinction between self-love and self-liking (or selfishness and pride), which is only introduced in Mandeville's later works published in 1729 and 1732. It was thus crucial for Hume to discuss selfishness and pride (and the derivative moral institutions of justice and politeness) together at relevant points in his works in order to align himself with Mandeville (the pre-*Treatise* indications of this are evident not only in the essay on modern honour, but also in the explicitly Mandevillean analysis of politeness in Hume's letter to Michael Ramsay written in 1734, discussed below). It is the link of self-love to pride followed by the link between justice and politeness that is of central importance, and which is only crystallised in Book 3 of the *Treatise*. If it was only pride that was important, Hume could equally well be aligned with Malebranche (or a number of French authors), but it is the distinction between self-interest and pride and the use of this distinction in a morally neutral manner that makes it Mandevillean.

In the words of M. A. Stewart, 'although' Hume 'was seeking his own independence of mind', there is no evidence that Hume had yet abandoned the ancients' conception (mainly Cicero and the Stoics) of the philosophical enterprise when, around his eighteenth birthday (April 1729), he was confronted with 'a new Scene of Thought'.[30] Reinhard Brandt made a similar observation

30. Stewart, 'Hume's intellectual development, 1711-1752', p.29.

indicating the influence of Mandeville on Hume.[31] What has not been taken into consideration, however, is that this was also the very time when *Part II* was published. There is a strong likelihood that reading the later works of Mandeville was one reason for Hume to adopt a more sceptical, anatomist approach to morals and civil society around the time when *Part II* was published. It should be borne in mind that the relevance of *Part II* (independently of the original *Fable*) remained a well-established fact in eighteenth-century Scottish thought. Adam Smith is the supposed author of a famous letter to the authors of the *Edinburgh review* in 1755, quite fittingly pointing out that 'the second volume of the Fable of the Bees has given occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau'. What I find fitting is not only that the author of the letter had his finger on the right book, but also the fact that he wrote this in 1755, which was the first time there was such a thing as a printed 'second volume of the *Fable*'.[32] The first Edinburgh edition came out that year and it was the first time in Britain that the two parts of the *Fable* had been issued together. The young Hume's intellectual development took place in a world in which *The Fable of the bees* and *Part II* were two different works.

In 1737 Hume wrote a letter to Henry Home explaining that he was 'at present castrating' his *Treatise* and 'cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavouring it shall give as little Offence as possible'.[33] Despite this self-censorship that most likely meant that a part on miracles and perhaps another part on origin of evil were cut out, Mandeville's name remains next to Hutcheson's in the introduction of the published work. There had to be a significant reason why Hume named Mandeville as the predecessor of his 'science of man' project when he knew that this might damage his already fragile relationship with Francis Hutcheson and go against his own interest.

31. Brandt, 'The beginnings of Hume's philosophy', p.117-27. Also Stewart acknowledges that the relevance of the 'new Scene of Thought' is 'well made in' Brandt's article, which is (in the words of Stewart) 'one of the best analyses so far of the letter to the physician'; see Stewart, 'Hume's intellectual development, 1711-1752', p.29, n.56.
32. *Edinburgh review* (Edinburgh, printed for G. Hamilton and J. Balfour, 1755), p.73.
33. David Hume to Henry Home, 2.XII 1737, Hume, *New letters*, p.2.

In *Part II* Mandeville gives a line to his spokesman Cleomenes that encapsulates the essence of his later works: 'When I have a mind to dive into the origin of any maxim' established 'for the use of society in general, I don't trouble my head with enquiring after the time or country, in which it was first heard of, nor what others have wrote or said about it; but I go directly to the fountain head, human nature itself.'[34] Of course, this is not to say that Hume was Mandeville in disguise.[35] Hume's scope of the 'science of man' is much more ambitious, ingenious and complex. Most importantly, the science of man in the *Treatise* is a vast project of philosophy of mind covering aspects ranging from causal inference and aesthetic thought to social theory and politics. Nothing Mandeville ever wrote could be compared to this. However, it is not my intention to explain it in its entire magnitude or make claims about the essence of the science of man. When one focuses on Mandeville and Hume as anatomists of morals and pays attention to the conjectural history of civil society and social theory, I contend, one finds significant points in common with Mandeville's later works and the *Treatise*, which suggests that perhaps they should be interpreted together.

ii. Hume's distance from *The Fable of the bees* and his attachment to Mandeville

Before engaging with the idiosyncratic features of David Hume's thinking, it would be worth establishing his relation with Bernard Mandeville more precisely. A good point to start with is the argument that supposedly separates the Scotsman from Mandeville. Hume is careful to inform his audience that he rejects the idea that all moral distinctions are artificial inventions, thus putting a distance between himself and the controversial reputation of *The Fable of the bees*. Towards the end of the *Treatise*, in a

34. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.128.
35. David Fate Norton has reminded the 'readers of Hume' to 'be wary of those commentators who engage in the kind of historical reductivism that claims to unlock the secrets of Hume's thought by reference to one or two authors or one intellectual tradition'; see David Fate Norton, 'An introduction to Hume's thought', in *The Cambridge companion to Hume*, ed. David Fate Norton (Cambridge, 1993), p.13.

section entitled 'Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices', he refers to 'some philosophers' who thought that 'moral distinctions' only arose 'when skilful politicians endeavour'd to restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the notions of honour and shame'.[36] As he publicly stated, he did not endorse the view according to which 'all moral distinctions' are represented 'as the effect of artifice and education'. He explicitly dismisses such a 'system' because it is not 'consistent with experience'.[37] Modern scholars have taken careful note of this and commonly suggest that 'Hume forcefully rejects "the selfish philosophy" then associated with Hobbes and Mandeville'.[38] The anamorphosis in the prevailing interpretations derived from remarks on Hume's relationship with Mandeville is that Mandeville had come to the same conclusion ten years earlier.

Hume makes two observations to counter the claim that all moral distinctions are the inventions of skilful politicians. According to his interpretation, all the 'virtues and vices' in the selfish system are thought to have a 'tendency to the public advantage or loss'.[39] Maintaining that there are other virtues as well, some of which are agreeable or useful to the person concerned and not in any way to the public, he claims that in this respect the selfish system is not plausible. His second point, which modern scholars have taken as the factor that rigorously distinguishes Hume from Mandeville, concerns the existence of a moral vocabulary. Hume claims that if men did not have any 'natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it cou'd never be excited by politicians; nor wou'd the words *laudable* and *praiseworthy*, *blameable* and *odious*, be any more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly unknown to us'.[40] It seems to have been Hume's explicit intention to argue that anyone claiming that all moral distinctions are artificial was wrong because there is a comprehensive moral vocabulary and thus there have to be at

36. T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578.
37. T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578.
38. Krause, 'Hume and the (false) luster of justice', p.641.
39. T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578-79.
40. T 3.3.1.11; SBN 579.

least some natural sentiments approving and disapproving of certain qualities without any external, socially binding force.[41] Hume argues this point on three different occasions, twice in the *Treatise* and once in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*.

I am not claiming that the argument about moral vocabulary is not an important point in the *Treatise*. It certainly puts distance between Hume and the reception of the *Fable*. However, I cannot see how this alone would separate Hume's interpretation of a civil society and social theory from Mandeville's revised vision. In his later works, Bernard Mandeville was happy to admit that there was at least one thoroughly natural virtue in human nature – natural affection. Seen in the light of the criticism in the 1720s, it seems that Hume's position differed very little from the stance taken in Mandeville's later works.[42]

Hume's criticism leads directly to the heart of the matter – natural and artificial virtues.[43] Why are certain virtues called natural? Hume makes it plain that the foundation of a natural virtue is human nature. If there is an original motive implanted in our nature to act in a virtuous manner, this particular virtue is natural. When we detect a sign of what we take to be a virtuous motive in others, we instinctively approve of it. This approving sentiment is natural and arises without the benefit of education or social experience. Given that there are certain inclinations to act in a virtuous manner regardless of artificial conventions and public instruction, we cannot claim that all moral distinctions are the effect of artifice and education. Humanity, for example, is a natural virtue and 'when I relieve persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive',[44] and even if there 'was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity wou'd lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of humanity'.[45]

41. On Butler and the argument of moral vocabulary, see p.62-63 of this volume; on Hutcheson on the same topic, see p.56-57.
42. On natural affection and earlier and later Mandeville and 1720s criticism, see p.44, 50-62, 73-76, 91-92 of this volume.
43. On Mandeville and natural and artificial in *Part II*, see p.82-86 of this volume.
44. T 3.3.1.12; SBN 579.
45. T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518.

Hume makes the case for natural virtues much more forcefully when discussing a father who takes 'care of his children'. Taking care of his children is the man's 'duty', but he also has 'a natural inclination to it'.[46] Natural virtues in Hume's system are exactly what Hutcheson and other virtue theorists understood by virtue in general. I can see no interpretative difficulties regarding the nature of natural virtues. In emphasising that parental affection was a natural quality, Hume was conforming to the standard view of natural affection, as Butler and Hutcheson, among others, pointed out.[47]

John Mackie argues in his influential interpretation of Hume's moral theory that 'natural virtues' are 'after all' only 'a further set of artificial virtues'.[48] I find this interpretation somewhat problematic because it seems to miss the point of the distinction between these two classes of virtues and, in a sense, takes an inequitable shortcut regarding the question of moral motivation.[49] Natural affection is the only active natural virtue that operates at the beginning of the civilising process or in a barbarous age. Most of the others are latent features of human nature, which can easily be used as a reason for not paying particular attention to them when focusing on the origins of human society. The latent quality of the majority of natural virtues is also apparent. As a case in point, Hume's favourite example of humanity may only become effectual in a civil society due to external circumstances. This does not mean that men did not originally have the seeds of these inclinations, only that it takes time and social development before they are placed in a situation in which they are effective. This also explains his claim that only contemporary Europe had become effectively humane through

46. T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518-19.
47. On Mandeville and natural affection in *Part II*, see p.73-75 of this volume.
48. Mackie, *Hume's moral theory*, p.123.
49. How can natural virtues 'counteract' the 'effects' of 'confined generosity', if confined generosity is crucially caused by natural virtues, i.e. natural affection? To me it seems that Mackie's account of natural virtues over-emphasises the psychological role of pleasure for Hume. Natural virtue is a natural virtue because we are naturally motivated to act accordingly and we naturally approve this type of behaviour in others. This is clear enough and I do not think that there is anything to be added to this in order to understand what natural virtues are.

the circle of refinement, whereas ancient Greece, for example, had remained barbarous in this respect.[50] It would nevertheless be futile to argue whether or not humanity or brutality is an original feature of human nature because either one may actualise in a given society depending on the circumstances. It is a question of controlling these overall circumstances that is at the heart of the matter. In other words, the advancement of artificial moral institutions provides the means for securing self-love and balancing economic development, which in turn gives the foundation for cultivating natural virtues in a proper manner. Without the circle of refinement and the foundational role of artificial moral institutions, this would remain impossible.

Hume gives a clarifying example in his *Essays* when he explains that there are two kinds of moral duties. On the one hand, there are 'those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility'. Such duties include 'love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate'.[51] This conforms precisely to the principal arguments in the criticism of Hobbism of the 1720s.[52] On the other hand, there are 'moral duties' that 'are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected'.[53] To put it simply, natural virtues are the beneficial acts that men are naturally inclined to perform, and we consequently have natural sentiments that approve of the motives that set men to perform these actions.

Perhaps the most influential recent reading of Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues is that of Schneewind in his *Invention of autonomy*.[54] Schneewind interprets it as a direct

50. For a particularly useful article drawing a clear picture of Hume as 'a lover of ancient literature' who 'holds ancient philosophy in very low regard', see Peter Loptson, 'Hume and ancient philosophy', *British journal for the history of philosophy* 20 (2012), p.741-72.
51. Hume, 'Of the original contract', in *Essays*, p.479.
52. On 1720s criticism of Hobbism, see p.49-65 of this volume.
53. Hume, 'Of the original contract', in *Essays*, p.480.
54. J. B. Schneewind, *The Invention of autonomy: a history of modern moral philosophy* (Cambridge, 1998), p.365.

continuation of Grotius's distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. Even if it was indirectly influenced by the natural law tradition, it was widely used by the moral philosophers of the 1720s, who were not necessarily part of any discussion on rights and natural law. Natural and artificial virtues commonly featured in the on-going debate.

Another common contemporary way of interpreting the distinction between natural and artificial virtues is to take Hume's words at face value. Norton has emphasised that the difference is that natural virtues, in Hume's words, 'produce good on each occasion of their practise' and are approved 'on every occasion', whereas some instances of artificial virtue might be 'contrary to the public good' and be approved only as it is entailed by 'a general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous' in so far as it conforms to one of the general rules we have been disposed to form.[55] This is indeed what Hume tells his audience, having explained the conjectural development of civil society and vehemently questioning the relevance of natural moral principles. In describing the civilising process he does not highlight the similarities between natural and artificial virtues, but rather stresses the apparent conflict between natural ideas of morality (that include natural virtues) and artificial moral institutions.

If one understands that Hume was adopting a familiar argument when discussing natural virtues, it also becomes clear that the concessions he makes to Hutcheson are very slight. The question at hand is not whether there are some virtues that could be called natural, but whether the foundational virtues of justice and politeness are natural. Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury before him, claims that a natural sentiment of universal benevolence is the foundation of justice, thus justice is a natural virtue. David Hume categorically maintains that 'there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind'.[56] He argues that 'public benevolence', 'regard to the interests of mankind' or '*private benevolence*' cannot be the 'original motive of justice'[57] and therefore 'we must allow' that this virtue is 'not deriv'd from nature'. Instead, it arises 'artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and human conventions'.[58] I cannot see how this is in any way decidedly different from the views Mandeville expresses in *Part II*.

55. Norton, *David Hume: common-sense moralist, sceptical metaphysician*, p.16. T 3.3.1.12; SBN 579.
56. T 3.2.1.12; SBN 481.
57. T 3.2.1.13; SBN 482.

The link to Mandeville's later theory becomes apparent in the light of the role natural virtues play in the *Treatise*. Hume's premises regarding the first savage state are altogether familiar from Mandeville's discussion on the same subject. The first crucial point that distinguishes both accounts from the modern theory of natural law concerns the concept of the state of nature. Mandeville pointed out that the contrast between the state of nature and civil society should not be over-emphasised because the children of the first wild couple were born into a social state.[59] Thus, the idea of the state of nature could be used as a hypothetical device. David Hume also emphasises that the '*state of nature*' should 'be regarded as a mere fiction', and if it is to be utilised in our reasoning it should be referred to as a 'suppos'd *state of nature*' instead of an actual condition.[60] Like Mandeville when he discusses the first savages, Hume uses the concept of a 'wild uncultivated state' instead of a state of nature.[61]

In his discussion on the first family society (a wild couple and their children) Mandeville singles out three original principles: lust between the sexes, the instinct of sovereignty and natural affection. It is a significant part of his theory of the civilising process that the first family was formed in accordance with the natural principles of human nature. Lust first naturally drew the wild couple together. The instinct of sovereignty, which governed all their actions, made them send their children to labour for their few needs. Finally, natural affection, which is defined as a lasting and other-regarding passion that restricts behaviour and can even make a savage man sacrifice his life for his children's sake, plays an important role in various ways, not only in the development of a family society but also in later stages in the

58. T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
59. On the contrast between family and civil society in Mandeville, see p.78-80 above.
60. T 3.2.2.15; SBN 493; T 3.2.2.14; SBN 492
61. T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.

formation of a civil society.[62] Hume's remarks are notably similar. 'Natural appetite betwixt the sexes' is the primary 'necessity' in the association between human beings. The first wild family had a natural bond because the parents were always guided by 'natural affection', which restrains 'the exercise' of 'the authority' that 'they bear their children',[63] for example, and it is precisely the 'passions of lust and natural affection' that seemed to render the 'union' within the savage family 'unavoidable'.[64] He also stresses that this 'requisite conjunction' is partly disturbed by 'other particulars' of human nature and '*outward circumstances*'. It is, of course, human '*selfishness*' that he maintains was 'the most considerable' aspect of 'our *natural temper*', and which is considered the greatest obstacle in an established society.[65] As mentioned above, this is remarkably close to Mandeville's description of the first private family.[66] Selfish principles are perceived as the governing feature of human nature, but their other natural passions, namely sexual lust and natural affection for kin – without any assistance from artificial institutions – enabled the first private family to function as a coherent unit.

After stating that selfishness is the dominating feature in human nature, Hume is quick to seemingly balance the accounts, declaring that he does not think 'that men have no affection for any thing beyond themselves'.[67] According to his testimony, even though 'it be rare to meet with' a person 'who loves any single person better than himself; yet 'tis as rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over-balance all the selfish'. Taking this thought further, he begs his audience to 'consult common experience': was it not evident that even when 'the whole expense of the family be generally under the direction of the master of it', most masters 'bestow the largest part' of their fortune 'on the pleasures of their wives, and the education of their children, reserving the smallest portion for their own

62. Compare the change in later Mandeville and natural affection (see p.73-77 above) to natural affection in *The Fable of the bees* (see p.43-45 above).
63. T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.
64. T 3.2.2.5; SBN 486.
65. T 3.2.2.5; SBN 486.
66. See p.72-74 above.
67. T 3.2.2.5; SBN 487.

proper use and entertainment'?[68] Instead of jumping to the conclusion here that Hume detached himself from Mandeville's egoistic system, let us stop to think what he was actually saying. As noted, he strongly denies that there is such a 'passion in human minds, as the love of mankind',[69] labouring the point instead that 'we are naturally very limited in our kindness and affection'.[70] Even if he describes the role of other-regarding affection with overwhelming eloquence, in his system the affections of savages did not extend to strangers. Given that Mandeville gives a similar response to the 1720s criticism in *Part II*, the radical content of Hume's argument is all the more striking: according to him, naturally generous feelings are confined within the family. In other words, Hume makes no more concessions to Hutcheson than Mandeville does. They both emphasise the significance of 'natural affection' and the unifying passion between the sexes. This point also comes out in Hume's treatment of passions in Book 2 of the *Treatise*, in which he describes 'love' between the 'sexes' as natural[71] and 'the affection of parents to their young' as emanating 'from a peculiar instinct' in all 'animals', not just men.[72] Thus, it hardly comes as a surprise that the only natural virtue of significant relevance in this civilising scheme is encapsulated in the example of a parent, who takes 'care of his children' because he has 'a natural inclination to it'.[73] Hume indeed makes much of the fact that his system has a place for natural virtues. Nevertheless, when discussing the common propensities of the human mind in a civilised and in an 'uncultivated

68. T 3.2.2.5; SBN 487.
69. T 3.2.1.12; SBN 481.
70. T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519.
71. T 2.2.11.1; SBN 394.
72. T 2.2.12.5; SBN 398. It is noteworthy that 'The affection of parents to their young proceeds from a peculiar instinct in animals, as well as in our species' is so important a remark that it occupies a whole paragraph.
73. T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518-19. A curious fact about the *Treatise* is that Hume treated natural virtues (somewhat systematically) only after he had described the conjectural development of artificial virtues. The obvious reason for this is that natural virtues made little difference for the process of a savage family society turning into a civilised state. Thus, the structure of the *Treatise* already underscores the stark distinction between artificial and natural virtues, as well as the prevalence of the former over the latter regarding civil society.

state' the only original principles he singles out are '*selfishness* and *limited generosity*'.[74] Against this background it is understandable that other natural virtues are simply catalogued in the *Treatise*. Perhaps one could draw the even sharper conclusion that the roles of the original, other-regarding passions of human nature are analogous in *Part II* and the *Treatise*.

It is not enough just to note that Hume should be read in the same context as Mandeville, but his position should be analysed further. He is far more outspoken, analytic and radical in his proposals than Mandeville. He redefines the two passions that are 'evidently implanted in human nature', 'affection betwixt the sexes'[75] and 'natural affection' towards children, as 'confined generosity', and explains how it vaguely touches all loved ones in general.[76] Having stated that 'this generosity must be acknowledg'd to the honour of human nature', he comes up with a twist that turns the argument on its head: 'so noble an affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them, as the most narrow selfishness'. The intention of the civilising process, and a considerable part of Book 3 of the *Treatise*, is to explain how men are integrated into civil society. Instead of eulogising the natural virtues, Hume claims that all the generosity we naturally have stands in stark contrast to large societies, since 'each person loves himself better than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance, this must necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions'.[77] Thus, what he manages to do is to tie selfishness and confined generosity together and, significantly, to coin them as 'natural uncultivated ideas of morality' that are fundamentally opposed to civil society.[78] These natural ideas of morality are often in conflict with the notion of a civil society for the plain reason that in their partiality they stand opposed to the artificial moral institutions that are not based on any natural inclinations

74. T 3.2.2.16; SBN 494.
75. T 3.2.1.12; SBN 481.
76. T 3.2.2.18; SBN 495; see also T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519 and T 3.2.8.10; SBN 558.
77. T 3.2.2.6; SBN 487.
78. T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.

in human nature.[79] After analysing these uncultivated principles for three pages or so, he reaches the unambiguous conclusion that natural ideas of morality 'instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections, do rather conform themselves to that partiality, and give it an additional force and influence'.[80]

Mandeville and Hume made two interrelated conceptual distinctions: the first between a small and a large society, and the second between natural morality and artificial moral institutions. The purpose of stressing these divisions is to give an understanding of morality based on a pluralist system, in which selfishness and natural partiality are kept under control. This is also why he vehemently argues that 'the generosity of men is very limited' and 'it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country'.[81] It cannot be assumed that the prevailing system of justice is based on natural benevolence, which could only mean that it excludes most of humanity from its scope. It is remarkable that both Mandeville and Hume forcefully attack the pre-eminent position of natural generosity in the prevailing ethical systems, which in their opinion would interfere with a more equitable way of deciding what is right and wrong. Their intention was to explain how men began their moral development, in a wild and uncultivated state, from natural morality fully based on natural motives, and how, during the long course of the civilising process, they were forced to face the fact that their natural judgement was always partial and tied to the circumstances (no matter how right it might have felt). Hence,

79. Duncan Forbes also pointed out that 'Hume deliberately rejected the continuity between family and civil society'; see Forbes, *Hume's philosophical politics*, p.75. From a perspective of moral philosophy, Rachel Cohon has also written that 'it is not only my selfishness which will lead me to use force or stealth to make off with the fruits of your labour or the whole of our joint product. My partiality to my own friends and family will lead to the same sort of behaviour'; see Cohon, 'Hume's difficulty with the virtue of honesty', p.96. Regarding the same argument about the contradiction between natural virtues and civil society, see also Baron, 'Hume's noble lie', p.545.
80. T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489. This inherent problem of men turning to their natural ideas of morality in order to justify their own actions is a significant point for understanding Hume's moral philosophy and I will treat it later concerning both justice and politeness.
81. T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602.

men eventually came to fix particular artificial rules restricting the movement of their natural passions. The immediate consequence of this paradigmatic change in morals was that they were then able to advance their own interests, which in turn created a new sense of a moral need to uphold a system that did not depend on their partial judgement, but that nevertheless served their self-interest. This is what the conjectural history of civil society is all about. It is what I wish to study in detail, having established that this development, in the strict sense of the term, was fully dependent upon artificial principles.

No non-moral motive for artificial virtues

According to David Hume, justice is an artificial virtue founded on a previous human convention. Bernard Mandeville put forward a similar hypothesis.[82] Before beginning to examine Hume's views on artificial virtues and the conjectural development of moral institutions I should clarify one point that will considerably help in the task. Not only do we have to look beyond human nature for a foundation for moral institutions that enable the civilising process, we must also realise that it is simply impossible to find a natural (or non-moral) motive for these artificial virtues because Hume states that none exists.

What still disturbs many philosophically oriented commentators is the supposed tension between Hume's overall definition of morality and artificial virtues. In what way is an artificial virtue to be considered a virtue? Before acknowledging the possibility of a virtue that does not originate in human nature, Hume claims that '*no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality*'.[83] The problem is that a few pages later he seems to refute his own system of morals, stating that 'we have naturally no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a

82. See p.96-99 above.
83. T 3.2.1.7; SBN 479.

circle'.[84] Some philosophers interested in 'Humean' morality have taken the requirement of a non-moral motive behind a virtuous action very seriously, and painstakingly considered different explanations of how Hume's system of ethics meets this criterion or fails to do so.[85] This is problematic because Hume states unambiguously as he closes his analysis that instead of looking for some separate motive 'we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv'd from nature'.[86]

In my view this condition simply does not apply to artificial virtues. More explicitly, according to Hume it is precarious to think that it might. The often-quoted passage in which he seems to apply the requirement of a non-moral motive to artificial virtues is an illustration of what requirements justice would have to meet if it were a natural virtue.[87] In making such a claim I am not seeking to work my way around Hume's circle argument; my contention is rather that in his system it is relevant not to suppose that artificial virtues have to meet the criterion.[88] What Hume does is to point out that there is a significant difference between natural and artificial virtues. Failure to realise this, and to imagine instead that artificial virtues have to have their motivating basis in human nature in the same manner as natural virtues do, will lead to confusion and, as Hume points out, jeopardise the scheme of justice and other artificial virtues that are regulated by general rules.[89] Hence the idea of there being natural (or non-moral) motives behind an artificial virtue is not only confusing, it is also unwarranted.

Hume argues this in his third point in the section, entitled 'Some farther reflexions concerning justice and injustice'. He

84. T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
85. On the common topic of moral motivation in Hume's philosophy, see, for example, Donald Hubin, 'What's special about Humeanism', *Nous* 33 (1999), p.30-45.
86. T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
87. T 3.1.2; SBN 477-84.
88. On this theme, see Don Garrett, 'The first motive to justice: Hume's circle argument squared', *Hume studies* 33 (2007), p.257-88.
89. About general rules and the role of a philosopher, see Richard Serjeantson, 'Hume's general rules and the "Chief business of philosophers"', in *Impressions of Hume*, ed. Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail (Oxford, 2005), p.187-212.

considers what happens if we make the mistake of thinking that an artificial virtue is founded on common principles of human nature, in other words on some natural motive. He claims first that in 'the ordinary course of human actions' the mind is never restrained 'by any general and universal rules' but acts according to 'its present motives and inclination'.[90] The circumstances always define naturally motivated human judgement and, as a consequence, 'if on some occasions' we try to 'form' strictly from our own experience 'something like *general rules* for our conduct' what always happens is that 'these rules are not perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions'.[91] Any rules that can be formed from particular experience in 'the ordinary course of human actions' are only 'something like *general rules*' and not general rules *per se*. In contrast, 'the laws of justice' are 'universal and perfectly inflexible', thus they 'can never be deriv'd from nature' nor could they 'be the immediate offspring of any natural motive or inclination'.[92] Hume is very clear about man's incapacity to form a coherent system of justice based on natural passions.

As I have pointed out, the reason why this section is significant is not the commonplace fact that justice, according to Hume, is an artificial virtue, but the explicit proof that he was trying to convince his audience why they should not try to look for non-moral motives behind artificial virtues. After conducting the above mentioned analysis he considers the example of a 'dispute for an estate': one of the quarrellers is 'rich, a fool', 'a batchelor' and 'my enemy', whereas 'the other poor, a man of sense', who 'has a numerous family' and is 'my friend'.[93] The whole point of this example is to show what would happen to civil society if the rules of justice were to be based on natural sentiments of morality, which are the only non-moral motives we have. The consequences would be dreadful. For the sake of argument, and not because it was his own premise, Hume takes the position that 'no action can be either morally good or evil, unless there be some

90. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 531.
91. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 531.
92. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
93. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.

natural passion or motive to impel us to it, or deter us from it', which is the same requirement of a non-moral motive that he suggests in section 3.2.1.[94] The conclusion he draws from this premise is evident. If we are to resolve the dispute based on our 'natural motives' we 'must' do whatever we can 'to procure the estate to' the poor family man.[95] This is, of course, contrary to Hume's idea of justice.

In real life we also have to consider 'the right and property of the persons' that restrain our judgement instead of trusting our natural motives. We need an inflexible general rule that has nothing to do with the way we would naturally feel about right and wrong, which is not a constant principle, as he points out, but varies according to the circumstances. If 'all property depends on morality' and 'all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions', and these, in turn, 'are only directed by particular motives', he concludes, it is 'evident' that 'such a partial conduct must be suitable to the strictest morality, and cou'd never be a violation of property'.[96] Thus, if we were taking the suggested premise as a real one, without exception in this particular example our judgement would transfer the estate to the poor man, regardless of the question of 'rightful' ownership. Justice based on any natural motives would always be partial. As one would expect, this is an absurd claim and, as Hume indicates, it was not his position, but a demonstration of what would happen if someone, no matter how earnestly, tried to construct a system of justice trusting his natural understanding. In short, this person would always end up building his system of justice on natural motives, which are 'a very improper foundation for such rigid inflexible rules as the laws of nature'.[97]

The point is, therefore, that if men were able to brush aside impressions of the artificial moral rules derived from education, they would go back to their original principles and act according to the way they naturally felt about what is right and wrong. All

94. *'no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality'.* T 3.2.1.7; SBN 479.
95. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
96. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
97. T 3.2.6.10; SBN 533.

they would be doing would be to 'conduct themselves' by 'particular judgements' that 'wou'd produce an infinite confusion in human society' and 'the avidity and partiality of men wou'd quickly bring disorder into the world'. This is the reason why justice is not based on natural motives, and why men need to be 'restrain'd by some general and inflexible principles'. In that justice cannot be partial, and our natural motives always lead us to a partial judgement, there is no primary non-moral motive on which artificial virtues are based. Instead, 'men have establish'd' certain 'principles' in order 'to restrain themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public interest'.[98] Hume continues, suggesting that 'these rules, then, are artificially invented for a certain purpose, and are contrary to the common principles of human nature, which accommodate themselves to circumstances, and have no stated invariable method of operation'.[99] The 'laws of nature' are not founded on natural motives. They 'can only be deriv'd from human conventions, when men perceiv'd the disorders that result from following their natural and variable principles'.[100]

The opening section of *Part II* of Book 3 of the *Treatise*, in which Hume first takes up the topic of justice, has understandably attracted a vast amount of attention from scholars, and it might certainly seem as if he were imposing the requirement of a non-moral motive on any moral theory, including his own description of artificial virtues. Even though the section is admittedly very strangely written, it only demonstrates what conditions an artificial virtue would have to meet if it were to become a natural virtue. Nevertheless, what quite effectively proves that he was only putting forward a hypothetical premise is the *reductio ad absurdum* argument I have just analysed, which demolishes the idea that a sense of justice could be based on any 'natural motive'. Here Hume specifically attacks this idea. A close reading of what he wrote on the requirement of a non-moral motive in section 3.2.1 reveals that it only 'appears' that 'all virtuous actions derive their

98. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
99. T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532-33.
100. T 3.2.6.10; SBN 533.

merit only from virtuous motives' and this 'first virtuous motive', as he emphasises 'must be some other natural motive or principle'.[101] If this were also a requirement for artificial virtues, Hume's system would not make any sense whatsoever. However, as he goes on to explain, it only concerns natural virtues, such as 'natural affection',[102] and it cannot hold true for the artificial virtues that are 'not deriv'd from nature', but arise 'artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and human conventions'.[103] What is more, since he emphasises that we should not look for natural motives for artificial virtues because it would be confusing and harmful to our established system, I think we may conclude that the requirement for a non-moral motive does not apply to artificial virtues.

The conjectural development of artificial moral institutions

In order to understand Hume's *Treatise*, more attention should be paid to the different transitional phases in his account of the conjectural history of civil society. He was not a contract theorist or an advocate of the four-stage theory, yet the distinction between different kinds of societies made all the difference to his understanding of natural and artificial virtues alike.[104]

Hume was in agreement with Mandeville that, in a sense, the 'very first state and situation' of a savage 'may justly be esteem'd social'.[105] Without hesitation he acknowledges that 'the state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and may subsist with the conjunction of many families'.[106] According to Hobbes, it is possible to find a social condition only in a civil society based on state sovereignty. Thus, we may detect some change in this regard. Mandeville had already explained that, relying on the natural principles implanted in human nature, the first wild family expanded into a clan that coexisted

101. T 3.2.1.4; SBN 478.
102. T 3.2.1.5; SBN 478.
103. T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
104. The significant division between natural society and a large society has been also stressed by Forbes, *Hume's philosophical politics*, p.75.
105. T 3.2.2.15; SBN 493.
106. T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541.

without fixed government. Similarly, Hume emphasises that 'all societies on their first formation' are 'so barbarous and uninstructed' that 'many years must elapse before these cou'd encrease to such a degree, as to disturb men in the enjoyment of peace and concord'. Hume's intent was to bring out a distinction between small, clan-based societies and large civil societies. Only 'an encrease of riches and possessions' would eventually force men to stop relying on their natural bonds.[107] But again, this does not mean that Hume's conception of civil society could be understood in any other terms than political society.

It is against this divisional background that Hume's well-known assertion that it is 'by society alone' that a 'man' may overcome his 'unnatural conjunction of infirmity, and of necessity' and 'raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them' should be analysed.[108] The first state of society is extremely barbarous, yet that is when artificial moral development starts. Hume practically annuls the role of any natural generosity by equating it to extreme selfishness, thus the problem is, of course, how men acquire a form of morality that functions in a large society. One detail Hume explicates much more comprehensively than Mandeville (which is understandable given that Hume's medium was a treatise and Mandeville's a dialogue) is how radical the idea of an artificial basis for morality is. The role of artificial virtues is to get men to act contrary to their original principles and natural sentiments, and at times against their natural understanding of morality. People might not grasp how uncompromising a suggestion this is because they are used to living in a society in which laws, custom and honour have replaced the natural conscience, and are inclined to prefer invented rules to the natural turn of mind. However, in the eighteenth century this was more sweeping than stating that all moral distinctions were artificial. Recognition of the effective contrast between natural and artificial virtues makes apparent the need, at times, to cast aside original natural inclinations and choose an artificial system invented by men. The dichotomy between natural and artificial virtues is more devastating to the 'Hutchesonian' system of benevolence than Hobbist moral scepticism, which claims that all moral principles are artificial inventions.

107. T 3.2.8.2; SBN 540.
108. T 3.2.2.3; SBN 485.

Another common feature in both Mandeville's and Hume's account of the conjectural history of civil society is their firm circumscription of the role of reason in the civilising process. Hume writes that in the 'wild uncultivated state' it is 'impossible' for savages 'by study and reflexion alone' to 'be able to attain' the knowledge of the 'advantages' of 'society'.[109] The point is not that savages are unable to use the faculty of reason, it is rather that men can only learn from experience, thus the role of reason cannot be at centre stage when the history of civil society is played out. The role of reason in the civilising process is severely limited and replaced by social experience.

The question of civil society and sociability concerns man's passions. Precisely like Mandeville, Hume points out the critical change in the first children compared to their wild parents. 'Custom and habit' start to operate 'on the tender minds of the children' and 'in a little time' they make 'them sensible of the advantages, which they may reap from society'.[110] As mentioned, one defining quality of a sociable creature for Mandeville was an insatiable desire to meliorate his condition. Hume mentions the very same feature in the *Treatise*: this desire is such a dominating characteristic of human nature that he goes on to declare that men would 'never be so foolish' as to agree upon anything but in hopes of 'bettering their own condition'.[111] Relying on this theoretical backdrop he suggests that with the generous aid of 'custom and habit' the children are 'by degrees' fashioned for society and slowly start to rub 'off those rough corners and untoward affections' that prevent 'their coalition'.[112] Consequently, 'insensibly and by degrees', within the course of many generations men eventually become 'sensible of the misery' of 'their savage and solitary condition'. Instead of guarding their natural liberty, people recognise 'the advantages that wou'd result

109. T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.
110. T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.
111. T 3.2.9.2; SBN 550.
112. T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.

from society', seek 'each other's company' and make 'an offer of mutual protection and assistance'.[113] Thus, the motive to seek society is that men have 'become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it', and simultaneously, 'from their early education in society' they acquire 'a new affection to company and conversation' that will slowly start moulding their self-image to be tenaciously dependent upon the opinion of others.[114]

The description of the process and the focus of the conjectural history of civil society are similar (or partly identical) in *Part II* and the *Treatise*, but so is the intellectual scenario that explains how this historical development of artificial moral institutions takes place. In both the role of the countervailing passions is put forward as the primary civilising device, the idea being to play them against themselves. What is more, the passion that has to be redirected is not only self-love or self-interest, but also self-liking or pride. A remarkable feature of the *Treatise* is that it meticulously follows Mandeville's distinction between self-love and self-applause. Hume, like his Dutch predecessor in anatomy of morals, adopts the idea that there are two original selfish passions in human nature that need to be regulated by strict rules in order to be cultivated, the direct 'passion of self-interest'[115] and the indirect passion of pride.[116] Civil society, according to this outline, derived partly perhaps from Pierre Nicole and (what some scholars have come to call) the neo-Augustinian tradition, is built by nurturing these passions.[117] The point is that these two distinct passions give rise to the two corresponding moral institutions. Every civil society is forced to form these two general outlines of artificial morality because of the passion in question. Scholars have previously singled out justice and politeness as important virtues, but not as interrelated or connected.[118] Thus

113. T 3.2.3.3; SBN 502-503.
114. T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
115. T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.
116. In the *Treatise*, Hume uses the terms 'pride', 'vanity' and 'self-satisfaction' respectively.
117. On Nicole and Mandeville, see Guion, *Pierre Nicole: moraliste*, p.56-57, and for a moral elaborated argument about his particular relevance for Mandeville's distinction between self-love and self-liking, see Tolonen, 'Self-love and self-liking', p.131-49.
118. The relevance of justice is a commonplace in Hume's political philosophy, but the role of politeness is often ignored; see, however, Johnson, 'Hume on manners and the civil condition', p.209-22.

far, no one has pointed out the apparent symmetry between the passions and the equivalent artificial virtues, nor that Hume saw them as two sides of the same coin.

In making a distinction between self-love and self-liking we are referring to two different passions. Most of the other artificial virtues that Hume studies in detail, such as promise-keeping, allegiance and the laws of nations are part of justice or are derived directly from it. They all belong to self-love. Hume's system also allows other artificial virtues such as chastity. However, the intellectual framework underlying chastity is different from that of justice and politeness. In the case of chastity the idea is to curb the passion of lust, whereas in both justice and politeness it is to cultivate the passion in question.[119] As Hume tells his audience, even when 'the fundamental laws of nature' (in other words, justice) 'impose' a 'restraint' on 'the passions of men', in fact they 'are only a more artful and more refin'd way of satisfying them'.[120] The same holds true for politeness, the idea being that 'good-breeding' requires 'that we shou'd avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show' the passion of 'pride'. However, 'pride, or self-applause' is 'always agreeable to ourselves' and 'thus self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character'.[121] In the case of justice and politeness Hume introduces the notion of a circle of refinement, in which the moral institution strengthens as the passion of self-love or self-liking is encouraged. This redirected spiral is altogether familiar in Mandeville. According to Hume, in order to be able to cultivate pride 'we must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour', whereas the actual feeling we nurture is diametrically opposed to this theatrical mask.[122] There is little doubt that with regard to the pivotal artificial virtues Hume was

119. On the central importance of lust in Mandeville, see p.68, 73, 100, 102 above.
120. T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526.
121. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
122. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 598.

putting forward the idea of cultivating the passion in question by redirecting its course.

The passions of self-interest (self-love) and pride (self-liking) are not to be confined but advanced, and the idea is to 'prevent the opposition' of them and not to curb them. Without giving 'a new direction' to these 'natural passions'[123] through the laws of nature and rules of good breeding, a large society would disperse. Only at this point does the idea of morality, which is essentially an inclination to follow these rules, come into play. When 'justice' is 'esteem'd an artificial and not a natural virtue', as Hume famously maintains, 'honour, and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience, and produce, in some degree, the same effects'.[124] In other words, what Hume does in his *Treatise* is counter the common eighteenth-century understanding of justice and politeness as natural virtues. He aims instead at a Mandevillean goal, the circle of refinement, where in the end men can boost their pride and enter into new spheres with the generous aid of material wealth, which consequently leads society to a situation in which manners and customs are reciprocally refined.

The distinction between the two self-regarding passions has gone unnoticed for the simple reason that Hume mainly concentrates on justice in Book 3 of the *Treatise*. He had plausible reasons for doing this. He may have adopted the distinction between self-interest and pride from Mandeville, but he continues developing this theory of a civil society. Explaining how self-love is a direct passion and pride indirect, he makes it obvious that controlling the unbound movement of self-love is the primary object in any large society. Because 'interest' is the 'passion' that is the hardest to restrain, 'the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession' is prescribed in 'all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society'. An indirect passion, on the other hand, does not set men immediately into action, and 'vanity' is not directly disparaging to society and can be considered 'a bond of union among men'.[125]

123. T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521.
124. T 2.1.10.2; SBN 310.
125. T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491. The Mandevillean tone in Hume's discussion of vanity was noted already in Forbes, *Hume's philosophical politics*, p.85. Forbes, however, links Hume's discussion of pride to Malebranche instead of Mandeville; see Forbes, *Hume's philosophical politics*, p.107.

Thus, justice is the foundational artificial virtue and it is understandable that Hume concentrates mainly on explaining its position in civil society in Book 3, even if it is only one of the 'virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessities of mankind'.[126] This is also understandable when we remember the importance placed on the natural law tradition in Scottish universities at the time.[127]

Nevertheless, Book 3 is not only about justice. Hume makes an explicit analogy between the two primary moral institutions, stating that 'as we establish the *laws of nature*, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest', in a similar manner 'we establish the *rules of good-breeding*, in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive'.[128] He does this in a section tellingly entitled 'Greatness of mind'. I take this analogy to be one of the main components of Hume's moral and political thought. One could not express with more clarity that there are primarily two self-regarding passions that need to be redirected by general rules in order to enable men to cultivate them better. Furthermore, if instead of analysing what Hume writes in Book 3 of the *Treatise* one also takes into account Book 2, 'Of the passions', the relevance of pride is obvious.

Hume explains why it is that societies establish in the same way the rules of justice that come to form the rules of good breeding, which essentially are meant to hide the sentiments of pride. The rules of politeness that prohibit men from showing their pride were originally formed for the same reason as the laws of justice. It is 'our own pride, which makes us so much displeas'd with the pride of other people'. The reason why the exposed 'vanity' of other people is 'insupportable' is 'merely' the fact that 'we are

126. T 3.2.1.1; SBN 477.
127. See Philip Milton, 'David Hume and the eighteenth-century conception of natural law', *Legal studies* 2 (1982), p.14-33, and other collected essays in *Hume and law*, ed. Ken Mackinnon (Surrey, 2012).
128. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.

vain' also.[129] This is the point that Mandeville was stressing just a few years earlier: we have to be able to cultivate our vanity, in a similar manner as our avidity, without disturbing the pride of others. According to Hume, if it depended on man's good nature, benevolence or simple regard for the public, it would be utterly impossible. On the other hand, the rigid rules of good breeding ought to do the trick that was beyond natural virtues or implanted ideas of morality. The artificial virtue in this case also creates an inclination to follow the rules of politeness once they have been established for some time. We have no interest in following them before we have developed an inclination to be polite towards people in general, except for the fact that we are concerned about our reputation and are aware that through sympathy other people will spontaneously counter an unpleasant feeling when they meet with impolite behaviour. We are proud and vain, but our need to use artificial means to disguise these inner feelings is of prime importance.

The distinction between self-love and self-liking also explains why Hume's notion of justice concentrates solely on property.[130] He also has other methodical tools with which to explain social existence. The entire burden of political sociability does not rely on justice, and it is the centrality of pride that explains, to a large extent, the motivation to follow the rules of justice. Thus, some of the significant points Hume makes are exactly the same ones Mandeville had emphasised previously. It is highly relevant that justice and politeness are recognised as interrelated concepts and seen as part of the same gradually advancing scheme of conjectural history. I will first bring some novel points to the more familiar question of justice, and then I will turn to politeness. My aim is to show how politeness was a foundational theme for Hume before the *Treatise*, and how he developed this discussion in his works.

129. T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596.

130. James Moore, for example, ends his seminal discussion on Hume's theory of justice thus: 'the experience of the two centuries of social life that have passed since Hume wrote requires us to recognize that social justice involves more than security for owners of property'; see Moore, 'Hume's theory of justice and property', p.119. Haakonssen also finds it 'odd' that 'Hume's concept of rights that are protected by rules of justice' are restricted 'to property rights'; see Haakonssen, *Science of the legislator*, p.13.

iii. Self-love and justice

It should be borne in mind that Hume was developing his notion of justice in terms of a conjectural history. I find interpretations that take Book 3 of the *Treatise* as a systematic ethical theory confusing. One persistent problem is the commonly and obscurely used idea of the prevalence of 'enlightened self-interest' in his system. Annette Baier, among others, derives the moral substance in Hume's theory from the idea of respecting conventions exemplified in the idea of two people rowing in stroke based on tacit agreement. She has an excellent understanding of Hume's moral psychology that includes features that are quite complex. Her account, however, does not take into consideration what Hume says about the difference between small and large communities. Baier turns the question continuously back to settings that concern only small communities and in her reading of justice she holds fast to the idea of 'enlightened self-interest' without accepting that this is only true in small communities and in large communities actual moral substance that might hold a smaller community together is replaced by political rules that produce morality or a sense of duty to respect these rules. This kind of second order morality does not transcend rule obedience becoming any kind of worthier motivation to follow rules. In Hume's system, only in small societies does there exist a more obvious connection between moral approval and moral motivation. In Baier's scheme, when we abstract a convention to involve a larger number of people who do not necessarily know each other, in the same proportion the need to emphasise the role of reflective quality in our moral judgements grows larger, which is in contrast to Hume's own intention to explain how civil society is able to function with a minimal level of reflection.[131]

A good reason for being cautious when analysing the idea of self-interest in the *Treatise* is to avoid mistaking it for another line of answers to Hobbism based on an entirely different view of human nature.[132] It was the likes of Ralph Cudworth who

131. See Baier, *The Cautious jealous virtue*, p.46-55, 66-82.

132. On Hume and Hobbism, see Flage, 'Hume's Hobbism and his anti-Hobbism', p.369-82. Flage argues that Hume was 'a mitigated Hobbist', because he based

introduced the argument of (what tends to be called) 'enlightened self-interest' as an immediate response to Hobbism, claiming to overrule the idea that private 'self-interest is the primary measure and standard of our actions'.[133] According to Cudworth, true self-interest counters this mistaken idea, and when 'self-interest' is 'rightly understood and taken in its due latitude', it 'not only' denotes men 'in *private capacitys*, but also as *political* and *sociable creatures*'. This, in turn, means that 'what is term'd *self-interest*' falls 'in with the last end and greatest happiness of nature'.[134] Thus, the greatest public good is our true interest, and reasonable men are able to pursue this end.

What stands in contrast between Cudworth and Hume's account is evidently the role of reason, but most importantly, the gap between these different lines of thought is created by the contrasting conceptions of human nature. Hume would not have agreed with Cudworth's analysis of men's 'social' and 'political' capacity and how they are 'by their nature and condition *sociable*', in other words that they naturally prioritise the greater good over their private self-interest.[135] According to Hume, there is no implanted principle in mankind that points towards the greatest public good.

To use the concept of enlightened self-interest as a generalisation of Hume's social thought is misleading because it turns him into a quasi-rationalist who claimed that, particularly in large civil societies, men were able to reasonably pursue their long-term interests and control their self-love (even without equating long-term interest to the public good). Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the *Treatise*. Something more dynamic and

justice on conventional moral rules as Hobbes did, but differs on the question of moral value. Only Paul Russell has argued that Hume is an outright 'Hobbist'; see Russell, 'Hume's *Treatise* and Hobbes's *The Elements of law*', p.41-63; Russell, 'A Hobbist Tory: Johnson on Hume', *Hume studies* 16 (1990), p.75-80; and Russell, *The Riddle of Hume's Treatise*, p.12-82.

133. Ralph Cudworth, *True intellectual system of the universe: abridgments* (London, printed for Andrew Bell, 1706), vol.2, p.787. Cudworth's confutations were seen to be worth printing almost thirty years after they first appeared in print in the 1670s.
134. Cudworth, *True intellectual system*, vol.2, p.787.
135. Cudworth, *True intellectual system*, vol.2, p.793.

external than an individual understanding of long-term interests is needed in large societies in order to make men respect the property of complete strangers. The whole point of artificial virtues is to explain how people act according to established rules, even if it is hard to think of anything 'more fluctuating and inconsistent' than 'the will of man'[136] and if 'human conduct', in general, 'is irregular and uncertain'.[137] Furthermore, since Hume emphasises that it is common in large societies for men to 'act knowingly against their interest' and that 'the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them', one has to realise that the concept of enlightened self-interest is not the cornerstone of his system.[138] The key is to understand that there is a comprehensive difference between how a convention of justice is first established in a small society and how it will eventually function in a large society. Self-interest is the first motive to act in a judicious way in simple and rude societies, but its role changes when people enter into societies managed by government and controlled by inflexible laws.

'Society', Hume writes, is 'absolutely necessary for the well-being of men',[139] and its 'chief advantage' is 'the improvement' of 'such possessions as we have acquir'd by our industry and good fortune'. In other words, it is, first and foremost, meant to serve (in the strict definition of the concept) man's self-interest. If the main benefit of a civil society concerns self-love, it is the very same source that is also seen as the 'chief impediment' of society because it creates the '*instability*' of the 'possession' of goods that are scarce.[140] Thus, it is 'certain, that self-love, when it acts at its liberty, instead of engaging us with honest actions, is the source of all injustice and violence'.[141] This problem of 'instability' is inherent in any human society because of human nature. No set of 'moralists or politicians' could ever overcome the fact that man is a selfish creature.[142] We are 'naturally selfish', unable to

136. T 2.1.10.7; SBN 313.
137. T 2.3.1.11; SBN 403.
138. T 2.3.3.10; SBN 418.
139. T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526.
140. T 3.2.2.7; SBN 487-88.
141. T 3.2.1.10; SBN 480.
142. T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521.

change our nature and never 'induc'd to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage, which we have no hope of obtaining but by such a performance'.[143] We cannot undo our selfishness and the only thing that can be done, and has to be done, is to correct and restrain 'the *natural* movements' of this passion.[144] Thus, David Hume invokes the conjectural development of justice to explain the redirection of the interested passion through the establishment of the 'fundamental laws of nature'[145] that 'are as necessary to the support of society' as society is to self-interest; and how these laws, in turn, provide the basis for the laws of society that conclude the conjectural development of the artificial virtue of justice.[146]

An interesting question in Hume's idea of the evolution of justice concerns how man came to realise that 'we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions' when we are simultaneously 'preserving society' instead of 'running into the solitary and forlorn condition' that leads to 'violence' and 'universal license'.[147] The answer is two-fold. When first establishing the convention that gave rise to the idea of justice, men had to have some sort of impression of concrete material advantage. However, once justice had been forged into a universal principle guarded by the laws of society they no longer necessarily needed to (or at times could) be conscious of this interest.[148] Provided that they had been educated in a civil society they would entertain sentiments that approved of acts performed by other people in accordance with the laws of justice, and would disapprove of acts that were not. Moral sentiment arising from education is not a

143. T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519. The case is crucially different, of course, with our loved ones and friends, who are not 'strangers' and neither do we hope to reap advantage from them in order to show our kindness. They belong to the sphere of our confined generosity, which indeed is natural and, in this sense, unselfish by nature.
144. T 3.2.1.10; SBN 480.
145. I.e. justice as an extended definition covering the 'stability of possession', 'its transference by consent' and 'the performance of promises'.
146. T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526.
147. T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.
148. On a similar idea in Mandeville, see p.88-90, 101-102 above. On a similar idea in Butler, see p.64 above.

sufficient motive for acting according to the laws of justice: it only approves and disapproves of actions performed by other people. Granted, it indirectly affects the actions we perform, but without social, physical and fiscal sanctions, fear of reproach and a loss of self-liking this moral sentiment alone would never become a moral obligation. Thus, one can detect two stages of justice in the conjectural history of civil society. These stages follow the fundamental division between small and large societies and concern the 'natural' and 'moral obligation' of justice.[149] I will now examine this question starting with the first convention that proceeds from the impression of interest to the idea of justice.

According to Hume, there is no original 'principle of human mind' that could 'make us overcome the temptations arising from our circumstances'. If men in the wild condition somehow acquired an 'idea of justice' without any impression of the underlying interest, it could 'never' inspire them 'with an equitable conduct towards each other'.[150] In order to be motivated to establish a convention that stabilises property, men need to have a vivid impression that this convention of justice is within their interest. In a small society they arrive at this through concrete rewards rather than abstractly realising the advantages. Given that 'the principal disturbance in society arises from' external goods, men 'must seek for a remedy' that 'can be done after no other manner, than by a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry'.[151] Note how accurately Hume follows the idea of countervailing passions here. His description of the establishment of the convention of justice fully adheres to the idea that 'there is no passion' that would be 'capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction'.[152] Thus, he was also able to conclude that it was the same passion of 'self-love' (that first rendered 'men so incom-

149. T 3.2.2.23; SBN 498.
150. T 3.2.2.8; SBN 488, Mandeville, *Part II*, p.222-23.
151. T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
152. T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.

modious to each other') that now took 'a new and more convenient direction' and produced 'the rules of justice'. Remarkably, it was also the same passion that was 'the *first* motive of their observance'.[153] In other words, the 'real origin' of the 'rules' that determine 'property, right, and obligation' is 'self-love'.[154] With reference to a small society, Hume concludes: 'every one knows what he may safely possess; and the passions are restrain'd in their partial and contradictory motions'.[155]

There are important points to note in this basic account. First of all, the description is confined to small societies and the beginning of the conjectural development of justice.[156] Hume stresses that 'all the members of the society' have to enter this 'convention'. He was an outspoken and well-known critic of the contract theory, and he definitely did not extend such claims to a large society.[157] However, there is no reason not to take the remark about 'all the members of society' literally, given what Hume was, in fact, doing: he was dealing with small clan-based societies and not analysing civil society in general. When discussing 'natural obligation to justice', in other words 'interest' in section 3.2.2 he was concentrating solely on the first instance of the convention of establishing justice in a natural society, in which all the connections between members are personal.[158] In this family-based society (which he also dubbed 'narrow and contracted society') everyone is affiliated with each other and the members are still largely affected by their natural generosity.[159] This is also the reason why the examples he invokes are particular and concrete, such as the famous case of the 'two men' pulling 'the oars of the boat', who 'do it by an agreement or convention' even when 'they have never given promises to each other'.[160] To take these examples out of context and to use them

153. T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.
154. T 3.2.6.6; SBN 528-29.
155. T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
156. On small society in Mandeville, see p.81-83 above.
157. This is widely accepted; the dissenting voice is David Gauthier, 'David Hume, contractarian', *The Philosophical review*, 88 (1979), p.3-38.
158. T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
159. T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499.
160. T 3.2.2.10; SBN 490.

as an illustration of Hume's system as a whole and of his idea of justice in general is to totally misunderstand his intentions. Only having realised that he was referring to small, uncultivated societies can one easily talk about enlightened self-interest: in other words these simpletons were consciously following their rules of justice because the small number and plainness of their social relations made it hard for them to lose sight of what was within their interest. Thus, it is understandable that Hume describes the rise of justice as a relatively easy, although gradual, process: for 'every member' of this primitive 'society is sensible' of the 'interest' in stabilising property. A person expresses this sentiment to his 'fellows, along with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions by it, on condition that others will do the same'. Therefore, nothing else is a 'requisite to induce any one of them to perform an act of justice, who has the first opportunity'. This, in turn, 'becomes an example to others'. It is in this manner that 'justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos'd to be common to all, and where every single act is perform'd in expectation that others are to perform the like'.[161]

Thus one can see how neatly Hume was able to close the circle of the first foundation of 'justice' that 'takes its rise from human conventions'[162] in small societies, concluding that it was evident that '*only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin*'.[163] Later, when emphasising the role of the government in the 'execution and decision of justice', he points out that enlightened self-interest might enable 'two neighbours' to 'agree to drain a meadow', but it is 'very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such action'.[164] He invokes such examples to prove his point that the idea of enlightened self-interest operating smoothly in a small society can no longer be regarded as the basis of justice when the society grows out of its wretched and uncultivated beginning. By and

161. T 3.2.2.24; SBN 498.
162. T 3.2.2.16; SBN 494.
163. T 3.2.2.18; SBN 495.
164. T 3.2.7.8; SBN 538.

large, one should take a completely different approach when examining how justice functions in large societies.

Moral sentiments in large societies

If Hume's idea of self-interest and large societies differs from Cudworth's analysis of enlightened self-interest, another eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher who in a significant way reflected Cudworth's view was Francis Hutcheson.[165] In one sense Hutcheson has rightly been interpreted as Hume's predecessor because he diminishes the role of reason in moral philosophy by emphasising the function of moral sentiments. His overall account differs somewhat in logic from Cudworth's staunch vindication of reason. Nevertheless, and more importantly, it is the uniform understanding of human nature that brings these interpretations of moral propensities together and distinguishes them clearly from the work of Mandeville and Hume. This contrast becomes obvious if one compares their ideas about how a large society is able to function.

Hutcheson's solution for large societies, like Cudworth's, is unproblematic. The idea of universal benevolence is an overriding concept in his system, and he was quick to reach the conclusion that 'mankind', in simple terms, is 'capable of large extensive ideas of *great societies*'. In support of this idea he suggests that it 'is' duly 'expected' from men that '*general benevolence* should continually direct and limit, not only their *selfish affections*, but even their *nearer attachments* to others'. In other words, man's confined generosity does not stand in contrast with the public interest and the 'desire of *publick* good, and aversion to *publick* misery' in the natural course of human actions; it overcomes the 'desire of *positive private advantages*'. Universal benevolence forces men to 'abstain from any action which would be positively pernicious or hurtful to *mankind*, however *beneficial* it might be to *themselves*, or their *favourites*'.[166] Hutcheson bases the motive of

165. On the putative link between Cudworth and Shaftesbury (which might easily also be extended to Hutcheson), see Norton, *David Hume: common-sense moralist*, p.27 and the works cited there.

166. Francis Hutcheson, *An Essay on the nature and the conduct of the passions and affections*, p.311.

virtuous action on the passion of universal benevolence. Nevertheless, in a sense he comes close to Cudworth's analysis in claiming that because of the succinct taxonomy of human passions men can trust their faculty of reason regarding the preference between right and wrong, and are able to choose actions that are within the best interest of the public. The role of passions plays a foundational role in Hutcheson's reasoning, but he also reverts to an analysis similar to Cudworth's and equates the public good with enlightened self-interest. However, he was not the only one applying this strategy. It seems that one way to solve the problem of confined generosity was simply to deny that 'the partiality implanted in us to our own interests and welfare' was 'an inclination' that interfered 'with the publick good'.[167]

Curiously, according to Hutcheson, it is the 'power of *reason* and *reflection*, by which we may see what course of action will naturally tend to procure us the most valuable *gratifications* of all our desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary *pains*'. The 'course of action' that 'naturally' provides 'the most valuable gratifications of all our desires' is the one that creates the largest amount of public good. If happiness is dependent upon the public good that is created by human action, and it is the faculty of reason that directs the course of such action, I cannot see how Hutcheson's account of man in a large society would differ in this sense from Cudworth's theory. On the contrary, this line of thought gives Hutcheson good reason to conclude that humans naturally 'have wisdom sufficient to form ideas of *rights*, *laws*, *constitutions*; so as to preserve large societies in peace and prosperity, and promote a *general good* amidst all *the private interests*'.[168] In other words, his position is diametrically opposed to that of David Hume, who in his *Treatise* makes the case that it is the artificially established rules originally formed to serve man's private interests that define moral sentiments. In contrast, as Hutcheson put it, it is man's natural, other-regarding sentiments that delineate the rules that protect civil society.

167. [Anon.], *An Essay concerning the original of society, government, religion and laws, especially those of the penal kind* (London, printed for J. Clark and R. Hett, 1727), p.6.

168. Hutcheson, *An Essay on the nature and the conduct of the passions and affections*, p.181.

Hutcheson apparently thought that large societies did not pose any significant challenge to his moral philosophy. Men were wise and reasonable and if they followed their moral sense, civil society would remain a peaceful and happy place. The fact that he found the question of men in large societies unproblematic, however, is one of the weakest points of his moral theory. As Hume implies, why would it be necessary to place any emphasis on laws if benevolence was universal? If you 'encrease' the 'benevolence of men' to 'a sufficient degree' the whole institution of 'justice' is rendered 'useless', he writes.[169] As modern day interpreters we have to bring this explicit difference out clearly, and if we do not make a rigid distinction between the line of response to Hobbes that Hutcheson was pursuing, and the altogether different position that Hume and Mandeville held, we lose sight of the highly relevant split between a man in small societies and a man in large societies.

Hume makes explicit the division between small and large societies and the effect it has upon moral sentiments. Self-love and the sense of immediate advantage induce men in small societies to naturally 'lay themselves under the restraint of such rules, as may render their commerce more safe and commodious'. The first motive to form a convention of justice is self-interest that 'on the first formation of society' is 'sufficiently strong and forcible' to guide the actions of these uncivilised men. In contrast with this uncultivated society, problems concerning justice start to occur when 'society' becomes 'more numerous' and increases 'to a tribe or nation'. The immediate 'interest' becomes 'more remote', and men no longer 'perceive, that disorder and confusion' that follow 'upon every breach of these rules' they used to detect 'in a more narrow and contracted society'. However, if they are brought up to respect an established convention of justice that generations have followed they might 'frequently lose sight of' the 'interest' in 'maintaining order' of their 'own actions', but they would 'never fail to observe the prejudice' they 'receive' from 'the injustice' done by others.[170]

This is indeed an interesting point. What we disapprove of in

169. T 3.2.2.16; SBN 494-95.
170. T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499.

others we might be more than tempted to do ourselves. Or, even more succinctly, we might be unaware that we are breaking the rules but we still have a disapproving moral sentiment towards those who are guilty of the same injustice. One should bear in mind here that Hume was not in the business of colouring and recommending moral virtues, but was rather explaining the human understanding of morality.[171] Thus, it is understandable that he pointed out with such emphasis that man's moral outlook could be what some might call completely hypocritical. It is not that he wanted to highlight this contradiction in man's common way of thinking in order to moralise or condemn it as Pierre Bayle did, for example. In the end, such a hypocritical stance was vital for strengthening moral institutions, and it explains how civil society functions given that men are what they are. Even those who are motivated to act contrary to the established rules of justice disapprove of similar behaviour in others.

This logic of artificial virtues is not confined to justice, but concerns artificial virtues in general. The most explicit example is chastity.[172] First, chastity in women becomes a general rule when 'those, who have an interest' in their fidelity 'naturally disapprove of their infidelity, and all the approaches to it'. According to Hume's system of artificial virtues, this disapproving sentiment is also common among those 'who have no interest' in fidelity. They are simply 'carried along with the stream'.[173] Finally, as a notable consequence, Hume concludes that even 'batchelors, however debauch'd, cannot but be shock'd with any instance of lewdness

171. A point that James Moore has systematically emphasised. On logical accounts that try to prove certain inconsistencies in Hume's moral theory, see, for example, David Gauthier, 'Artificial virtues and the sensible knave', *Hume studies* 18 (1992), p.401-28; James King, 'Pride and Hume's sensible knave', *Hume studies* 25 (1999), p.123-37; and Cohon, 'Hume's difficulty with the virtue of honesty', p.91-112.
172. For a recent discussion on chastity with an anthropological approach, see Christopher Berry, 'Lusty women and loose imagination: Hume's philosophical anthropology of chastity', *History of political thought* 24 (2003), p.415-33.
173. T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572. Hume's ms. amendment to the first edition of *Treatise* added: and 'also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interest of society'; see SBN 671. The Clarendon Editions of the *Treatise* and *Abstract* incorporates Hume's corrections and manuscript amendments to his works, without pointing them out.

or impudence in women', which is clear proof of the authoritative grip that artificial moral institutions have on our opinions.[174] A man who seeks the company of a lewd woman cannot help his feelings of disapproval towards the very same person. What I would like to point out is that the intellectual framework underlying chastity is crucially different from justice and politeness. The idea in chastity is merely to curb the passion of lust, whereas in both justice and politeness the idea is to cultivate the passion in question. Hume's account of chastity for women in his *Treatise* seems to be quite common among Augustinian writers, formulated (with the exception of the idea of how a general rule might be extended to concern people who originally have no interest in a certain type of behaviour) by Pierre Bayle.[175]

Hume makes a similar case about the extension of the artificial virtue of justice: even if 'the injustice is so distant from us' that it cannot in any way 'affect our interest, it still displeases us'.[176] This is also where he claims that 'we partake of' people's 'uneasiness by *sympathy*'. Modern commentators have stressed the role of this mechanical faculty of receiving 'by communication' other people's 'inclinations and sentiments' that might be 'even contrary to our own'.[177] What Hume also points out is that the only direct way in which sympathy affects 'our own actions' is that 'we naturally *sympathize* with others in the sentiments they entertain of us'.[178] In other words, all he may have been saying about the connection between sympathy and moral motivation was that people tend to respect the rules of justice because they are dependent upon the opinions of others. If they break the rules others will disapprove of their actions and logically also of their character. One can perfectly well, and indeed should, apply these examples to artificial virtues *in toto*. Since men automatically

174. T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572.
175. Bayle, *Pensées diverses sur la comète* (Rotterdam, R. Leers, 1682), vol.2, p.clxiii-clxiv. For the English text, see Pierre Bayle, *Miscellaneous reflections occasion'd by the comet which appeared in December 1680* (London, printed for J. Morphew, 1708), vol.2, p.331-34.
176. T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499.
177. T 2.1.11.2; SBN 316.
178. T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499.

disapprove of breaching established rules they condemn those who are inclined to do so. The fact that their opinion of themselves is dependent upon the opinion of others is a vital restriction upon their actions. What this means for a civil society is that in the normal course of events there are only a few people, educated in a particular society, who are willing to break the established rules, even if they have no natural motive, apart from self-interest, to act according to them.

Since man has these approving and disapproving moral sentiments, why would they not automatically create the motive to act according to the rules? Well, they simply do not. In the case of chastity mentioned above, Hume did not set out to pinpoint a particular motive for women to be chaste: motives vary, just as customs vary. The only thing that is certain is that through 'education' convention 'takes possession of the ductile minds of the fair sex in their infancy'.[179] Some of them might avoid 'the strongest imaginable' temptation of lust in order to avoid 'shame',[180] others might be proud to be chaste, and yet others simply follow the rules as a manner of habit. Can one say that some women are truly chaste because they have a virtuous motive, and some are not? One cannot make this distinction if there is no sign of an inclination to be unchaste. Without any discrimination, a woman's character is approved of if there is no reason to doubt her fidelity. But what does this mean? Well, it means that one approves of women who show no signs of infidelity, thus the question of virtuous motivation never enters one's mind. One simply approves of their behaviour because it is not mischievous.

By and large, the question about motives in Hume's project is indifferent because he set out to explain common ideas of morality and how established customs and laws affect us. In the end, what matters is that civil society is able to function. This might be a difficult point to accept if one does not understand the role that pride and the opinion of others play in Hume's system.

179. T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572.
180. T 3.2.12.5; SBN 571.

iv. Self-liking and politeness

John Mackie writes that 'good manners are minor artificial virtues'.[181] I think they are much more than that. Politeness in the *Treatise* relates directly and solely to the passion of pride. This is a simple point, but extremely significant in terms of Hume's overall social theory. 'Good-breeding', he asserts, is an artificial virtue that requires nothing more and nothing less than 'that we shou'd avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show' our pride. Equally importantly, he did not mean that people should actually be humble. On the contrary, 'self-satisfaction and vanity' are not only 'allowable, but requisite in a character'.[182] All that needs to be remembered is that 'if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour'. Hume explicitly points out that 'humility, which good-breeding and decency require', does not go 'beyond the outside' and it cannot be expected 'thorough sincerity in this particular' to comprise 'a real part of our duty'.[183] In the *Treatise* he vindicates civility, good breeding and politeness for one purpose only, to conceal the good opinion people have of themselves. This should not come as a surprise to those acquainted with the material he wrote prior to the *Treatise*.

Hume's first known explicit examination of the theory of politeness was in a letter he sent from Paris in 1734.[184] At the beginning of it he wrote that he had been given 'advice to observe carefully & imitate as much as possible, the manners of the French'.[185] His interlocutor, Chevalier Ramsay, had apparently

181. Mackie, *Hume's moral theory*, p.126.
182. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
183. T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598.
184. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *The Letters of David Hume*, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols (Oxford, 1932), vol.1, p.19-21. According to the editor Greig, Michael Ramsay was most likely Hume's school friend. Based on the scholarship that I have been able to consult, his possible family connection to Chevalier Ramsay remains unknown. My analysis of this letter has been published in Tolonen, 'Politeness, Paris and the *Treatise*'.
185. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.19.

based his advice on the assumption that 'the English' might 'have more of the real Politeness of the Heart', but it should be acknowledged that 'the French certainly have a better way of expressing it'.[186] Ramsay's published works support a similar understanding of politeness. In his *Plan of education for a prince* he claims that men have an 'inward principle of justice' that makes them 'naturally' do 'justice' to other men and by which 'we will know how to distinguish and honour true merit'. By the same token, 'we acquire not only an universal inward beneficence, generosity, and disinterested good-nature, but also that outward politeness and delicacy of manners which expresses itself by a noble freedom and easiness far remov'd from the everlasting ceremonies of an importunate, formal and never-ceasing civility'.[187] In short, according to Ramsay, true politeness springs from the soul. He advances the same 'Addisonian' dichotomy between inward politeness and outward civility in his famous *Travels of Cyrus*, making it clear that 'internal politeness is very different' from 'superficial civility'.[188] Furthermore, 'true politeness is common to all delicate souls of all nations' and 'external civility is but the form establish'd in the different countries for expressing that politeness of the soul'.[189] Thus, all Hume would learn from the French were the expressions of civility, and not the essence of politeness.

Hume continues his letter, telling his friend that Ramsay's opinions had given him 'occasion to reflect upon the Matter, & in my humble Opinion, it is just the Contrary, viz. that the French have more real Politeness & the English the better Method of

186. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.19-20. Chevalier Ramsay was Hume's 'guide' in Paris and 'gave him several introductions, notably to the Abbé Pluche, and perhaps also to the Pyrrhonist philosopher Lévesque de Pouilly, whose brother was an acquaintance of Ramsay's'; see John Robertson, 'Hume, David (1711-1776)', *Oxford dictionary of national biography*. Regarding Ramsay, see G. D. Henderson, *Chevalier Ramsay* (London, 1952). On Ramsay and his *Travels of Cyrus*, see Doohwan Ahn, 'From Greece to Babylon: the political thought of Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686-1743)', *History of European ideas* 37 (2011), p.421-37.
187. Andrew Michael Ramsay, *A Plan of education for a young prince* (London, printed for J. Wilford, 1732), p.xi.
188. Andrew Michael Ramsay, *The Travels of Cyrus* (London, 1730), vol.2, p.84.
189. Ramsay, *The Travels of Cyrus*, vol.2, p.83.

expressing it'.[190] The letter is significant evidence of Hume's early intellectual development, which has been overlooked. As young as he was, he gives a counter-argument on each point Ramsay had made.[191] First, he questions the popular idea that politeness was a quality of the heart. Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, among others, argued that politeness could be pinned down as a national character trait, emphasising that the English cultivated their moral qualities, whereas the French corrupted themselves with mindless trifles. Hume disagrees. He strikes the adjunct 'of the heart' from Ramsay's sentence and states that between these nations it is actually 'the French', who 'have more real Politeness'.[192] Politeness, not being something that was planted in the soul, could only be cultivated through the constant application of theatrical gestures. It would take time for manners to refine, and kind expressions to become customary. By way of clarification he points out that 'by real Politeness' he was referring to 'Softness of Temper' and the 'Inclination to oblige & be serviceable'.[193] The twenty-three-year-old David Hume was convinced that good breeding was, above all, a deeply rooted habit.

I believe that Hume's attitude towards Ramsay had much to do with modern scepticism.[194] The fact that he is ridiculing Ramsay's position in a Mandevillian manner is a clear indication of what side Hume had taken. Furthermore, the fact that the conflict regards politeness, a central theme for Mandeville, is important. I do not think that David Norton is correct when he writes that 'Hume's moral theory' must 'be seen as part of this anti-sceptical moral

190. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.
191. On Hume's extremely 'low opinion' about Ramsay's 'philosophical abilities', see John Valdimir Price, *David Hume* (New York, 1969), p.39-40.
192. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.
193. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.
194. See Richard H. Popkin, 'The sceptical precursors of David Hume', *Philosophy and phenomenological research* 16 (1955), p.69-70 and Popkin, 'Scepticism in the Enlightenment', in *Scepticism in the Enlightenment*, ed. Richard H. Popkin, Ezequiel de Olaso and Giorgio Tonelli (Dordrecht, 1998), p.4. Even when Popkin's view is polemical, it seems that the young Hume sided with the modern sceptics. For 'Hume's early *Memoranda* as evidence of a very specific reading of Bayle by Hume', see J. P. Pittion, 'Hume's reading of Bayle: an inquiry into the sources and role of the *Memoranda*', *History of philosophy* 15 (1977), p.373-86.

tradition' of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and like-minded philosophers (amongst whom I would include Chevalier Ramsay).[195]

Hume's youthful point reflects the view put forward by Bernard Mandeville, whose succinct formulation of this overall idea was printed just a few years before Hume conducted his first analysis of French manners.[196] According to Mandeville, 'men become sociable, by living together in Society'.[197] Habitual expressions of politeness become second nature to gentlemen, but only when the institution has been long established and men have become accustomed to being polite. Hume's French experience confirmed this: 'politeness' has become 'conspicuous' in France, but 'not only among the high but the low, insomuch that the Porters & Coachmen' (who in the eighteenth century were considered the worst mannered brutes) 'are civil'. What is more, these vulgar men are 'not only' polite towards 'Gentlemen but likewise among themselves'. Hume avows that he has 'not yet seen one Quarrel in France, tho' they are every where to be met with in England'.[198] His empirical fact is an entirely 'Mandevillean' observation. For the Dutchman politeness 'in its original is a plain Shift to avoid fighting, and the ill Consequences of it'.[199] According to Hume, however, the reason one did not witness quarrels in France was not that the French had found a way to open their hearts and show their naturally virtuous nature; on the contrary, quarrels were so rare because people customarily conformed to the rules of good breeding. What is also important is that Hume discussed 'Porters & Coachmen'. Mandeville wrote that 'Porters and carmen are reckon'd the rudest and most uncivilis'd part of the nation'.[200] Regarding 'Hackney coachmen', an interesting attitude was expressed by Erasmus Jones, who stated:

195. Norton, *David Hume: common-sense moralist*, p.43.
196. For an interpretation of Hume's account of politeness that links it to Addison and Steele and claims that in this particular letter on politeness Hume prefers 'English manners' to 'French', see Box, *The Suasive art of David Hume*, p.142-48.
197. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.189.
198. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.
199. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.295.
200. Bernard Mandeville, *Free thoughts on religion, the church and national happiness* (London, 1720), p.273. For the dichotomy: 'Porters and hackney coachmen' and 'kings and princes', see also *The Fable of the bees*, p.219.

> I believe, it will be neither thought uncharitable nor extravagant, to suppose that there are hardly half an hundred Hackney Coachmen within the Bills of Mortality, but what would with the utmost Pleasure and Satisfaction, drive over the most innocent Person whom they never knew, or receiv'd any Injury from, provided they could do it conveniently and safely, that is, *within the Verge of the Law*.[201]

Ramsay's second assumption, namely that 'the French' have 'a better way of expressing' politeness than the English, was, according to Hume, as negligent a remark as his first postulation.[202] If French manners were to be criticised for anything, it was precisely for their inflated nature. Addison and Steele dismissed the whole artificiál nature of French manners as moral corruption. Mandeville, in turn, points out that outward civility might fail to create a pleasant feeling, and that the artificial nature of politeness should not become offensively visible. Hume accepted the latter view, maintaining that expressions of good breeding essentially had to 'please by their appearance' and to 'lead the mind' into 'an agreeable delusion'.[203]

With regard to Ramsay's first supposition, Hume argues that 'real politeness' simply means that good breeding plays such a habitual part in people's lives that they have a real inclination (which cannot be natural in a strict sense) to show expressions of politeness to friends, strangers and even people they dislike. It does not matter how natural a courtesy seems or how willing people are to show these gestures, it is still an artificial convention. When he discusses 'expressions of politeness', he emphasises the contrast between natural kindness and the artificial nature of politeness in general. This is the same disparity as exists between Hume's idea of 'real politeness' and Ramsay's suggestion of 'politeness of the heart'. Politeness is now linked with 'kindness', which is taken to be what Ramsay was alluding to in his advice about the 'politeness of the heart': it is a 'Shaftesburyan' way of addressing the topic. Shaftesbury supposed that politeness was a

201. Erasmus Jones, *The Man of manners* (London, printed for J. Roberts, 1737), p.43-44.
202. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.19.
203. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.

natural feature of human nature. If men just looked into their souls, instead of following pompous ceremonies, they would be able to be spontaneously kind towards each other. His principal argument was that court civility prevented men from being naturally virtuous. Hume points out that this assumption is false: even 'men of the Best Dispositions of the World' cannot naturally feel this kindness 'towards Strangers & indifferent Persons'. Artificial expressions are needed in order to compensate for this 'defect', and 'real politeness' for Hume was an inclination to habitually show such expressions.[204]

Given Hume's belief that natural benevolence was very limited, 'expressions of politeness' constitute the core of his analysis of good breeding. 'These ceremonies' have to be set apart from natural expressions. They 'ought to be so contriv'd, as that, tho they do not deceive, nor pass for sincere, yet still they please by their Appearance'. Such courtesies may produce 'two extremes' of behaviour in people, who might go astray by making their ceremonies 'too like Truth or too remote from it'. In both cases, failing politeness means that the expressions do not 'lead the mind' to an 'agreeable delusion'. The first 'extreme' is scarcely possible because 'whenever any Expression or Action becomes customary' it cannot 'deceive': he gives the example of a Quaker addressing himself as 'your friend' instead of 'your humble servant'. 'In the contrary Extreme' it is 'the French' that 'err' by 'making their Civilities too remote from Truth'. Hume highlights his point through the analogy of an exaggerated courtesy and 'a Dramatic Poet' mixing 'Improbabilities with his Fable'.[205] Both of these instances, a ceremony and a tale, should be credible, otherwise the mind cannot proceed to an 'agreeable delusion'.

This evidence links Hume's early analysis of politeness to

204. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.21. A rarely noticed overall definition of virtue that neatly fits Hume's concept of politeness is found in his answer to the criticism (in the *Newcastle journal*, 1742) regarding his essay on Walpole's character in the *Gentleman's magazine*, May 1742, vol.12, p.265. Hume wrote, 'virtue is properly, good-nature made steddy and extensive by good principles. A man may have many virtues without deserving so noble a character'; see Elliott, 'Hume's "Character of Sir Robert Walpole"', p.368. It is striking how well this definition suits Hume's understanding of the artificial nature of politeness.
205. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.

Mandeville. After offering some idiosyncratic speculations about English expressions of good breeding, Hume goes back to consider the positive aspects of French politeness and dispels any possible misgivings about his having any sympathy with the 'Spectatorian' understanding of politeness, for 'after all it must be confest, that the little Niceties of the French Behaviour, tho' troublesome & impertinent, yet serve to polish the ordinary Kind of People & prevent Rudeness & Brutality'.[206] He clearly had no intention of presenting himself as an eager advocate of English 'expressions of politeness'. All he was aiming at was to counter Ramsay's assumptions point by point and contrast them with his Mandevillean view. In his opinion, the artificiality of politeness should not become too visible, but it had to be acknowledged that such artificial gestures were of the essence in terms of preventing brutality in the 'ordinary kind of people'. The fact that it was exclusively against these 'troublesome' and 'impertinent' little 'Niceties', which Hume endorsed, that Shaftesbury, Addison and Steele directed the full force of their arguments, highlights the discrepancy with the Shaftesburyan perspective.

Hume proceeds in his letter to make an intriguing comparison: 'Soldiers are found to become more courageous in learning to hold their Musquets within half an Inch of a place appointed', and similarly, 'Devotees feel their Devotion encrease by the Observance of trivial Superstitions', such as 'Sprinkling, Kneeling, Crossing &c'. In precisely the same manner, 'men insensibly soften towards each other in the Practise of these Ceremonies'.[207] He concludes saying that 'the Mind pleases itself by the Progress it makes in such Trifles, & while it is so supported makes an easy Transition to something more material: And I verily believe, that tis for this Reason you Scarce ever meet with a Clown, or an ill bred man in France'.[208] What was this 'something more material'

206. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.21.
207. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.21.
208. On the same page of the *Free thoughts* where Mandeville discusses 'porters and carmen', he also uses this same dichotomy between 'a well-bred man' and 'the greatest clown'. Mandeville's emblematic point is that virtue or virtuous sociability has nothing to do with politeness. In fact, 'virtue is scarce, every where, and a well-bred man, may as much want real probity, as the greatest clown.' Mandeville, *Free thoughts*, p.273.

to which the 'mind' was transferred? I take it that it was not a sublime level of morality, but simply an example of how custom helped an idea to be transformed into an impression, and men to acquire an 'Inclination to oblige & be serviceable'.[209] In other words, it is what Hume defined as 'real politeness'. Hence, he had completed his circle and ended right back where he started – the French were more polite because they followed the theatrical expressions of politeness.

Towards the end of his letter Hume seems to have become aware that the addressee might want to raise some objections to his credulous enthusiasm for French politeness. 'You may perhaps wonder', he states carefully, 'that I who have stay'd so short time in France & who have confest that I am not a Master of their Language, shou'd decide so positively of their manners'. For 'with Nations' it is 'as with particular Man, where one Trifle frequently serves more to discover the Character, than a whole Train of considerable Actions'. In Hume's case the decisive 'trifle' had been the way people customarily addressed each other. The 'English Phraze of humble Servant' is omitted 'upon the least Intimacy'. The French 'never forget' to tell you that it is 'the Honour of being your most humble Servant'. What was even more remarkable was the use of this phrase 'by People to those who are very much their Inferiours'.[210] Hence, English manners were clearly inferior to French politeness.

It is a well-known fact that in his later life Hume was a great lover of Paris who occasionally snubbed London. For example, in a letter to Colonel Isaac Barré on 16 July 1764, Hume states: 'Paris' is 'the centre of arts, of politeness, of gallantry, and of good company'.[211] A year before, Hume had called Paris the 'centre of the polite arts'.[212] When comparing London to Paris, Hume wrote, 'The method of living is not near so agreeable in London as in Paris. The best company are usually, and more so at present, in a flame of politics: the men of letters are few, and not very

209. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.
210. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.21.
211. Hume, *New letters of David Hume*, ed. Raymond Klibansky and E. C. Mossner (Oxford, 1954), p.85.
212. Hume to the comtesse de Boufflers, 22.I 1763, *Letters*, vol.1, p.375.

sociable: the women are not in general very conversible'.[213] Thus, it is understandable, also for other than personal reasons, that Hume in a famous letter complains that 'I have a Reluctance to think of living among the factious Barbarians of London, who will hate me because I am a Scotsman & I am not a Whig, and despise me because I am a man of Letters'.[214] This was not the first time Hume called Londoners the 'factious Barbarians of London'. Two years earlier, in a letter to William Robertson, Hume had used the same term.[215] It makes perfect sense that, after he had learned the importance of French politeness as a young man, Hume's lifelong fear was that the British would be remembered as a nation 'which was at best but half civilised'.[216] In this context, it is understandable that a poem 'celebrating Hume's return to Edinburgh' in 1769 published in *The Caledonian mercury* 'looks from the remote north, ignoring England, to the culture of Europe'.[217] Young Hume returning to Britain in the late 1730s, with his French-cut jackets, has been memorably described by Miss Elizabeth Mure in her 'Some remarks on the change of manners in my own time 1700-1790'.[218]

Nevertheless, Hume's first analysis of politeness was incomplete compared to the theoretical speculation that constitutes a major part of his *Treatise*. He makes no mention in his letter of self-applause or pride, which was to constitute the essence of politeness for him and Bernard Mandeville. Consequently, he is still to address the relation between human nature and politeness – a gap he bridges in his *Treatise*. As an example of a text, other than the letter on politeness, written by the young Hume in the early 1730s that makes a Mandevillean analysis of the history of civil society, see 'An historical essay on chivalry and modern honour'.[219] This essay

213. Hume to the Comtesse de Boufflers, 12.I 1766, *Letters*, vol.2, p.11.
214. Hume to Hugh Blair, 23.VIII 1765, *Letters*, vol.1, p.517.
215. Hume to William Robertson, 1.XII 1763, *Letters*, vol.1, p.417.
216. Hume to Horace Walpole, 20.XI 1766, *Letters*, vol.2, p.111.
217. Donald Livingston, 'A poem by Philocalos celebrating Hume's return to Edinburgh', *Studies in Scottish literature* 24 (1989), p.108-109.
218. *Selections from the family papers preserved at Caldwell* (Glasgow, 1854), vol.1, p.37. See also *Selections from the family papers*, vol.1, p.267-68.
219. NLS, MS. 23159 f.4. For an accurate transcription of the essay and an analysis of the Mandevillean and Hutchesonian elements in it, see Wright, 'Hume on the origin of "modern honour"', p.187-209. On dating the essay, see especially M. A. Stewart, 'The dating of Hume's manuscripts', in *The Scottish Enlightenment: essays in reinterpretation*, ed. Paul Wood (Rochester, NY, 2000), p.267. See also Brandt, 'The beginnings of Hume's philosophy', p.117-25.

is an important document when determining whether Hume's emphasis on courage lies on the side of the ancients or moderns.[220] John P. Wright has also noted similarities between Mandeville's *Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick diseases* and the description of hypochondria in Hume's famous letter to a doctor, also written in the early 1730s.[221] In Mandeville's dialogue, a character called Misomedon is described as 'a Man of Learning, who whilst he has his Health was of a gay, even temper, and a friendly open Disposition; but having long labour'd under the Hypochondriack Passion is now much alter'd for the worse, and become peevish, fickle, censorious and mistrustful'.[222] In a similar manner, as in Hume's letter to the anonymous doctor, hypochondria is refered to as 'the Disease of the Learned' by Mandeville.[223] Like Hume, Misomedon also tells that he studied law, but hated it.[224] Instead, he had great admiration for the humanists.[225] And he sought advice from different doctors before consulting Philopiro.[226] Although we should not overstate the relevance of these similarities, it is still

220. For contrasting views, see Ryan Hanley, 'David Hume and the modern problem of honor', *Modern schoolman* 84 (2007), p.295-312, and Ryu Susato, 'The idea of chivalry in the Scottish Enlightenment: the case of David Hume', *Hume studies* 33 (2007), p.155-78. Hume's early essay also gets a central role in Donald T. Siebert, 'Chivalry and romance in the age of Hume', *Eighteenth-century life* 21 (1997), p.62-79. For a recent attempt to harness the Humean honour, reading the *Treatise* in accordance with Hume's essay on modern honour, see Ted Westhusing, 'A beguiling military virtue: honour', *Journal of military ethics* 2 (2003), p.195-212.
221. Wright, *The Sceptical realism of David Hume*, p.190-91, 236-37, and John P. Wright, 'Dr George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay and Hume's letter to a physician', p.139 n.44. Mandeville, *Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick diseases*, 3rd edn (London, printed for Jacob Tonson, 1730).
222. Mandeville, *Treatise of the hypochondriack*, p.xii.
223. Mandeville, *Treatise of the hypochondriack*, p.106.
224. Mandeville, *Treatise of the hypochondriack*, p.3-4.
225. Mandeville, *Treatise of the hypochondriack*, p.7.
226. Mandeville, *Treatise of the hypochondriack*, p.20. See also Wright, *Hume's 'A Treatise of human nature': an introduction*, p.8-9. On the essay on chivalry and Hume's letter to a physician, see also Wright, *Hume's 'A Treatise of human nature': an introduction*, p.11-19.

possible that Hume had also carefully studied Mandeville's *Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick diseases*.

Defining 'pride' in Book 2 of the Treatise

What is pride? It is 'simple and uniform' and because of this, according to David Hume, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition' of it.[227] A little later in the *Treatise*, however, he states: 'But not to dispute about words, I observe that by *pride* I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy'd with ourselves.'[228] Although the causes of pride extend beyond the above-mentioned qualities in other parts of the *Treatise*, this aspect of being satisfied with oneself is the key to Hume's conception. In accordance with human nature, the distinction between pleasure and pain applies to everything. Pride is always on the side of pleasure. As Amelie Rorty put it, 'pride is a particular unanalysable pleasurable quality'.[229] It may be impossible to state precisely what pride is, or to break it up into particles, but the basic tenet is that it is always pleasurable in terms of promoting self-satisfaction.

A technical definition of pride is that it has the self as an object. Another way of putting this is that it is an indirect passion or secondary impression.[230] That is to say, it is reflective in a sense in that the object is fixed to the self. There is a crucial, double relation between an impression and an idea. A certain something (usually, but not necessarily, a personal quality) strikes a pleasurable impression in the mind. If this impression is related to the idea of the self, it naturally produces the secondary impression of pride. As Gabriele Taylor writes, 'the condition for a person

227. T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277.
228. T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297.
229. Amelie Rorty, 'Pride produces the idea of self: Hume on moral agency', *Australasian journal of philosophy* 68 (1990), p.258.
230. The classic starting point for this discussion is Páll Árdal, *Passion and value in Hume's 'Treatise'* (Edinburgh, 1966). See also Haruko Inoue, 'The origin of the indirect passions in the *Treatise*: an analogy between Books 1 and 2', *Hume studies* 29 (2003), p.205-21.

feeling pride is not that the object in question be connected with him, but only that he believe this to be the case'.[231]

One way of explaining the indirectness of pride is to contrast it with direct passions, which 'arise from good and evil' without 'the least preparation'. What is involved is 'an *original* instinct' that 'tends to unite itself with the good [pleasure], and to avoid the evil [pain]'.[232] Fear and hope are examples of direct passions in that they arise without the double relation of impressions and ideas. 'When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other'.[233] There is no need to relate the impression of likely pain to the idea of the self through the double relation of impressions and ideas in order for the direct passions to arise.

Indirect passions, on the other hand, always need adjustment between the primary impression and the idea of the self before the secondary impression is produced. The relation between a pleasing quality and the self need not be rationally calculated (we cannot normally make a rational choice whether to be proud of something or not: our judgement can be refined or corrupted, of course, but that is a different matter), but what should be understood at this point is that the association between a certain impression and the self has to be made in the mind in order to produce the secondary impression of pride.

Hume emphasises the fact that almost anything can cause pride: the 'most obvious and remarkable property' of the 'causes of pride' is 'the vast variety of *subjects*, on which they may be plac'd'.[234] First of all, 'whatever in ourselves is either useful, beautiful, or surprising, is an object of pride'.[235] The scope is much more vast, however, and in the end, 'every valuable quality of the mind', 'body', other abilities and even external subjects such as 'our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths' and so on 'may become a cause'.[236]

231. Gabriele Taylor, 'Pride and humility', *Pride, shame and guilt: emotions of self-assessment* (Oxford, 1985), p.27.
232. T 2.3.9.2; SBN 438.
233. T 2.3.9.6; SBN 439.
234. T 2.1.2.5; SBN 278.
235. T. 2.1.8.5; SBN 300-301.
236. T 2.1.2.5; SBN 279.

Perhaps the most explicit point Hume makes about these almost unlimited causes is that 'any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object'.[237] He does not suggest that there is a right and a wrong kind of pride, there is just pride that almost anything can cause.

This is not to say that the function of the passion is arbitrary, however. There are clear guidelines that Hume gives in his explanations. The regular operation of the passions is naturally extremely important. 'Tho' the effects be many', he reminds his audience, 'the principles, from which they arise, are commonly but few and simple, and that 'tis the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different operation'.[238] The human mind is, in one sense, unaccountable and the causes of pride may be almost unlimited. However, the mechanism of how it operates is uniform and simple. There is no simplicity in the self for Hume, but there is regularity in the operation of the passions.

Thus, the basic principle in the production of pride is that the cause must be related to the self through the double relation of impressions and ideas. The cause must also fulfil other conditions. The most relevant of these are that its relation to the object must be a close one (closer than in delight or joy, for example); the cause must be 'peculiar to ourselves',[239] and it must usually be evident to others.[240] The rareness, constancy and the durable connection between the cause and the self determine whether something causes pride or not.[241] General rules also influence its operation, which is to say that what is customarily considered worthy matters a great deal in one's assessment of the worth of a particular object.

Hume scholars have put much effort into discussing the causes (and limitations) of pride. It is striking how much time and space Hume took to emphasise that more or less anything could be a cause. Although it is possible to distinguish certain causes however, it is only with a certain probability. Therefore, all the discussion about the 'proper' causes of pride seems rather futile compared to the question that interested him the most: pride is caused by almost anything. The point is to establish the need to be satisfied with one's own self. Naturally, the mind also craves for a certain cause in order to be satisfied, but this is not as relevant as the existence of pride and being satisfied with oneself – even if one is not morally or publicly worthy in any way. Every man (good or bad, happy or sad) needs to sustain his self-satisfaction based on pride in order to prolong his will to exist as a social being.

237. T 2.1.5.8; SBN 288.
238. T 2.1.3.6; SBN 282.
239. T 2.1.6.4; SBN 291.
240. T 2.1.6.5; SBN 292.
241. T.2.1.6.7; SBN 293.

The nature of pride as an indirect passion is a technical topic that has been intelligently discussed among scholars.[242] What should be stressed is the spherical and conditional sense in which Hume introduces this passion. The spherical sense of pride is based on the distinction between self-love and self-liking, and can only be understood in relation to self-love (and self-preservation). The conditional role is also derived directly from Mandeville's adaptation of the Augustinian argument of self-doubt.

Annette Baier's most effective contribution to the discussion on pride is to broaden the scope of the concept by emphasising its nature as a passion that must be sustained. Pauline Chazan is also on the right track in making the further point that 'we sustain our pride, and so our self-consciousness of who and what we are, by means of a continued perception of qualities and attributes related to the self, perceptions which are reflected back to us by means of the attentions, regard, and esteem of others'.[243] There is not an adequate explanation in the secondary literature of why this is so. What is the purpose of the sustaining aspect of pride? Chazan, for example, makes the valid point that 'pride' itself 'for Hume is to quite some degree self-sustaining'. The mind

242. On indirect passions in general, see Rachel Cohon, 'Hume's indirect passions', in *Blackwell companion to Hume*, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe (Oxford, 2008), p.159-84.
243. Pauline Chazan, 'Pride, virtue and selfhood: a reconstruction of Hume', *Canadian journal of philosophy* 22 (1992), p.48. The article makes a novel point about the interaction between self and pride, claiming that 'what is radical about Hume's thesis is that pride comes into being as the self comes into being. One does not precede the other'; see Chazan, 'Pride, virtue and selfhood', p.51.

does not need to be in constant search of the different causes, and people may at times operate out of simple curiosity. Yet, 'without a continued perception of qualities and attributes' that produces pride eventually 'the idea of the self, together with the passion of pride, would fade away'.[244] These are both very good points, but the question of the self could also be put in a different light. The self for Hume was, after all, quite a mutable subject. It is a highly important concept, of course, but still rather vague. What does it mean that the self fades away? Rather than plunging into the philosophical depths of the question, it is better to use Hume's analogy between self-love and pride in order to make it more concrete.

Its generally unanalysable nature is one characteristic of pride. Furthermore, 'as our idea of ourself' is 'advantageous' we feel a pleasurable affection and 'are elated by pride'.[245] This lifting and expanding quality is important. These two points about its unanalysable quality and expanding nature draw a picture of pride in a spherical sense. There are several different aspects that fall within the sphere of the passion of pride, but it is the qualities of this uniform sphere in general that make a bigger difference in terms of understanding human nature than certain distinctions within the passion itself. Hume does not even bother to draw a clear distinction between pride and self-esteem: his point is to analyse pride as a uniform passion – including aspects that most people would consider separate.[246]

Let us consider the analogy between self-love and pride in order to understand why this is so. For example, pride as a spherical passion is analogous with self-love, which is also spherical in nature. What is self-love? In the context in which Hume uses it, it is first of all ensuring that one's body continues to exist, in the manner of self-preservation. In this sense the concept can also be naturally extended to concern avarice and the love of gain, for example. There are several different aspects and operations of self-love and self-preservation to be achieved and satisfied, some of which can even be considered independent passions, affections

244. Chazan, 'Pride, virtue and selfhood', p.49.
245. T 2.1.2.2; SBN 277.
246. T 2.2.1.9; SBN 331-32.

or desires. This is a large sphere as such, with many aspects including the most natural acts such as eating and drinking. Hunger and thirst are prime examples of bodily functions that can be discussed as independent desires or appetites. However, a look beyond these details reveals the larger sphere of self-love (or self-preservation), which is also an unanalysable passion in this sense. The point is that one can talk about self-love as one passion that leads to prolonging the life of one's body.

Hume makes this analogy between the spherical sense of pride and self-love explicit in pointing out the most important difference between the two with regard to the body: 'there is no disposition of body peculiar to pride, as there is to thirst and hunger'. Having understood the analogy between the spheres, one also realises that in the *Treatise* he discusses the sustaining aspect of pride with the analogy of self-love in mind. 'Daily experience convinces us', he points out, 'that pride requires certain causes to excite it, and languishes when unsupported by some excellency in the character, in bodily accomplishments, in cloaths, equipage or fortune'.[247] What is involved is an implicit comparison to hunger in the case of self-love, the difference being that hunger is a direct passion (as are all other related desires) and pride is indirect. Pride does not arise independently. It is a social passion and needs some external objects to accompany it. This is one reason why Book 2 of the *Treatise* commences with the indirect passion of pride and not with direct passions, as one might perhaps have expected.

Self-love is different in nature from pride, mainly because it has the dispositions of the body. However, although hunger, for example, can be satisfied, it also varies. For the sake of self-preservation it might be enough to eat a lot less than we do, but as animals we have natural restrictions on the amount of food we can consume. Pride is tricky because there really are no natural limits to it. As it expands it becomes clear that there is no end to it, it cannot be saturated. Once more, the contrast between indirect and direct passions proves useful: direct passions in general can be satisfied, indirect passions cannot.

In this light, it made good sense for Hume to establish the

247. T 2.1.5.7; SBN 288.

central division between direct and indirect passions that neatly fits the distinction between self-love and pride. This is then further tuned in his discussion of violent and calm passions. The point is that these are the main principles of human nature. Self-love helps us to exist (if we do not eat or fail to avoid death our body no longer exists). The self is simultaneously dependent on pride (and vice versa). As a consequence, 'social death' could be considered equally harmful to the self as natural death is to the body. This is a very different view of the distinction between self-love and self-liking than the Rousseauvian vision of natural self-preservation and perverted attachment to the self. Mandeville and Hume emphasise that pride is just as important to the human being as self-presérvation (in the common meaning of the word).

Once one understands the spherical nature of pride it is easy to understand why Hume put such effort into emphasising that its causes need not be real. Self-love is restricted and guided by bodily dispositions to a certain extent. It is plausible to say that hunger and thirst may be quenched: one concretely feels that one has eaten or drunk enough. Pride does not have these natural limitations in that there is no such thing as quenched pride. It may well languish, but it cannot be quenched.

Unlike in the case of hunger, people tend to overstate and mistake their pride. Perhaps they do not even have a clear conception of it. One might just, in some vague sense, feel the pleasure involved in self-approval through the mechanism of pride. This is an aspect that has occasionally surfaced in Hume scholarship without a satisfactory explanation. One commentator points out that in pride 'no real object of any sort is necessary. All that is needed is that the proud person has certain beliefs. He must believe that he is actually receiving, or at least that he deserves to receive, the admiration and envy of others.'[248] Some find Hume's view that 'someone sufficiently determined to shine can somehow build his pride on a relation which is not really adequate' puzzling.[249] His system seems to make it ridiculously easy to justify one's beliefs and pride. There are always people

248. Robert W. Burch, 'Hume on pride and humility', *The New scholasticism* 49 (1975), p.185-86.
249. Taylor, 'Pride and humility', p.22.

who believe that 'if only others were more intelligent or less trivially minded they, too, would come to value that thing [they are proud of], or at least come to see that it might be valued'.[250] It is important that a person can just be proud, without really being proud of anything (even if Hume usually refers to pride as an indirect passion that needs a particular cause). On the general level he does not make a distinction between these two cases. He always puts the basic question in terms of pleasure and pain, which is perhaps worth noting in this context. In the case of pride, the pleasure is not necessarily connected to the pleasure taken in the object. What is important is that the pleasure, which is pride, is sustained. The causes vary, but the overall passion is the same.

Hume's theory of human nature is universal. The point is that even a poor beggar or wretched criminal can sustain his or her pride. People need to be proud of something in order to want to prolong their existence as social beings – a matter that does not only concern self-preservation. If it were possible, most men would perhaps be like Alexander the Great, conquering half of the world and hence receiving justification for their supposedly superior nature. One might choose activities other than conquering and commanding, but the nature and principle of one's pride are the same. One's way of life might be more modest (and even unrecognisable to someone with Alexander's military frame of mind), but in due proportion ambitions tend to be the same – without much grounding in due causes, just causes that vary and usually involve a strong, social element in the form of the real or assumed approval of others. Perhaps the best way of characterising Hume's theory of pride is to assume that man is naturally predisposed to feeling superior and having inordinate self-esteem – which should not be viewed in a negative sense but as a natural fact.[251]

Although Hume tends to use words such as boastful and overstated in his discussion of pride, he takes care to point out that there is always an element of doubt – even for those who have conquered half the world or lived like sages for all their lives. This conditional aspect is one cause of self-doubt, but at the same time

250. Taylor, 'Pride and humility', p.27.
251. On Mandeville, self-liking and instinct of sovereignty, see p.84-86 of this volume.

it is one reason for self-deception. Hume calls this the 'quality of the mind' by which 'we are seduc'd into a good opinion of ourselves'. He unravels this further: 'the great propensity men have to pride' is partly explained in terms of taking delight in things that are close, 'the mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects, to which it is accustom'd, and naturally prefers them to others, which, tho', perhaps, in themselves more valuable, are less known to it. By the same quality of the mind we are seduc'd into a good opinion of ourselves, and of all objects, that belong to us. They appear in a stronger light; are more agreeable; and consequently fitter subjects of pride and vanity, than any other'.[252] This is a robust statement that makes it more or less impossible to imagine that Hume could entertain the notion of an objective foundation of pride. The only thing that is clearly established is that there is always some uncertainty on the question of whether it is well founded, even when the probable causes are evident.

According to Hume's system, if the objective foundation of self-satisfaction is the prime concern, there are several good reasons to doubt the right to be proud of anything at all: no bodily disposition guides one's pride; a strong social component could mean that one only looks to please others without any regard of how their approval is gained; the mind tends to delight in things with which it is familiar without real justification, and somehow one craves for pride and tends to overstate it. After all, the causes need not be real – self-satisfaction may be based upon views of which one might not even approve. But we are not stupid. We are extremely rational in some aspects of life. Our pride is very precarious and we realise this. This creates self-doubt, which is perhaps the most important element that makes pride a social passion. It is also the element that seems to be missing from most philosophical analysis of pride.

Pride, good breeding and the theory of passions

An important step in David Hume's intellectual development, outlined in his letter on politeness, was his study of how external

252. T 2.2.4.8; SBN 354-55.

expressions of kindness rendered civil society lenient. In the *Treatise* he made these notions into one of the cornerstones of his social theory. As Annette Baier and some other philosophers perceptively note, pride was a 'master passion' for Hume.[253] Donald Siebert has astutely analysed that 'in his philosophical teaching Hume had boldly redefined virtue, insisting that greatness of mind and pride were more essentially virtuous than humility' and that 'vanity is a good thing, if decorously masked'.[254] Nevertheless, the crucial link between pride and politeness in these philosophical analyses has not hitherto been established.[255]

Hume opens Book 2 of the *Treatise*, entitled 'Of the passions', with a section on pride. A relevant connection between his philosophical theory of passions and his overall analysis of politeness is his distinction of 'pride' and 'humility' as passions that 'are directly contrary in their effects'.[256] One commentator has suggested that this dichotomy was a mistake on Hume's part, and he was 'confusing humility with shame'.[257] I do not agree. It should be remembered that even when he was focusing on his analysis of passions, he was also participating in a larger debate

253. Annette Baier, 'Master passions', in *Explaining emotions*, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley, CA, 1980), p.403-24; Baier, 'Persons and the wheel of their passions', in *A Progress of sentiments: reflections on Hume's 'Treatise'*, p.129-51; Baier, 'Hume on resentment', *Hume studies* 6 (1980), p.133-49; Baier, 'Hume's account of our absurd passions', *Journal of philosophy* 79 (1982), p.643-51 and Baier, 'Hume's analysis of pride', *Journal of philosophy* 75 (1980), p.27-40. See also Donald Davidson, 'Hume's cognitive theory of pride', *Journal of philosophy* 73 (1976), p.744-57.

254. Donald T. Siebert, 'David Hume's last words: the importance of *My own life*', *Studies in Scottish literature* 19 (1984), p.135. On Siebert's short but perceptive account of the link between Mandeville, Hume and luxury, see his *Moral animus of David Hume* (Newark, DE, 1990), p.150-52. See also Andrew Sabl, 'Noble infirmity: love of fame in Hume', *Political theory* 34 (2006), p.542-68.

255. The only article that I am aware of that tries to link Hume's scepticism with civility is Johnson, 'Hume on manners and the civil condition', p.209-22. However, in his article Johnson is not setting Hume's theory of civility or his notions of manners in their intellectual context, thus Johnson does not establish the crucial link between Hume and Mandeville nor the link between politeness and justice, which are decisive for understanding Hume's idea of civility and the role of politeness in his overall system.

256. T 2.1.5.9; SBN 289.

257. Arnold Isenberg, 'Natural pride and natural shame', in *Explaining emotions*, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley, CA, 1980), p.362.

about pride, modesty and politeness. From this perspective, the dichotomy between pride and humility (and not pride and shame) turns out to be significant. Hume managed to exclude all popular accounts claiming that true modesty was the real source of politeness. For a theorist confusing his ideas he was quite rigorous in claiming that it was 'impossible' that 'a man can be at the same time' both 'proud and humble'.[258] I think that was what he had in mind to indicate this conceptual blunder in some previous accounts of politeness. He maintains that 'pride' is always 'a pleasant' and 'agreeable' sensation, whilst 'humility' is 'uneasy' and 'painful'.[259] In other words, even if pride and humility cannot operate without some external object or quality that excites the passion, it is very clear that to be proud is something desirable, whereas humility or true modesty is not.

When discussing some limitations of his system of the double relation of impressions and ideas concerning pride Hume uses the example of a 'feast' at which the guests may only feel 'joy' and not 'pride' at being present, whence the 'master of the feast' is the only one that has 'the additional passion of self-applause and vanity'.[260] The fact that he chose to use this particular example is revealing of his view of politeness as a way of hiding pride. He explains in his essays how one can detect this 'master of the feast' among 'good company', for most 'certainly' he is the 'man, who sits in the lowest place, and who is always industrious in helping every one'.[261] The master is proud, but he appears to be humble. In Book 3 of the *Treatise*, Hume also defines one feature of the 'general rule' of not revealing 'self-applause': in order to keep 'the appearance of modesty' we have to 'be ready to prefer others to ourselves' and 'to seem always the lowest and least in the company'.[262] A polite gentleman is proud, and entertains a high opinion of himself, thus to 'seem' the 'lowest and least' most definitely is not something natural for him. All this has to do with is the 'appearance', and has nothing to do with actual modesty. In

258. T 2.1.2.3; SBN 278.
259. T 2.1.5.4; SBN 286 and T 2.1.5.9; SBN 288-89.
260. T 2.1.6.2; SBN 290.
261. Hume, 'Rise and progress of arts and sciences', in *Essays*, p.133.
262. T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598.

other words, because the master is the only one who may truly feel proud of the fact that 'delicacies of every kind' are being served, he self-evidently is extremely careful not to expose this passion.[263]

As Annette Baier points out, Hume describes pride as an indirect passion that in a sense does not immediately cause actions, yet it is a passion that has to last.[264] Mandeville's term, self-liking, captures this meaning, and Hume's own definition confirms this Mandevillean backdrop. 'By *pride*', he points out, 'I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view' of our good qualities 'makes us satisfy'd with ourselves'.[265] The very essence of social existence is that we are satisfied with ourselves, in other words, we have to be able to cultivate our self-liking. This condition is dependent upon several variable circumstances. Bernard Mandeville emphasises the fact that when self-liking ceases, life becomes a burden and thus suicide might be a valid option. David Hume, in turn, asserts that 'no man ever threw away life, while it was worth keeping'.[266] Given that human passions tend to be unaccountable and extremely amendable to different situations, Hume explains that one turns to this option as a last resort: 'a man may be proud' of virtually anything – not just virtue, beauty, riches and power, which are the most obvious and natural causes.[267] Hume points out that 'any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride'.[268] Most people are able to find something to be proud of, something they think helps them to outshine everyone and that is closely related to the self. We all need other people to somehow confirm (in our own minds) the opinion we have of ourselves. This is the central part of Hume's analysis of self-applause or self-liking. The necessary premise on which to build our self-image is that it has to be strengthened by

263. T 2.1.6.2; SBN 290.
264. Baier, 'Master passions', p.405-407.
265. T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297.
266. Hume, 'Of suicide', in *Essays*, p.588. To me it seems that the topic of suicide was an extreme example, along with duelling, of how to argue that self-liking was more important for men than self-love.
267. T 2.1.2.6; SBN 279.
268. T 2.1.5.8; SBN 288.

the people whose opinion we value. This is the key to understanding how self-liking, in the end, creates social cohesion and how 'vanity' is, as Hume describes it, 'a bond of union among men'.[269] Causes of pride, such as 'virtue, beauty and riches', have almost no 'influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others'.[270] Because self-applause and vanity are dependent upon other people, 'we' cannot even 'form' a 'wish' that would 'not have a reference to society', and 'perfect solitude' might be 'the greatest punishment we can suffer'.[271]

This leads me to the point at which I think Baier's analysis needs some rethinking. Given that Hume was not trying to form a prescriptive theory of ethics, he was not taking on the Sisyphean task of explaining what due pride is and is not. What is striking in his philosophical analysis is that he consistently supports a view based on the idea that we never know whether or not our own pride is well founded, and everything is dependent on the fact that we follow established rules. The point is that we are all more or less proud, and thus we have to hide this sentiment of self-applause. As Baier notes, Hume does not deal with the concept of due pride in Book 2 of the *Treatise*.[272] The most problematic part of Baier's analysis is that, in seeking to show that due pride was a vital concept for Hume, she takes her evidence from a section of the *Treatise* that, in my opinion, proves that this was not the case.[273] What she means by due pride is pride that is well founded, and she bases her evidence on a supposed dichotomy between 'overweaning conceit' and 'due pride'. Hume does not stress the importance of well founded and 'due pride', however. The precise quote from the *Treatise* is 'that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree of pride', which is just another way of saying that pride, in general, is a useful passion.[274] I cannot see how Hume could have been pinpointing a dichotomy between well-founded pride and 'overweaning conceit'. Baier's further suggestion is that it was unnecessary for Hume to suggest

269. T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491.
270. T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.
271. T 2.2.5.16; SBN 363.
272. Baier, 'Master passions', p.418.
273. T 3.3.2; SBN 592-602.
274. T 3.3.2.8; SBN 596.

it was necessary to conceal due pride. The 'expression of ill-founded excessive and uncorrected pride', she claims, 'should be restricted' and people have to be able to show their due pride if it is their ruling passion.[275] This might be a good basis for a contemporary philosophical stance, but it misses the point of this section in the *Treatise*. On the following page Hume clearly states, and I quote his reasoning at length: 'nothing is more disagreeable than a man's over-weaning conceit of himself: Every one almost has a strong propensity to this vice: No one can well distinguish *in himself* betwixt the vice and virtue, or be certain, that his esteem of his own merit is well-founded'.[276] Thus, instead of making any distinctions between the right and wrong kind of pride, he contends that most of us are plain proud.

Of course, one could argue that it would be better if everyone was proud of the fact that they respected the laws of justice rather than some vain notions that they were pretty or owned beautiful houses. Nevertheless, these are meagre distinctions, and Hume was not making such a point. To expect men only to have due pride is to anticipate an immense change in human nature, which Hume had ruled out as impossible. What he argues is that – whatever the reason – we tend to think highly of ourselves, which is simply a positive phenomenon that gives us confidence and causes a pleasant sensation.[277] This reaches a point at which we cannot possibly be sure whether or not we have stepped over the boundary of 'due degree of pride' (if such a line could actually be drawn and the concept was not just used for descriptive purposes). On the one hand, self-liking does not harm others as long as we do not reveal our true sentiments, but on the other hand, once we start showing our pride everything goes astray no matter how 'legitimate' are the reasons for self-applause. The case is analogous with the laws of justice. If we turn to consult our natural ideas instead of the fixed rules of justice, or if we start wondering whether or not our pride is well founded, we soon find civil society in confusion and our conversations unpleasant. In

275. Baier, 'Master passions', p.418.
276. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597-98.
277. See Mandeville, *Part II*, p.91: 'The instinct of high value, which every individual has for himself, is a very useful passion.'

the end, everyone seeks the means to justify their unlawfulness and to vent their pride, which would be a setback in terms of cultivating self-love and self-liking. Simultaneously, the circle of refinement would be reversed, which is why Hume further states that 'all direct expressions of this passion are condemn'd; nor do we make any exception to this rule in favour of men of sense and merit'. I think this neatly sums up the core idea of politeness. Not a single exception is to be made to the rule that no one is 'allow'd to do themselves justice openly'. It is the 'impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men to over-value themselves', and it is this same propensity that 'has given us such a *prejudice* against self-applause, that we are apt to condemn it, by a *general rule*, wherever we meet with it'.[278] The idea of 'due pride' might be relevant in contemporary philosophy, but I am not convinced that it was something David Hume wanted to stress.

The centrality of a section in the Treatise entitled 'Greatness of mind'

Given that Hume was vindicating the idea of politeness rather than due pride in section 3.3.2, it also makes sense that in other places he attempts to build such a strong case that one's self-image is dependent upon other people's opinions.[279] I will now offer a technical explanation of how politeness and pride operate in Hume's system of the mind. Of vital importance here is the contrary effect of pride and humility in accordance with the operation of sympathy and comparison.

The notion of social distance plays a notable role in Hume's system. According to the established tradition of court civility in the eighteenth century, external politeness was particularly necessary within an equal social group. Hume also believed that

278. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 598.
279. This part of the *Treatise*, where Hume makes this salient point, is 'commonly read as a mere illustration of the principles of Humean moral evaluation' instead of bearing any crucial relevance for Hume's moral theory; see Katie Abramson, 'Two portraits of the Humean moral agent', *Pacific philosophical quarterly* 83 (2002), p.305. See, for example, Mackie, *Hume's moral theory*, p.125-26. Abramson's idea is that greatness of mind is the 'all-important link between Hume's view about moral evaluation and the questions about moral motivation which dominate the rest of Book III'.

respect and deference towards superiors had more to do with a natural turn of the mind and did not necessarily need strong artificial rules in order to be activated. Thus, when a person is actually superior in rank or in some other substantial sense, the mechanism of sympathy will operate in us rather smoothly, and if we contemplate the causes that are most likely to create the passion of pride in a superior person it will also stir in us a pleasant impression. For example, a rich man will naturally deserve our esteem if he is placed above us.[280] If we do not think we are on an equal level with someone placed above us in the social hierarchy, we cannot be envious of his or her good fortune, even if in accordance with an overpowering feature of human nature 'we are every moment apt to' compare 'ourselves with others'.[281]

Meanwhile, 'a sense of superiority' creates in us 'an inclination to keep' this 'distance' from a person above us and 'to redouble the marks of respect and reverence' if we have 'to approach him'.[282] It is only natural that 'in the presence of a great man' we 'sink' in 'our own eyes' and are very sincere in our 'respect'.[283] This respect is the sentiment that we as inferiors are supposed to have, and if we do not 'observe' proper 'conduct' towards him it is 'proof' that we 'are not sensible of his superiority'.[284] Throughout the *Treatise* Hume emphasises that 'whoever is elevated' above 'the rest of mankind, must', through operation of sympathy, 'excite in us the sentiments of esteem and approbation'.[285] A person who 'can excite these sentiments' will also acquire 'our esteem; unless other circumstances of his character render him odious and disagreeable'.[286] In other words, in most cases politeness towards the people who are placed far above us comes through a natural operation of the mind, and a sentiment of humility created by the presence of a great man does not mortify us.[287] However,

280. T 2.2.5.1; SBN 357, T 2.2.5; SBN 359 and T 2.2.5.10-11; SBN 361.
281. T 2.1.6.5; SBN 292.
282. T 2.2.10.10; SBN 393.
283. T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595.
284. T 2.2.10.10; SBN 393.
285. T 3.3.4.14; SBN 613.
286. T 3.3.4.14; SBN 614.
287. T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595.

although it is natural to respect people set above us hierarchically, this is not the case among equals, which explains why Hume in his letter on politeness was so astonished that French 'porters and coachmen' were not only 'civil' towards gentlemen, but 'likewise among themselves'.[288]

For the comfortable existence of a peer group it is essential to hide sentiments of self-applause. In technical terms, external politeness (or hypocrisy, if you like) is needed because of the natural operation of comparison in Hume's system. In the presence of other gentlemen no one is elevated above others. Hume denotes comparison as an operation of the mind that can function in several ways. Even if we (as poor people) cannot be made envious by comparing ourselves to the rich man, comparison, in turn, functions as a mechanism that explains how this rich man might boost his pride. He may compare 'himself to his inferior' and receive 'pleasure from the comparison'.[289] A rich man is proud of his wealth, and confirms his opinion by comparing himself to a poor man. Nevertheless, regardless of how many comparisons he makes, a rich man's self-liking is established on thin ice if his character is not supported by (what he can take as) the approving opinion of his equals. The self-sustaining idea of comparing ourselves to our inferiors is not the primary social conjunction between pride, comparison and politeness. It is significant that Hume's idea of politeness concerned men who were not separated by a social divide. As I have suggested, this becomes clear when one realises that Hume's analysis, even if it has its merits, belongs to a certain tradition of analysing court society.

When a principle of comparison operates within a social group (with reference to pride and humility) it has a different task than among superiors or inferiors. Hume describes pride as a passion that is 'always pleasant', whereas humility, in most cases, causes a painful sensation. However, 'humility' is considered a virtue because it 'exalts' us, whereas 'pride' is a vice, because it 'mortifies us'.[290] Here he was evidently referring to

288. David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, *Letters*, vol.1, p.20.
289. T 2.2.8.12; SBN 377.
290. T 2.1.7.3; SBN 295.

the effect of the sentiment that other people seem to entertain of themselves: it is a natural operation of the mind that 'when we compare the sentiments of others to our own, we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one'.[291] In other words, if we are forced to operate through the principle of comparison, the appearance of pride in other equals will cause humility in us, whereas the appearance of humility will cause pride. 'Through sympathy', Hume explains, we 'enter into those elevated sentiments, which the proud man entertains of himself'. Sympathy denotes a mechanism by which we obtain an impression through the signs of the sentiment expressed by the other person. The point is that when we detect signs of pride, the operation of sympathy is immediately blocked and this leads to 'comparison, which is so mortifying and disagreeable'. Furthermore, 'if we observe' in a 'man, whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit' any 'extraordinary degree of pride', the 'firm persuasions he has of his own merit, takes hold of the imagination, and diminishes us in our own eyes'.[292] Again in technical terms, the idea we have of this man is not converted into an impression and we are forced to make a disagreeable comparison to ourselves, and vice versa: if we thought he had the good qualities he seemed to be so proud of it would have 'a contrary effect'. The idea would now be converted into an impression and the man's sentiments 'wou'd operate on us by sympathy' creating approval.[293] However, this does not happen often within a peer group.

Hume describes it as an 'impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men, to over-value themselves'.[294] This premise might not turn out to be such an enormous obstacle to sympathy if it only concerned the person expressing a good opinion of himself. Nevertheless, the inclination to over-value one's worth holds equally true with the interlocutor who is affected by the expressed sentiment. If he happens to over-value himself, which is very likely, it affects how he, in turn, interprets the merit of the

291. T 2.2.9.1; SBN 381.
292. T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595.
293. T 3.3.2.6; SBN 596.
294. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.

other person. Thus, what commonly happens is that a due expression of pride (whatever that might mean) still creates an unpleasant feeling, which is yet another reason why Hume was not concerned with due pride. One might conclude that usually both parties over-value themselves, and the gap between their understanding of due merit and pride is greater than expected. By and large, it is not a normal situation (in any given social framework) for the actual opinions of merit between equals to meet at a level at which sympathy rather than comparison operates. Thus, it is safe to say that instead of eulogising due pride, Hume goes on to support the idea that if people opened their hearts and revealed what they took as a due degree of pride, the result would be the unsustainable situation of a never-ending circle of humility through the natural operation of the principle of comparison.[295]

'Pride' simply 'must be vicious' because 'it causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison'.[296] Another (or rather a Mandevillean) way of expressing this is to suggest that a high degree of self-liking is a recommendable quality, but once it becomes visible to others it is called pride, which turns out to be vicious because it causes a setback for other people's self-liking. Notably, this is with reference to equals because the operation of the principle of comparison is different when the social distance is greater. The virtue of humility can only be the hypocritical appearance of humility, since the passion within is vanity, pride or self-applause (depending on which one of these synonyms for self-liking one uses). As Hume argues, 'while' sentiments 'remain conceal'd in the minds of others, they can never have any influence upon us'.[297] In other words, we approve of the sign (humility) not necessarily because we are mistaking it for a true quality, but because it causes a pleasant sentiment (pride) through comparison with ourselves.[298] In this case the actual virtue is the sign of humility,

295. T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598.
296. T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596.
297. T 3.3.2.3; SBN 593.
298. So, a theory of mistaken attribution of virtue is not a sufficient explanation for Hume's idea of moral approval. This is an influential theory argued by Mackie in *Hume's moral theory*, p.72.

and no questions about motives or real quality have to be asked. As Hume perceptively concludes, 'no one, who duly considers of this matter, will make any scruple of allowing, that any piece of ill-breeding, or any expression of pride and haughtiness, is displeasing to us, merely because it shocks our own pride, and leads us by sympathy into a comparison, which causes the disagreeable passion of humility'.[299] Hume's intention seems rather clear to me: if pride always brings pleasure to an individual and the cultivation of self-liking is the cornerstone of human existence, everyone should be able to be proud. Moreover, because other people's visible pride usually mortifies us and brings in humility, the solution is simple: we have to be proud without showing it to others. 'Self-satisfaction and vanity', he declares, 'may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character', but it is 'certain, that good-breeding and decency require that we shou'd avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show that passion'.[300] This is indeed what politeness is. Hume makes this point earlier in Book 2 of the *Treatise*, but he vindicates it much more forcefully in Book 3, 'Of morals', in which he manages to integrate it into his social and political theory.

The system of the human mind presented in the *Treatise* also has a relevant connection to flattery, another Mandevillean social concept. As mentioned, the particular feeling created by the appearance of sentiment in one's peers has a corresponding effect on one's sentiments towards them. If through sympathy we detect signs of pride, we compare this elevated idea to ourselves and cannot be but mortified, which means that our approving feelings of his character are unlikely to prevail. If, on the other hand, we detect (through sympathy) signs of humility we are exalted and are also inclined to approve the character of the person in question. What this means, as Mandeville describes it, is that in a civil society men are ready to take one step further: flattery flows like a torrent, and within a peer group members seek other members' approval through deliberate attempts to please.

At first glance it might seem that flattery was an undemanding pastime for David Hume. He describes 'vanity' as a 'passion' that

299. T 3.3.2.17; SBN 601.
300. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.

'is so prompt, that it rouzes at the least call'.[301] People are very much inclined to be proud. By the same token, it should be easy to encourage this passion in others, especially when 'nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity'.[302] Because 'self-applause' is 'always agreeable'[303] and the 'causes of pride' have almost no 'influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others',[304] would it not be more than evident that men are very pleased when flattered and also inclined to adopt this practice? According to Hume, indeed it is: 'Whoever can find the means either by his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render himself useful or agreeable to us, is sure of our affections.'[305] The human mind is a faculty that is 'easily shock'd with whatever opposes' the 'good opinion we have of ourselves' and likewise 'peculiarly pleas'd with any thing, that confirms' our self-applause.[306] Certainly, 'nothing more readily produces kindness and affection to any person, than his approbation of our conduct and character'.[307] Hume was taken by the idea that, because of certain principles of the human mind, a society of gentlemen naturally produced a self-sufficient system of exchanging 'a good office' for another – a practice that was 'agreeable, chiefly because it flatters our vanity'.[308] To put it briefly, Hume thought that to be in civilised company was always pleasing because we are 'seduc'd into a good opinion of ourselves'.[309]

To please a person is not as simple as one might think. Like any positive social practice, flattery has rules based on the operation of the human mind. Hume takes the topic highly seriously and points out that 'the praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we chiefly excel'.[310] In other words, we are only

301. T 2.2.10.4; SBN 390.
302. T 2.2.10.6; SBN 391.
303. T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
304. T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.
305. T 2.2.3.2; SBN 348.
306. T 2.1.11.9; SBN 321.
307. T 2.2.2.27; SBN 346.
308. T 2.2.3.5; SBN 349.
309. T 2.2.4.8; SBN 355.
310. T 2.1.11.13; SBN 322.

flattered when we are praised for a reason, and no single individual can much appreciate gross flattery that fails to create a plausible illusion and convince him or her that the person might actually mean what he or she is saying. As both Nicole and Abbadie point out, false flattery is one of the worst insults because it 'cloaks a most real *contempt*, under the mask of an apparent *esteem*'.[311] Hume thinks that the presence of a gross flatterer is not desirable because the signs of his sentiments do not please. Meanwhile, the gross flatterer's own opinion of himself is unlikely to be 'seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others'.[312] A vain man believes that 'every thing belonging' to him 'is the best that is any where to be found', but not even this miserable wretch can reap pleasure from praise that is not in accord with his own opinions.[313] Consequently, the self-liking of the vain man is established on just as fragile a base as the self-applause of the gross flatterer, who if he has any sense will learn through experience to regulate his behaviour so that it turns out to be more advantageous. Moreover, if the 'vain man' is a gentleman, how could it ever occur to us that he is 'a vain man' since he is able to hide his self-applause? At least in theory we cannot detect his vanity, and thus we approve of his character.

Flattery is a prime example of how the natural principles of the human mind can turn the social sphere into a self-regulating system that does not need moral philosophers to tell what is well-founded pride and what is not. All one needs to do in order to realise that a man may only advance a limited distance depending on flattery and politeness is to consider the way human nature functions in political society. Flattery, by definition, has to be based on the intrinsic worth of the attribute in question. According to Hume, 'no person is ever prais'd by another for any quality,

311. Jacques Abbadie, *The Art of knowing one-self* (London, printed for R. Bentley, 1696), p.259-60. Regarding Abbadie, see Isaac Nakhimovsky, 'The enlightened Epicureanism of Jacques Abbadie: *l'art de se connoître soi-même* and the morality of self-interest', *History of European ideas* 29 (2003), p.1-14, where the idea is that 'updated Epicurianism' forms an argument about 'genuine moral behaviour and ultimately even human moral perfection' that 'could arise from the principle of self-love.'
312. T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.
313. T 2.1.10.2; SBN 310.

which wou'd not, if real, produce, of itself, a pride in the person possest of it'.[314] The subject matter of successful flattery has to be something that is actually considered praiseworthy, and if a person is praised for a quality he does not think he possesses, or does not think the flatterer thinks he possesses, or does not consider it praiseworthy, it cannot promote his self-satisfaction to any great extent. Of course, the flattered person might be inclined to over-value himself, but even then he has to have some reason to take the praised quality as his own. Flattery has to resemble the truth at least.

These premises of the definition of flattery help to explain its social nature. The fact about human nature that confirms flattery as a sociable practice is that there is no 'original instinct' that would create 'a desire of fame'. If there were such an instinct, flattery would be anything but a self-regulating social practice because it would not make any difference whose 'opinion' was 'favourable'. In this case, all the 'opinions' of the world 'wou'd equally excite' our passions and it would not matter if the approving 'judgement' was passed on by 'a fool' or 'a wise man'. However, this is not consistent with experience. We do not have an original desire for fame, and even if 'fame in general' is 'agreeable' we 'receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those whom we ourselves esteem and approve'.[315] Not just any approval or disapproval will do. Our actions are restricted by our being utterly 'mortify'd with the contempt of persons, upon whose judgement we set some value', whereas in some cases we might even be 'indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind': hence the significance of the notions of social cohesion and self-regulating practices in Hume's social theory.[316]

The relevant point for Hume was that because of education and social pressure, most people would not choose the difficult path of trying to systematically take advantage of others and the established system. It would soon backfire and become a disadvantage because of the risk of ending up with no-one they valued

314. T 2.1.11.9; SBN 320.
315. T 2.1.11.11; SBN 321.
316. T 2.1.11.11; SBN 321.

and, in turn, no one to sincerely support their self-liking. As discussed above, if people are educated to respect established rules they will automatically experience disapproving sentiments when they see these rules being broken, regardless of the fact that they might be just as tempted to break them. As simple as it is, a person who systematically acts in a dishonest or otherwise improper manner will eventually be excluded from the group, and might end up realising that his character is no longer approved of by the people whose opinions he once admired.

On the one hand there are times when anyone might slip back to using the strategy of a knave, which is the precise reason why societies need good education and a strict system of laws regulated by government and established on a previous convention, thereby to control the ductile minds of children. On the other hand, because men are dependent upon society, the presence of acquaintances naturally restricts the behaviour of its members (even those who are more prone to knavery than others due to the operations of pride and humility, as I have explained). When these attributes are combined with real punishments regulated by government one can understand how it is possible for a civil society to grow and yet remain intact even if human nature remains as it is.

v. Government and political sociability

The evolutionary theory of artificial virtues, as noted by Knud Haakonssen, is bold and ingenious, because it explains how an elementary constituent of social life such as 'justice is a result of human activity', but is 'not deliberately constructed by men'.[317] I

317. This is one of the central points made by Haakonssen on Hume's idea of justice; see Haakonssen, *Science of the legislator*, p.20. Haakonssen also notes that this idea was 'clearly anticipated by Bernard Mandeville'; see Haakonssen, *Science of the legislator*, p.21. However, Haakonssen goes on to point out that 'Mandeville uses the idea in a rather general way, without too much attention to the details of the links between individual causes and the over-all effect. He also uses the idea mostly in an economic context'. This comment evidently derives from the common understanding of Mandeville and especially the first part of the *Fable*. As we have seen, Mandeville's evolutionary scheme and his idea of unintended causes particularly regarded the conjectural development of civil society (and justice and politeness).

would add to this observation that evolutionary theory was not only restricted to justice: both Mandeville and Hume also applied the same idea to politeness and argued that both of these moral institutions were the unintended consequences of individual human actions.[318] Having conducted a detailed analysis of the nature of both of these primary artificial virtues of justice and politeness and the passions behind them, I can now proceed to analyse the essential role of government in the conjectural history of civil society, and how political society is thought to function in the *Treatise*.[319]

First I will re-examine sympathy in the conjectural history of civil society. Haakonssen does not explicitly refer to government in his influential analysis of 'Hume's theory of justice', emphasising instead that the 'principle of sympathy' counters the problem that 'as society grows larger, the self-interested motive to observe the rules of justice grows fainter for the individual'.[320] As I see it, to omit government from Hume's theory of justice is to over-emphasise the role of the principle of sympathy.[321] Sympathy might explain how men come to hate themselves when they consider how they are judged by their fellow men if they breach the rules of justice, but this only concerns a society that already has an established government and a specific system of laws. Sympathy is not the solution to counter the faint motive to observe the rules of justice that Hume prescribes for large societies. Without analysing the role of government in the conjectural history of civil society we cannot understand how Hume thought large societies were able to function. Once a convention of justice has been formed men will – without further reflection – feel approval when observing actions that are in accordance with it, but this is not Hume's principal point. His major concern is

318. Several other perceptive accounts of Hume's social theory also miss the analogy between justice and politeness; see, for example, Christopher Berry's detailed and useful analysis of 'social cohesiveness' in the *Treatise*: Christopher Berry, *Hume, Hegel and human nature* (The Hague, 1982), p.69-95.
319. On the emphasis on 'the political' in the Scottish Enlightenment in general, see Oili Pulkkinen, 'The labyrinth of politics', p.31-87.
320. Haakonssen, *Science of the legislator*, p.33.
321. For an overall account of Hume's theory of justice that does not omit the role of government, see Moore, 'Hume's theory of justice and property', p.155-66.

that men have to observe the rules of justice in their own conduct in a large society too. Without laws enforced by government this is utterly impossible, despite the principle of sympathy. Thus, sympathy might be an important feature of the moral value of justice, but it is not the factor that enables civil society to function. It is my purpose in this section to explain, according to the *Treatise*, how to preserve peace in a large society.[322] I will argue that all the central social elements – conjectural history, self-love, self-liking and the role of an established government – have to be taken into account.

Apart from the methodological point of unintended consequences, another purpose of the conjectural scheme of a civil society is to explain how moral institutions cannot be arbitrary inventions of clever politicians, being based on previous human conventions. Hume takes particular care to prove that the convention of justice precedes laws and the established government. As a result he is able to make the point that even when 'the rules of justice' are '*artificial*, they are not *arbitrary*'.[323] He continues in the same manner, declaring that 'government, *upon its first establishment*' derives 'its obligation' from the 'laws of nature', which effectively reject the idea of an arbitrary role of the sovereign.[324] The inflexible laws prescribed by government have to be derived from a preceding convention. It is both '*natural*, as well as *civil* justice' that receive their 'origin from human conventions'.[325] It cannot be over-emphasised that, in Hume's system, moral institutions are established upon human convention in order to control certain passions. Hume stresses this point, allowing the possibility that 'men' may even 'preserve society for some time, without' a government relying on a simple convention.[326] However, this concerns only 'a small uncultivated society'.[327] Hence,

322. For a contrasting but informative contextual account of the centrality of sympathy regarding civil society in the *Treatise*, see John Mullan, *Sentiment and sociability: the language of feeling in the eighteenth century* (Oxford, 1990), p.18-56.
323. T 3.2.1.19; SBN 484.
324. T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541.
325. T 3.2.8.4; SBN 543.
326. T 3.2.8.2; SBN 539.
327. T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541.

once again, caution should prevail as far as the differences between small and large societies are concerned.

In a small, clan-based society, once the rules of justice have been established everyone becomes sensible of their own interests. The foundation of justice, self-interest, is immediately present, and on each occasion that justice is breached it is something concrete and substantial that directly concerns each member of the society. According to Hume, it is a common feature of human nature to prefer 'whatever is near and contiguous' to 'any object, that lies in a more distant and obscure light'.[328] This is a powerful principle of the human mind. Even though 'we may be fully convinc'd, that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgement; but yield to the solicitations of our passions'.[329] This premise does not create intractable difficulties in a small society because justice is directly connected to self-interest, which is continuously present. However, when the society increases in size men start to lose sight of their own interest in justice, which was prescribed as its first foundation. At the same time, it becomes inevitable that men 'cannot be associated without government'.[330]

Because of the inherent weakness in human nature, Hume notes, men might plausibly assert that 'the rules of justice' are 'sufficient to maintain any society', but it still is 'impossible for' these very same men 'to observe those rules, in large and polish'd societies'.[331] Every person educated in human society has a moral sentiment that approves of certain rules of justice. A man does not choose such sentiments, but simply feels them. A normal person will probably also pity people whose property has been violated, and demand that other people act according to the principle of justice. However, it does not follow that he would respect these rules himself (even if it is another common feature of human understanding to extend a general rule beyond its first circumstances). There is simply no other natural motive than self-interest in observing the rules of justice, and it is impossible for

328. T 3.2.7.2; SBN 535.
329. T 3.2.7.2; SBN 535.
330. T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402.
331. T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.

self-hatred and sympathy to counter the inclination to prefer what is near to what is remote until a government has been established and strict laws enforce the principle of justice. In a large society that is not run by government 'every one' turns out to be his 'own master, and violates or observes the laws of society, according to his present interest or pleasure'.[332] This is a critical statement. In Hume's system, the principle of sympathy alone is not sufficient to replace the fading motive of self-interest for justice in a large society, for without government everyone would follow his or her own interpretation of the rules of justice that varies according to the circumstances – which is virtually the same as having no justice at all. In other words, men might have a general idea of right and wrong, but are carried along by their passions and are unable to control their actions according to this judgement. This is also 'why men so often', as Hume points out, 'act in contradiction to their known interest'. A common feature of human nature is to 'prefer any trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so much depends on the observance of justice'. Once the society has become large, 'the consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counterbalance any immediate advantage, that may be reap'd from it'. For, as Hume emphasises, 'all men are, in some degree, subject to the same weakness', thus 'it necessarily happens, that the violations of equity must become very frequent in society, and the commerce of men, by that means, be render'd very dangerous and uncertain'. Furthermore, 'this quality' is not only 'very dangerous to society'; it seems that it is 'incapable of any remedy'.[333]

At this point in the conjectural history of civil society, despite general approval of actions that are beneficial to the public, there is a similar difficulty as in small societies before the establishment of the convention of justice. The rules of justice have turned out to be ineffective because there is no longer general agreement on what they mean in practice. The convention of justice is no longer the immediate interest of every member of society. Men need another impression of their own interest in upholding civil

332. T 3.2.10.2; SBN 554.
333. T 3.2.7.4; SBN 535.

society. This, again, is an unintended consequence of their experience in society. The remaining 'difficulty' is to 'find' a method by 'which men cure' this 'natural weakness, and lay themselves under the necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity'.[334] 'Once' they become aware of 'the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society' they 'naturally run into the invention of government, and put it out of their own power, as far as possible, to transgress the laws of society'.[335] They 'establish government, as a new invention to attain their ends, and preserve the old, or procure new advantages, by a more strict execution of justice'.[336]

Hume was convinced that it was impossible to 'change or correct any thing material in our nature'. We cannot remove the 'violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote', all we can do is 'change our circumstances and situation'. We have to revise the state of affairs and 'render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest, and their violation our most remote'. In a sense, we have to return to the same situation that prevailed in a small society when our interest in justice was immediately present. However, because this is 'impracticable with respect to all mankind, it can only take place with respect to a few, whom we thus immediately interest in the execution of justice'.[337] Hume reminds his audience that 'all government is plainly an invention of men',[338] instituted with a view to 'bettering their own condition'.[339] The idea is that 'the persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and their ministers, our governors and rulers' become 'indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state'. Politicians can 'have no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice'. Once they are 'satisfied with their present condition, and with their part in society' they will also 'have an immediate interest in every execution of justice, which is so necessary to the upholding of society'.[340] This is the 'origin of government and

334. T 3.2.7.6; SBN 537.
335. T 3.2.10.2; SBN 554.
336. T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.
337. T 3.2.7.6; SBN 537.
338. T 3.2.8.4; SBN 542.
339. T 3.2.9.2; SBN 550.
340. T 3.2.7.6; SBN 537.

political society'.[341] The 'execution of justice' becomes the business of government[342] and now 'men acquire a security against each others' weakness and passion, as well against their own, and under the shelter of governors, begin to taste at ease the sweets of society and mutual assistance'.[343]

Hume sees the consequences of this explicit step to a political society as far-reaching. 'The rule' that is 'absolutely necessary to human society', 'stability of possession', can finally 'serve' a specific 'purpose'.[344] Prior to the established government 'the general rule' of justice was 'apply'd by particular judgements'. Once society becomes a political society, justice is finally directed 'by other general rules, which must extend to the whole society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour'.[345] Thus, only in a political society are we governing 'ourselves by rules' that are 'general in their application' and 'free from doubt and uncertainty'.[346]

It is important to realise that Hume was redefining, rather than dismissing, the role of politicians and government in the conjectural history of civil society. In a sense, he was assigning rulers the very same role that Mandeville did in *Part II*. He is unambiguous in stating that one should not go too far in order 'to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind' and claim that politicians invent all moral distinctions.[347] Nevertheless, the role prescribed to politicians in the development of civil society is substantial. In order to understand its nature, one must first realise what politicians cannot do. It would 'be in vain', Hume writes, 'either for moralists or politicians, to tamper with us, or attempt to change the usual course of our actions, with a view to public interest'. If their task were to correct 'the selfishness and ingratitude of men', it would be impossible ever to 'make any progress'. Following entry into a political society, however, it is the business of politicians 'to give a new direction' to 'natural passions, and teach us

341. T 3.2.10.2; SBN 554.
342. T 3.2.7.6; SBN 536.
343. T 3.2.7.8; SBN 538.
344. T 3.2.3.1; SBN 501-502.
345. T 3.2.3.3; SBN 502.
346. T 3.2.4.1; SBN 514.
347. T 3.2.2.5; SBN 500.

that we can better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner, than by their headlong and impetuous motion'.[348]

The scheme of countervailing passions in political society is in the hands of the authorities. It is in the enlightened interest of the governors rather than individual citizens to make sure that everyone follows the rules of justice. In a sense, in the transformation from a small to a large society strict laws have replaced the convention of justice. Even if the laws of society are based on previous convention, it is the business of government from now on to form and execute other general rules that guarantee the effectiveness of the principle of justice, and to 'constrain men to observe the laws of nature'.[349] Particular laws are based on earlier convention, but they are also general rules in their own right. The idea that inflexible laws, to a certain extent, replace (and not only execute) the previous general rule of justice is vital in Hume's system. These new general rules serve the same purpose as the preceding convention, namely to prevent the opposition of self-interest for each citizen. The laws of justice are particular and concrete. Their execution through rewards and punishments restores the interest in justice for every individual.

For Hume, as some modern scholars have emphasised, the 'distinction betwixt justice and injustice' has two different foundations: 'self-interest' and 'morality'.[350] What one has to understand is that in a large society this second foundation, morality, is rendered effective only when there is an established government. Hume interprets the idea that a certain 'separate interest' may produce 'a separate sentiment of morality' quite freely, applying it to justice (in general), and keeping promises, allegiance and chastity (in particular).[351] This, of course, raises the question of why it could not be used for other purposes as well. It is plausible that Hume's discussion on artificial virtues in the *Treatise* concerns only moral institutions with a direct and evident connection to a corresponding passion. Nevertheless, the idea of a 'separate sentiment of morality' created by a 'separate interest'

348. T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521.
349. T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.
350. T 3.2.7.11; SBN 533. This question is, for example, the main point that David Norton makes in 'The foundations of morality', p.939-86.
351. T 3.2.10.3; SBN 554.

applies to a variety of different virtues. According to Hume's definition, anything that is useful or agreeable and that creates a certain kind of pleasant sentiment in us is a virtue, whereas anything that creates an unpleasant sentiment is a vice.

Traffic regulations would be an obvious example of artificially invented, interest-based virtue in that the rules create a morality of their own. It is easy to see how the rules are based on a previous human convention established in order to organise traffic. The convention is taken and replaced with specific regulations that vary in different countries, although their function is universal and fully in line with the preceding convention. Once we have become accustomed to specific regulations, a disapproving sentiment arises in us when we detect a sign of an action that breaches them. The cause of this disapproving sentiment is an action that breaks a specific rule (for example, ignoring a stop sign), not violation of the idea of traffic regulations in general. One could even picture a situation in which ignoring a stop sign could never hurt anyone, or be contrary to anyone's interest, but it might still create a disapproving sentiment in a bystander. It should also be noted that without considerable sanctions enforced by government it would be impossible to organise traffic in a large society, or even to get anyone to stop at a stop sign in the first place. The morality of the rule would be missing. Hence, one might ask how there could be moral sentiments towards an action if such an action does not exist (which would be the case of justice in a large society without a government). One could also contemplate the idea of a separate morality in accordance with the sentiments a traveller might have towards traffic regulations in a foreign country, where the rules and morality are different from those he is used to following.

Another example that helps to explain the idea of a moral foundation for justice concerns chess. The rules of chess create an independent morality of respect for rules. This may be analogous with the rules of justice, but fair play in chess is not part of justice (the rules of justice in the *Treatise* only cover property). The moral sentiment created in a chess player (if he is a chess player in the first place) exists independently of the further reflection that without respecting the rules it would eventually become utterly impossible to play the game, and thus cheating would be against

his own interests as a player. A cheating chess player is highly likely to disapprove of other people attempting to cheat at chess. I do not think this disapproving sentiment is necessarily relevant to the fact that the existence of the game is jeopardised if people tend to cheat: the person simply has a moral sentiment concerning the rules of chess. Thus, one could claim that these rules have acquired an independent moral foundation among chess players. Does this moral sentiment stop people from cheating? Does it motivate them? The obvious answer is: not necessarily. I see this disapproving sentiment towards cheating in a person that might cheat himself as an interesting example of how certain actions might acquire an independent moral status that affects our sentiments despite our own inclinations. Why do chess players tend not to cheat, then? For one thing, a player who is experienced enough can easily detect any such attempt. What can we infer from this? Chess is a game with good rules because it is difficult to cheat.

The separate morality of a certain action (once the action or quality has been generally approved) is something factual that creates some kind of moral sentiment in every person who is part of the society in question (society here refers to any number of people joined together). If human nature does not change, and it is virtually the same in all countries and has been throughout the ages, in every large society that is able to function there are certain moral institutions based on a preceding convention and originally established to counter certain original features of human nature. According to Hume's assumption, there will always be justice and politeness and the corresponding moral sentiments in a civil society that is able to function and last. Simultaneously, attempts to reform society based on unrealistic interpretations of human nature or measures contrary to basic moral conventions are doomed to fail. However, the real purpose of these speculations is to point out that a separate interest producing a separate morality, is a principle of the human mind that can be applied (and is applied in the *Treatise*) to several cases beyond justice. Thus, one should put into perspective the idea of the moral foundation of justice, and consider Hume's social theory from a general standpoint instead of putting too much weight on this important, although thin strand of morality.

Hume's foundational idea is that in the course of time, men will acquire an independent approving sentiment towards certain kinds of actions that have caused a pleasant sentiment because they are useful or agreeable.[352] What eventually happens is that a particular action breaks its direct connection with the preceding interest. In the human imagination it is no longer the underlying interest that concerns men, and an impression of an action is sufficient to produce a pleasant sentiment. As noted above in the case of chastity, once a certain mode of behaviour has been generally approved, not even those who are inclined to behave in a contrary manner are able to feel anything but disapproval towards other people who break this rule. A critical condition for a certain action to acquire this independent moral status, however, is that it has to be generally approved.

I have stressed the point that Hume continuously uses symmetric arguments and parallels in the *Treatise*, many of which concern the difference between small and large societies.[353] With regard to small societies, all that is needed is one example of an act of justice in order for the whole society to adopt a convention that serves their self-interest. In a large society that is not run by a government this same method reverses the trend and utterly incapacitates the principle of justice. Everyone is 'naturally carried to commit acts of injustice'. Each 'example' of injustice 'pushes' others 'forward in this way by imitation' and gives them 'a new reason for any breach of equity, by shewing' that why 'should' they 'be the cully' of their 'integrity', if they 'alone shou'd impose' on themselves 'a severe restraint admidst the licentiousness of others'.[354] Licentiousness becomes a common phenomenon in a large society that is not guided by strict laws. As noted, in small societies it was the first foundation, self-interest that kept the convention of justice intact, and as the society grew the general rules became futile. Thus, without emphasising the role of government and the replacement of the convention of

352. In the case of chastity, we have learned that men might approve of a certain general rule merely because it serves someone else's interest and they simply go along with the stream.
353. On the relevance of the size of society in Mandeville, see p.58-70, 79-81 above.
354. T 3.2.7.3; SBN 535.

justice with precise laws, it is difficult to comprehend what difference it would make that 'morality' was a secondary foundation for justice. Before they had government and inflexible laws, men had a moral sentiment concerning the rules of justice, but in a large society they are carried away by their particular judgements and inclination to break the rules. Meanwhile, the object of these moral sentiments becomes ambiguous, and men adapt them to serve their own short-term interests. Only in a situation that is as clear and obvious as the example of the two men pulling the oars of a boat can there be an actual foundation of morality in justice, and this can only be accomplished with an axiomatic system of laws. The whole point of the conjectural history of civil society is that 'rules, by which property, right, and obligation are determin'd' are 'changeable by human laws'.[355] 'Self-love is their real origin', and since 'the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to that of another', only when we have a specific 'system of conduct and behaviour' that forces 'these several interested passions' to 'adjust themselves' in a particular manner may we talk about a moral duty.[356] Thus, in the case of justice in large societies, the moral foundation in practice concerns particular, established laws and not the abstract idea of justice. It is only with regard to human laws that men have an unquestionable duty to act justly. This is also in perfect accordance with the fact that Hume was trying to establish a system based on a 'very low degree of rationality'.[357] A common man can approve of the actions that are in accordance with precise laws rather than the abstract foundation behind them. He follows (and expects other people to do so) specific rules, and might not have the slightest idea of why these rules are such as they are. This is further enhanced by the fact that 'men are mightily addicted to *general rules*'.[358] Most people are not addicted to the novel idea of justice: they are addicted to rules that tell them precisely what they can and cannot do.

Only 'after' the moment when 'interest is once establish'd and

355. T 3.2.6.6; SBN 528.
356. T 3.2.6.6; SBN 529.
357. Haakonssen, *Science of the legislator*, p.19.
358. T 3.2.9.3; SBN 551.

acknowledg'd, the sense of morality in the observance' of the rules of justice 'follows *naturally*'. Hume was apparently making the point that, in the case of large societies, this could only be accomplished in a political society. It is only with respect to particular laws that we could say that 'interest' in justice is finally 'observ'd to be common to all mankind, and men receive pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it'.[359] Given that relationships between men in large societies are complicated and sometimes obscure, only a rigid system of inflexible and universal laws restores meaning to the fact that 'we approve of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and disapprove of such as tend to its disturbance'.[360] Hume underlines this same point in Book 2 of the *Treatise,* stating that it is first and foremost the 'government' that 'makes a distinction of property and establishes the different ranks of men'.[361]

'All the rest comes on a-pace'

Hume's theory of justice has been criticised because it only concerns property and rightful ownership.[362] It has been claimed that his system does not account for the fact that there is much more to a peaceful existence in a civil society than property rights. Justice should expand to other aspects of human life, *pace* 'justice as fairness', and so on. I do not think Hume was advocating that the principle of justice should cover all the different aspects of human life: he simply did not have a positive theory of social (or distributive) justice.

Justice and property are, of course, Hume's first concern in the conjectural history of civil society presented in the *Treatise*. Once a government has been established the 'self-interested commerce of men' finally gets underway.[363] As noted, Mandeville also emphasised that 'once men come to be govern'd by written

359. T 3.2.6.11; SBN 533.
360. T 3.2.11.4; SBN 568.
361. T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402.
362. For example, James Moore sees this as a defect in his 'Hume's theory of justice and property', p.103-19.
363. T 3.2.5.10; SBN 521.

laws' and 'property, and safety of life and limb, may be secured', 'all the rest comes on a-pace'.[364] Assuming this very same tone, Hume argues that progress towards a polite society is rapid as soon as the political stage in the conjectural history of civil society is reached. Apart from restoring morality in justice by putting a general idea back into practice through the enactment of rigid and specific laws, government and politicians have other means with which to 'preserve order and concord in society'.[365] Because 'nature' has 'given us some notion of moral distinctions', 'politicians' may 'extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds'.[366] In other words, rulers mould the behaviour of citizens by setting examples and supporting certain kinds of useful and agreeable actiǫns, honourable conduct among soldiers and chastity for women being the most obvious examples. It is the effect of 'custom' that may give us 'an inclination and tendency' towards 'any action' that could never otherwise be an 'object of inclination' as long as it is not 'entirely disagreeable'.[367] For example, men may acquire an otherwise unnatural inclination to be polite towards their equals, but only after the custom of politeness has long been established.

Hume further states that 'nothing has a greater effect both to encrease and diminish our passions, to convert pleasure into pain, and pain into pleasure, than custom and repetition'.[368] This remark carries strong relativistic undertones, in that by custom virtually anything may be turned from 'pain into pleasure'. Mandeville was not entirely wrong in his initial thinking that at least some moral virtues are the result of skilful politicians moulding the passions of common men. He was just inaccurate. Hume emphasises that on 'some occasions' public encouragement may even 'produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action'.[369] Note that in the *Treatise*, 'publick praise and blame' and 'private education and instruction' are two sides of the same coin that guides the moral sentiments and actions of

364. Mandeville, *Part II*, p.284.
365. T 3.2.8.6; SBN 544.
366. T 3.2.2.25; SBN 500.
367. T 2.3.5.5; SBN 424.
368. T 2.3.5.1; SBN 422.
369. T 3.2.2.25; SBN 500.

citizens. This combined with the fact that our self-liking is dependent upon other people's opinion and we have a strong 'interest' in 'our reputation', gives some insight into how David Hume thought that political society was able to function.[370]

The progress that is set in motion through the establishment of a government is in many respects ambivalent, and the modern reader might be unwilling to take note of all the effects Hume considered important. For example, the social theory in the *Treatise* is anti-egalitarian in spirit. It is the 'government' that 'establishes different ranks of men', and it is this inequality within society that eventually 'produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in human life'. Competition further emphasises the distinction between different groups of men, and it is this effort to distinguish oneself that creates wealth, luxury and convenience. As indicative of the different ranks of men Hume makes a comparison between 'a day-labourer' and 'a man of quality': they are different in all possible respects. Their 'skin, pores, muscles, and nerves' are different and so are their 'sentiments, actions and manners'. Most evidently, 'different stations of life influence the whole fabric'. To have these different ranks is not only beneficial, but also the natural outcome of historical development. These 'different' ranks, he writes, arise 'necessarily' from the 'necessary and uniform principles of human nature'.[371]

The artificial virtue of justice in a large society has two main effects on men. First, once the laws of justice have been established they will develop an inclination through education and living in a society to respect them. Second, once accustomed to the laws of justice they will spontaneously disapprove of actions that breach them. These moral sentiments do not altogether prevent the strong temptation to be unjust. Nevertheless, because of the social cohesion created through the fact that our self-liking is dependent upon other people's opinion, it is possible to cultivate our self-interest and maintain social order, even if the

370. T 3.2.2.7; SBN 501.
371. T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402.

very passion of self-love is 'directly destructive of society'.[372] What is momentous in Hume's project is that self-love is subordinate to self-satisfaction. 'Riches' that are acquired might in many cases be the cause of vanity, but the final end is to be 'satisfy'd with ourselves', which is Hume's understanding of self-liking.[373] Furthermore, 'the relation, which is esteem'd the closest, and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of *property*'.[374] However, the cultivation of self-love and following the rules of justice could not make us satisfied with ourselves. Even if 'riches' were the 'original' cause of pride, 'when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others', they would 'have little influence'.[375] Moreover, living among equals requires flattery and dissimulation, since practically everyone has an overweaning self-conceit. Without the practice of dissimulation, mankind would not second our opinions and sentiments. It is precisely the same 'secondary satisfaction or vanity' that 'becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason, why we' desire them in the first place.[376] Self-love is secondary to pride in modern society, and, politeness, dissimulation and hiding real thoughts and feelings are unquestionably not only beneficial to us and to human interaction, but are also a relevant part of the social theory described in the *Treatise*.

In short, the secrets to a well-functioning civil society are due respect for other people's property and pride, while enjoying one's wealth and vanity. The principal role is hence given to long-term public and private education, which concretely shapes our understanding of good and bad, and right and wrong, with a minimal level of reflection. This in turn shapes what we appreciate in other human beings and what they value in us. The role reserved for any situational moral distancing is minimal in this outlook.

372. T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.
373. T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297.
374. T 2.1.10.1; SBN 309.
375. T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.
376. T 2.2.6.21; SBN 365.

5. Epilogue

Why self-love and self-liking? Why justice and politeness? Because this offers a framework with the least number of necessary principles explaining how a large, anonymous society with multiple sets of values can function. It puts the emphasis on the most important attributes all human beings should secure in a political society: self-preservation and self-esteem. One must also realise that Mandeville and Hume were constructing their anatomist outlooks on morals in a different manner than later attempts based on the conception of human rights and Kantian ideas of dignity.

Hume uses this Mandevillean paradigm in his *Essays* and his *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*. Its clearest implication in a single passage is where Hume states that 'the *sentiment* of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of man's own conduct and character' is 'the most common of all others', yet it 'has no proper name in our language'.[1] Not only does Hume use precisely the same words that Mandeville used when introducing his concept of self-liking, he also carries on in a footnote, explaining that

> the term, *pride*, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumstances which accompany it. The French express this sentiment by the term, *amour propre*, but as they also express self-love as well as vanity, by the same term, there arises thence a great confusion in Rochefoucault, and many of their moral writers.[2]

1. EPM Appendix 4.3; SBN 314.
2. EPM Appendix 4.3 n.66; SBN 314. Some scholars argue that a crucial feature of pride in Hume's moral theory is that it is founded on praise-worthy qualities (in other words, they put a strong emphasis on 'well-founded' pride). I don't think that this is Hume's own intention and at this point I would again put more emphasis on 'circumstances which accompany' pride than the idea of it being well-founded. For a discussion of this, see p.216-18, 222.

Mandeville's definition, in morally neutral terms, is that self-liking is the cause of pride, but only when 'excessive, and so openly shewn as to give offence to others' is it called pride. When it is kept out of sight it has 'no name', even when men act 'from that and from no other principle'.[3] The reason Mandeville gave for calling this passion 'self-liking' was simply that it had 'no Name', although it was 'a palpable Passion in our Nature'.[4]

According to Hume, this sentiment arises specifically from 'the endowments of courage and capacity, industry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies' that some might call due reasons for pride.[5] Artificial principles can make a compelling outward appearance of greatness, but they do not guarantee strength of mind, Hume reminds his readers.[6] 'Strength of mind' is 'a steady adherence to a general and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage'.[7] Greatness of mind, on the other hand, is mainly 'a disposition or turn of mind, which qualifies a man to rise in the world'.[8] Hume's point is that we ought not to think that people with certain 'mental excellencies' and the ability to rise in the world necessarily have real strength of mind. This is one reason why Hume's discussion on greatness of mind should not be confused with the common usage of magnanimity from Aristotle onwards.

The point is brought home if one considers Hume's treatment of ancient 'heroes in philosophy', who are often thought to have accomplished 'undisturbed philosophical tranquillity'. In *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*, these philosophical heroes are put on the same level as the Scythians 'scalping their enemies'.[9] It is just another 'branch' of self-denial, which in essence is 'extravagant and supernatural' and not different from the feverish cour-

3. Mandeville, *Origin of honour*, p.3.
4. Mandeville, *Origin of honour*, p.14.
5. EPM Appendix 4.3; SBN 314.
6. EPM 4.13-14; SBN 209 and EPM 6.15; SBN 239. On greatness of mind, see also Donald Livingston, *Philosophical melancholy and delirium: Hume's pathology of philosophy* (Chicago, IL, 1998).
7. EPM 4.1; SBN 205.
8. EPM 6.29; SBN 246.
9. EPM 7.14; SBN 255.

age of the ancients.[10] It is the ones who think they are justified who tend to be the greatest nuisances in the world.

A related and crucial issue is that throughout his œuvre Hume raises the objection that self-rule is a futile topic in politics. For example, describing the Stoics in *Essays* he remarks that when 'we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we are *philosophers*' and 'when we have reduced these rules to practice, we are *sages*'.[11] What is left unsaid, and what makes this ironic, is that self-rule rarely applies to real life, and the act of putting the rules of conduct into practice falls within the sphere of politics. As Hume famously declares, in politics 'every man ought to be supposed a *knave*'.[12] What is therefore required is a political structure based on a realistic understanding of human nature, quite the opposite of the society of Zeno's sages. The basic principle of any political system is the assumption that people remain just as foolish as they would without the right 'forms and institutions'. This does not mean assuming that everyone necessarily is a knave, but it does mean that talking about self-rule as a political principle is unproductive.[13] Hume's overall point is that people do not cultivate attributes such as 'philosophical tranquillity' in 'modern times' as part of their character. Instead, the 'administration of government' has had its influence and 'a degree of humanity, clemency, order' and real 'tranquillity' has been distributed, even among the vulgar, together with justice and politeness. To Hume, this was true 'compensation'.[14] Nevertheless, it is quite usual to see Hume linked to Stoicism. Peter Jones has emphasised the Ciceronian aspect in Hume.[15] Here Hume's remark to Hutcheson that he takes his catalogue of virtues from *De officiis* instead of *Whole duty of*

10. EPM 7.18; SBN 256. For Stoicism in eighteenth-century Scotland, see M. A. Stewart, 'The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish Enlightenment', in *Atoms, 'pneuma' and tranquillity*, ed. M. J. Osler (Cambridge, 1991), p.273-96.
11. Hume, 'The stoic', in *Essays*, p.149.
12. Hume, 'Of the independency of parliament', in *Essays*, p.42.
13. For a fresh argument that 'Zeno's *Republic* and the Cosmopolitan tradition' are in fact grounded in similar principles, see John Sellars, 'Stoic cosmopolitanism and Zeno's *Republic*', *History of political thought* 28 (2007), p.1-29. By and large, I think we have good grounds for dissociating Hume's political theory from ideas about morality as self-governance.
14. EPM 7.18; SBN 257.
15. Peter Jones, *Hume's sentiments: their Ciceronian and French context* (Edinburgh, 1982).

man has become a powerful rhetorical tool – although it does not necessarily imply that we need to go very far with this argument, because Hume contrasts his view quite sharply with Cicero (especially regarding manners).[16] James Moore makes a different case of Hume's link to Cicero, simply underlining Hume's admiration of *De officiis* in contrast to Hutcheson's view of moral sense.[17]

What this also means is that modern 'greatness of mind' and certain 'mental excellencies' should not be too heartily applauded as a quality of a particular individual. Hume's most mature presentation of the subject is included in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*. The partly ironic treatment of Alexander, the Macedonian madman, as an epic illustration of greatness is only implied in the *Tréatise*, whereas Hume consciously reveals the shallowness of this type of greatness. The 'supernatural courage of Alexander', that he also referred to in *Enquiry concerning human understanding* was based upon an extraordinary degree of frantic pride in a similar manner to Stoic heroes of philosophy.[18]

Hume's attitude towards the relationship between natural and artificial virtues changes from the *Treatise* to the *Enquiry*. In the former he treated natural affection and other natural virtues more or less indifferently, although it was crucial for the sake of the argument to maintain their existence. As I have shown, the principal function of natural virtues was to reveal man's confined generosity, which in a way conflicts with artificial virtues that enable a civil society to function. A clear change in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* is that Hume now treats natural virtues in a more positive light, although he still points out that 'we are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends' even when we 'are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct'.[19] He does not discuss the difference

16. Also Fred Wilson, 'Hume's cognitive Stoicism', *Hume studies* 10 (1984), p.52-68 follows Jones.
17. James Moore, 'Utility and humanity: the quest for the *Honestum* in Cicero, Hutcheson and Hume', *Utilitas* 14 (2002), p.365-86. See also John Valdimir Price, 'Sceptics in Cicero and Hume', *Journal of the history of ideas* 25 (1964), p.97-106. For a comprehensive and useful account of the context of Stoicism and Hume's anti-Stoic sentiments, see Brooke, *Philosophic pride: Stoicism and political thought from Lipsius to Rousseau*, p.149-81.
18. EHU 8.8.
19. EPM 3.13; SBN 188.

between the natural and the artificial as a direct contrast (which is still implied, however). Furthermore, he no longer discusses *de facto* natural virtues, but uses the term 'social (and softer) virtues'. Justice is still presented as coarse, but instead of stressing the partial role of natural virtues, he now implies that the real significance of social virtues is that they function as a balancing force in human nature. Nevertheless, as he points out, his 'present business' was not 'to recommend generosity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms of the social virtues'.[20]

Hume divides the section on 'greatness of mind', which discusses politeness as artificial virtue in the *Treatise,* into sections 7 and 8 in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*. As he sums it up in the Dialogue, his concern was the 'four sources of moral sentiment', which were 'the useful or the agreeable qualities; to those which regard self, or those which extend to society'. Note here the enthusiasm Hume put into his analysis of politeness. The first paragraph of section 8, 'Of qualities agreeable to others', summarises the importance of the distinction between self-love and self-liking in David Hume's moral and political philosophy:

> As the mutual shocks, in *society*, and the oppositions of interest and self-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of *justice*; in order to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection: In like manner, the eternal contrarieties, in *company*, of men's pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules of GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an undisturbed commerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected: Contempt of others disguised: Authority concealed: Attention given to each in his turn: And an easy stream of conversation maintained, without vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness for victory, and without any airs of superiority. These attentions and regards are immediately *agreeable* to others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies: They conciliate affection, promote esteem, and extremely enhance the merit of the person, who regulates his behaviour by them.[21]

20. EPM 2.4; SBN 177.
21. EPM 8.1; SBN 261.

The argument of politeness presented in the *Treatise* is retained and even enhanced in the *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*, described as the epitome of agreeableness. In the end, even if Hume's position became more mature and the explicit distinction between natural and artificial virtues faded into the background, nothing really changed. It was the question of self-liking and politeness that still played the main role in his ideas of civil society, together with self-love and justice.

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